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Flying the red flag? Communists in the NUM, 1945-85. 
The thesis seeks to analyse the industrial strategy of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CP) 
within the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). Although many historians have discussed 
the CP’s industrial work, particularly in the pre-1945 period, this thesis is original because 
there is not yet a detailed study of the party’s work in the NUM between 1945 and 1985. The 
thesis also aims to make an intervention into post-war political history more generally, 
beginning its coverage in 1945 with the election of the first majority Labour government, at a 
time when both the party and the mining industry had high hopes for the future. The research 
concludes in 1985, after the miners’ strike, when both the NUM and the CP were irreparably 
divided.  The thesis works within two overarching paradoxes: firstly, that the CP was believed 
to be ubiquitous in industry, yet weak elsewhere. Secondly, that the party ultimately imploded 
as a result of factionalism, which arose because of the industrial strategy that the CP had spent 
most of the post-war period adhering to.  
Moreover, the thesis makes four original contributions to knowledge. The work uses the 
historical method, drawing on empirical evidence from archives in Salford, Manchester, 
Warwick, Kew, London, Swansea and Barnsley, along with secondary evidence and interviews 
with protagonists, to construct a chronological analysis of the events; this, in addition to the 
scope of the work, is an original methodological contribution to knowledge. The second 
contribution discusses the relationship between the CP and communists in industry; although 
this has been discussed in the existing literature, the thesis adds more evidence to this through 
a detailed analysis of this specific period within the NUM. The thesis also offers the findings 
as a hypothesis for observations about the party’s industrial strategy generally, considering how 
the results of this study might be applied to other industries. The third original area is the theme 
of conflict across three groups: particularly, concerning the relationship between individual 
communists in the union; the party itself and communists in the union; and communists in the 
NUM and the union itself. The fourth area of originality derives from the thesis’s detailed 
analysis of wage militancy in the union across this period, a focus yet to be explored in any 
depth.  
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I Communism and Coal. 
1.0 The End 
The year is 1991 and, sat around a table in an inconspicuous-looking canteen, the three old 
ladies chatting over their sausage and chips would not have looked out of place in the local 
bingo hall. Their topic of conversation, however, was a wistful depiction of the type of fanciful 
socialism that had propelled the CP through its formative years and had somewhat sustained it, 
at least in part, through subsequent periods of strife. But fanciful optimism had run its course; 
the ladies were, somewhat dutifully, delegates to the party’s 43rd Congress and taking a break 
from the heated debates about what, if anything, was salvageable from the shipwreck of British 
communism. The 43rd Congress, unlike its 42 predecessors, was not looking forward to the 
future; instead, it was planning the end of the party. One of the ladies, 89 year old Rose 
Kerrigan, attempted to take stock of the situation but in fact managed to articulate one of the 
main reasons why the entire project was doomed from the off, saying that: ‘the Soviet Union 
….well, it’s been a big disappointment in a way, but I don’t blame them entirely for that, I 
think it’s the fact that the whole world was against them’.  1 Bob Horne venerated the utopian 
idealism that had blinded the party and prohibited its evolution, arguing that ‘they seem to have 
overlooked the fact that, although we were a small party, we were very influential’. 2  
But some party members were more realistic about the situation; one delegate took to 
the rostrum to announce that ‘we have failed miserably in recruitment, to understand new 
conditions….we have failed’. 3 This view emanated from the CP’s first (and, as it turned out, 
only) female general secretary, Nina Temple. The party had been in long-term decline, Temple 
told the delegates, and some form of salvation might only be found through an honest reflection 
on the party’s history, which would mean ‘unambiguously condemning positions that the party 
took in trying to justify the unjustifiable’.4 There was, Temple conceded, no historical 
inevitability for the CP; she then opened the vote that would make the decision to form the 
                                                          
1 Rose Kerrigan was the widow of Peter, industrial organiser from 1951-66. Rose Kerrigan died in 1995, but had 
decided against joining the Democratic Left, although she had been in the CP since 1921; in the documentary, at 
least, she appeared remarkably sanguine about the situation. A documentary film crew filmed the Congress for 
the 1992 documentary, ‘Short and Curlies’. It is available to view in three parts on YouTube. 
2 See ‘Short and Curlies’. Bob Horne was one of the founders of the CP of Scotland, which by 1998 had 
managed to get around 360 members.  The assumption is that the ‘they’ that Horne mentions were the 
modernising wing of the party, those associated with the Eurocommunist/Gramscian perspective.  
3 See ‘Short and Curlies’.  
4 Hopkins, S, ‘The CPGB and Moscow’, Labour History Review, 57:3, Winter 1992, 25.  
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Democratic Left, which thereafter failed to recognise itself as a political party. 5 How did a 
party, which burst out of the Second World War confident that it could secure a position for 
itself politically, find itself in this situation? In no small way, the failings of the party’s 
industrial strategy was a critical factor. Ironically, the industrial politics that the CP spent much 
of the post-war period believing in would be the trajectory to the 43rd Congress; exactly how 
this happened will now be addressed.  
1.1 Being British Communists 
The 43rd Congress was in some ways an inconspicuous end for a party that was once 
perceived to be ubiquitous and nefarious, to the extent that its industrial interventions 
attracted the attention of Harold Wilson. 6 Wilson, delivering a speech to the House of 
Commons in the wake of the 1966 seaman’s strike, warned that: 
The CP, unlike the major political parties, has at its disposal an efficient and disciplined 
industrial apparatus controlled from the CP headquarters…it may be because of the political 
impotence of the Communist party that it has sought expression in industrial organisation... but 
Hon. Members would delude themselves if they imagined that there was not a most efficient 
organisation on the industrial side, that it has not got fulltime officers ready to operate in any 
situation where industrial troubles are developing.7 
 
Wilson was on to something with his observations regarding the party’s general weaknesses, 
although he was by no means an astute pioneer of this critique. The CP was consistently weak 
in its function as a political party and it only ever had two elected MPs at the same time: Phil 
Piratin was the communist representative in Parliament for Mile End, Stepney for five years 
and William (Willie) Gallacher was the party’s MP for West Fife for fifteen years.8 But both 
were removed for good by the electorate in the 1950 general election. 9 Even the party’s general 
secretary could not secure electoral victory; whilst Harry Pollitt lost the Rhondda East 
constituency seat to W.H Mainwaring by a fairly respectable 972 votes in 1945, in 1950 Pollitt 
again lost, but this time by a substantial 22,182 votes. 10 The party also struggled to recruit and 
retain members: although membership had grown to 56,000 people in 1942, largely as a 
reaction to Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, the reactionary support of the British 
                                                          
5 The result of the vote was: Democratic Left (124); CPGB (71); Democratic Socialist Party (10); and 2 spoilt 
papers. See ‘Short and Curlies’.  
6 Wilson was British Prime Minister from 1964 to 1970 and 1974 to 1976. 
7 Wilson, Harold, The Labour Government 1964-70: a personal record, (London: 1971), 237. 
8 Branson, Noreen, The History of the Communist Party of Great Britain 1941-1951 (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1997), 207. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Gildart, Keith, North Wales Miners: a fragile unity, 1945-1996, (Dyfed: University of Wales Press, 2001), 43.  
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population for communism soon waned and by 1945 11,000 of the new recruits had already 
left the party. 11 Certainly these perennial weaknesses worried the CP, but they were able to 
attribute their electoral impotence on the two-party system, which they claimed was designed 
to ‘deny expression to emerging parties’.12 John Gollan, the party’s general secretary from 
1956-76, was able to use the ‘consistent advance of communist influence and support in the 
trade union movement and the workshops’ as evidence that communists were frozen out of the 
electoral arena, not because nobody wanted to vote for them, but because of first-past-the-post 
system, a structural barrier which the CP was powerless to overcome. 13 
The picture was not entirely bleak, however, and for a large portion of its existence the 
party could point to its industrial strategy as an area where it was apparently strong; indeed, 
Wilson’s attentions must have provided the party with a sense of omnipotence, an impenetrable 
feeling of kudos. As John McIlroy claims, ‘for much of its history, the CP saw trade unions as 
the primary arena for political intervention’. 14 At the party’s National Industrial Conference 
in 1947, for example, the delegates were reminded that ‘we must appreciate that in this country 
the party’s influence has always been predominantly in industry’.15 Willie Thompson, a 
historian and former party member, argued that the industrial strategy was essential because 
the CP ‘had nothing else going for it’. 16 Even Margaret Thatcher realised that ‘the communists 
knew that they could not be returned to parliament, so they chose to advance their cause by 
getting into office into the trade union movement’. 17  
The historian Henry Pelling, writing before the CP archives were freely available, noted 
the apparent paradox that ‘the success of communist penetration of the unions was especially 
remarkable by contrast with their abject failure at the polls’. 18 But the situation is not as strange 
as Pelling would have us believe; as McIlroy has pointed out, the price that the CP paid for 
using its most able industrial militants to build factory branches was its political position, and 
                                                          
11 Thompson, Willie, The Good Old Cause: British Communism 1920-1991 (London: Pluto, 1992), 218. For a 
discussion of the reactionary nature of British party membership see Thorpe, Andrew, ‘The Membership of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain 1920-1945’, The Historical Journal, 43:3, 2000, pp 777-800. 
12 Gollan, John, The British Political System, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), 82. 
13 Ibid. 
14 McIlroy, John, ‘Notes on the CP and Industrial Politics’, in British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: the 
high tide of trade unionism, 1964-1979, (Kent: Ashgate, 1999), 216. 
15 ‘Report of the NIC’, 5 January 1947, 4, CP/CENT/IND/10/07. 
16 Thompson, Willie, The Long Death of British Labourism: interpreting a political culture, (Pluto: London, 
1993), 56. 
17 Thatcher, Margaret, The Path to Power (London: Harper Press, 1992), 205. 
18 Pelling, Henry, The British Communist Party: A Historical Profile (Adam and Charles Black: London, 1963), 
137. 
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it was simply not large enough to cover elections, membership growth and an industrial strategy 
across several unions. 19 But this argument assumes that the CP as a political unit was 
proscriptive, and also successful, in its industrial interventions. Moreover, communist 
penetration of the unions was believed, by the party, to be a much more prudent path to their 
objective than relying on the electoral system. Nonetheless, this is a much more convincing 
explanation for the situation than the one offered by the historians James Hinton and Richard 
Hyman, who assert that the CP simply collapsed into ‘a politics of militant reformism’ because 
it tried to shape itself into a ‘mass revolutionary party’ at the time when conditions in Britain 
were not conducive to this.20 Hugo Dewar, himself an academic writing from a more critical 
Trotskyist position, points out that by the CP’s formation, in 1920-21, the ‘heart had gone out 
of the industrial rank and file movement’ but the CP looked to their failure to progress ‘either 
numerically or in terms of influence’ as the result of the organisational structure of the party. 
21Whatever the reasons for it the truth was that the CP, a political party and not a syndicalist 
organisation, was able to appear industrially potent. This chapter intends to give a brief 
historical overview of the CP in Britain, considering particularly the trajectory of the industrial 
strategy, before exploring its significance in the mining industry. The questions that must be 
addressed are: firstly, what was the CP’s industrial strategy and what did it aim to do? Secondly, 
where did it come from? Thirdly, why was it considered so important? Finally, how was the 
strategy perceived by communists and observers?  
1.2 The industrial strategy. 
In the post-war period, the principles of the CP’s industrial strategy always remained the same; 
this statement can confidently be applied until the mid-1970s, when the primacy of the party’s 
industrial strategy was challenged by the neo-Gramscian/Eurocommunist (‘modernising’) 
group within the party. The fact that this strategy did not particularly evolve or develop is not 
especially surprising; almost from its inception in 1920, the CP sought no haste in the 
achievement of the ultimate objective. As such Harry Pollitt, the party’s general secretary for 
most of the years 1929-56, had not worried about the gradualism of the strategy and, taking his 
lead from the Communist International (CI), he had no need to; the key, the CI believed, was 
                                                          
19
 McIlroy, John, ‘Reds at Work: Communist Factory Organisation in the Cold War, 1947-56’, 
Labour History Review, (Vol 65, No 2, Summer 2000) pp181-199, 191. 
20 Hinton, James and Hyman, Richard, Trade Unions and Revolution: the industrial politics of the early British 
Communist Party, (London: Pluto Press, 1975), 51. 
21 Dewar, Hugo, Communist Politics in Britain: the CPGB from its origins to the Second World War, (London: 
Pluto, 1976), 23. 
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to ‘work persistently and tenaciously’ to ‘capture all official posts’ in whatever industry was 
being targeted. 22  
 But there was not always consistency with the strategy and in the pre-Second World 
War period there was clear evidence of the mutating application of the CP’s industrial politics. 
In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution the British Bureau, which was linked to the Red 
International of Labour Unions, hoped to form ‘militant industrial organisations’ by the 
creation of ‘industrial solidarity on the basis of class struggle’ in order to create the chances of 
‘social revolution’. 23 From 1924 the Minority Movement was an attempt to form organisations 
against the official leadership and it moved away from communist efforts to construct or 
advocate a national rank and file movement. 24 The pre-1945 strategy was believed to be pliable 
in its application largely because communists believed that trade unions could be changed from 
defensive organisations to offensive ones and become ‘organs of attack against the capitalist 
system as a whole’. 25 This was particularly the case during the Third Period, with its aggressive 
‘class against class’ policy, where the party’s work in trade unions was expediently geared to 
‘revolutionary mass work within the reformist trade unions’. 26 The subsequent Popular Front 
was a more conciliatory stage of industrial activity. The party’s subsequent wartime pro-
production position and support for the first majority Labour government of 1945 ended with 
the onset of the Cold War and, by the late 1940s, the CP’s industrial strategy focused on two 
tiers of the trade unions.  
The post-war industrial strategy was, theoretically, fairly simple. At the top of the 
unions, the party’s industrial strategy envisaged that communists would be elected to leadership 
positions in numerically strong or influential unions. 27 Within the unions, the party intended 
to ‘work for the election of accredited communist officials as officials and delegates to 
conference’. 28 This is, as the existing literature concurs, the area through which the CP 
                                                          
22 ‘Instructions for Communist Fractions in workers’ organisations and bodies outside the party’, 21  February 
1924, from Jane Degras’ edited volume, 66, available at: 
http://marxists.anu.edu.au/history/international/comintern/documents/volume2-1923-1928.pdf 
23 Red International Labour Unions, British Bureau, October 1921, CP/CENT/IND/11/12. 
24 McIlroy, John and Campbell, Alan, ‘Organising the Militants: the Liaison Committee for the Defence of 
Trade Unions,1966-1079’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 37:1, pp1-31, March 1999, 4. 
25 Darlington, Ralph, Syndicalism and the Transition to Socialism, (Kent: Ashgate, 2013), 206. 
26 ‘The Position of the MM and its Immediate Tasks’, 4, CP/CENT/IND/11/01. For a full definition of the Third 
Period, see Worley, Matthew, ‘Class against Class: the Communist Party between the Wars’, (London: IB 
Tauris), 2002. 
27 Callaghan, John, ‘The Plan to Capture the Labour Party and its Paradoxical Results, 1947-91’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 40:4, 2005, pp 708-725. 
28 Callaghan, John, Rajani Palme Dutt: a study in British Stalinism, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1993), 50. 
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appeared to be the most successful; by 1975, for example, Tony Cliff of the Socialist Workers’ 
Party (SWP) was able to comment that ‘for a long time, the main industrial strategy of the CP 
has been to win official positions in the trade union hierarchy’. 29 How much of Cliff’s 
assessment was drawn from theoretical and strategic disagreement is unclear, but Francis 
Beckett points out that the British CP enjoyed a greater level of trade union influence than the 
Trotskyists could ever hope for. 30 At the bottom of the union structure, the CP believed that 
rank and file members should be politicised, largely through wage militancy. Whilst there is 
no definitive definition of exactly what this was, the Oxford English Dictionary defines 
‘militant’, and its derivative ‘militancy’, as  ‘favouring confrontational or violent methods in 
support of a political or social cause’. 31 With the exception of a violent methodology, which 
the party formally abandoned from 1951, the above definition will be used to understand the 
militancy around wages that the party believed would have politicising consequences. John 
Callaghan points out the broad appeal of wage militancy, from the Leninist perspective, seeking 
revolution at the point of production, to the ‘labourist’, who merely wanted ‘a fair day’s pay’. 
32  
For the bulk of the union membership, the rank and file, the party also believed that 
communist trade unionists could use ‘bread and butter issues’ as a stimulus to initiate ‘action 
on current political issues, while explaining what was wrong with capitalist society’ and of 
course offering  answers about how socialism could be achieved. 33 In this spirit, one party 
guide suggested that ‘every factory must be our fortress’ and claimed that this objective might 
well be achieved if communists were to ‘apply the general line of the party in a way that solves 
the concrete problems facing the workers’. 34 The CP believed that politicisation was 
achievable through (often work-based) propaganda, much of which was presented through the 
Daily Worker, the party’s newspaper formed in 1930. Ideally, the newspaper should be sold to 
curious workmates or, at the very least, the astute communist might produce it for some break-
time reading. The idea was that workers, on their breaks, might access party material in an 
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informal, non-political environment. Another succinct method of politicisation were the party-
produced A4 sized guides, which the diligent communist might strategically place in a 
prominent position in the factory after he had read it. For the more interested comrade, or the 
prospective recruit, educational courses were offered. 35 The party’s own rule book from 1948 
made it clear that the party’s aim was ‘to achieve a socialist Britain’ and in this spirit the CP 
compelled every member to ‘belong to and assist in the work of his/her appropriate trade 
union’. 36 Party members were also expected to make an effort to promote the CP to all fellow 
workers, but especially those who might not be unionised. 37 Overall, the party’s industrial 
strategy was of critical importance to its ultimate ambition.  
The CP was not particularly innovative in these tactics and the party’s prototype for 
success was Russia, where Lenin had proved that ‘exposure literature’ had created ‘a 
tremendous sensation’; but had, more importantly, assisted with the ‘widespread development 
and consolidation’ of the Russian workers. 38 Therefore the CI required its members and their 
factory cells to ‘distribute political literature in the factory’. 39 Hinton and Hyman have argued 
that the focus that the CP placed on industrial politics was unique; they claim that the Socialist 
Labour Party, from which some original CP recruits were drawn, was the only other left 
organisation before 1920 to place importance on industrial activity. 40 These observations go 
some way to explaining why the CP believed itself to be indispensable amongst the British 
working class. Willie Gallacher made this point in 1924, noting that ‘no man or group can 
represent the workers or endeavour to carry forward the workers’ struggle without following 
the leadership of the Communist Party. For the Communist Party is the political party of the 
workers’. 41This view transcended the party and one of numerous examples, taken from a party-
building guide in the early 1950s, instructed that ‘the CP MUST be linked with the working 
class, as an inseparable part of it- hence the emphasis of the party on building organisation in 
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the factories’.42 Students attending branch education meetings in 1952 could expect to learn 
that the CP’s role in the labour movement was to give it ‘a socialist consciousness, a theory 
and perspective of advance to socialism…only the CP can do this…..it will never happen 
spontaneously’.43 Communists were encouraged to ‘never miss an opportunity for a sale’; 
leaving a ‘complimentary copy’ of a document with the branch secretary ‘with the offer of a 
speaker’ was suggested as one way to do this. 44 This expectation transcended all ranks of the 
CP. Practically, of course, the best place to find the working class was in the ‘place where the 
workers work’ 45and it was suggested that, to maximise the party’s chances, ‘everyone in a 
leading position’ within the CP should have ‘the closest possible contact with the masses’. 46 
Historians have agreed that the CP was always much better at capturing leadership 
positions rather than politicising the rank and file of trade unions. McIlroy argues that this part 
of the CP’s strategy was weak, purely because it was content to work diplomatically with trade 
union officials ‘as a substitute for their recruitment to the party’. 47 One explanation for this is 
that trade union work offered a career structure, including for communists, who rose through 
the ranks of the union to this position by their militancy, but then once in official position 
‘succumbed’ to this role. 48 Beckett has observed that, by the start of the 1980s, the CP had lost 
control of trade unions. 49 Callaghan has argued that, during the wave of politically-peppered 
strikes from 1966-74, it was unlikely that the CP could have stopped the support for wage 
militancy even if it had wanted to. 50McIlroy and Campbell take the view that the CP was 
chasing the tail of the grass roots militants. 51 But if the strategy worked, warned one party 
dissident in 1952, then it had the potential to become the ‘the most important political weapon 
in the armoury’ of the CP. 52  But ultimately, as Eric Hobsbawn pointed out in 1975, the CP 
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had been unable to harness this militancy with any political capital; this had been the entire 
point of the strategy, as we will see.53  
1.3 The Labour Party  
What was the ultimate purpose of the party’s endeavours? The whole point was to put the party 
in a position where it could dominate trade unions, particularly large and influential ones, who 
had block votes at the Labour Party annual conference. 54 The communists’ rationale was that 
it would only be possible to get progressive policies onto the national executive of the Labour 
Party if unsympathetic trade union leaders were replaced by communists.55 The CP believed 
that if it had influence in the unions, and moved them in a ‘progressive’ direction, then it could 
influence the Labour Party’s policies; ultimately, and eventually, the communists hoped to 
engage in some sort of influential relationship with Labour. As J.R Campbell, the editor of the 
Daily Worker, put it: trade unions who were affiliated to the Labour Party could send delegates 
to the annual conference, who could then ‘fight for the adoption of a progressive policy for the 
advance to socialism’. 56 Therefore, in 1961, one party critic was able to write with accuracy 
that the CP was so bothered about its industrial efforts because of the significant role that unions 
had in forming Labour party policy. 57   
 Although the CP ultimately hoped to influence the Labour Party via the trade unions, 
they also had to address the fact that Labour already had a ‘unique structural link’ with the 
unions.58  This was a different structure to Russia but the CP remained optimistic, mostly 
because they believed that there was a fundamental flaw with this relationship, and because 
Lenin had decided the CP’s disparaging view of the Labour Party, noting that it was ‘a 
thoroughly bourgeois party…led by reactionaries and the worse kind of reactionaries at that’. 
59 The party constantly evidenced Labour’s ‘reformism’ in order to strengthen its own 
indispensability, leading Gollan to conclude in 1954 that the problem with the Labour Party 
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was that ‘they are in a political coalition with the conservatives, they act as servants of 
monopoly capitalism’. 60 
The hardest part of the strategy would be to build up enough of a presence in a union 
to get CP-sponsored resolutions moved by the union at the Labour Party annual conference. 
Once this had been achieved, the CP would be well on the way to influencing trade unions; any 
decisions made at the conference had to be carried by the party’s National Executive 
Committee. 61 The annual conference was the engine room of the Labour Party; the party itself 
described it as ‘the fountain of authority. It declares policy and elects the NEC, which is 
responsible to the whole movement for carrying out all phases of activities’.62 As Lewis Minkin 
has noted, ‘hence, in theory, decisions arrived at under the control of the dominant union votes 
determine the policy of the party in all the spheres of its operation.’ 63  
Communists believed that the Labour Party was incapable of moving to the left of its 
own volition. McIlroy notes that the party felt that its industrial strategy was the only way to 
radicalise the Labour party, which could be done through a potent brew of ‘left unity and 
industrial militancy’. 64 But the issue was that the Labour Party refused to dance to the 
communists’ tune. As Callaghan asks, ‘who would ally with an organisation claiming a 
monopoly of truth and openly swearing its determination to crush its rivals?’ 65 This problem 
should have been obvious, and as the years passed the CP constructed ever-more imaginative 
ways to engage with Labour, and Labour responded with ever-more draconian ways to freeze 
the CP out.66 Ironically, as Russia suggested ways that the British CP might work with the 
British Labour party, it was precisely because the CP was guided by the Comintern that the 
party had found itself facing bans and proscriptions from the Labour party from its inception.  
The genesis of this strategy was again Russian. Despite his dismissal of the Labour 
Party’s socialist credentials, Lenin realised that in order to avoid isolation, the early CP should 
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affiliate with the Labour Party; 67 but on the condition that the CP could enjoy ‘free and 
independent communist activity’.68 The CP were certainly not in any position to dictate the 
mechanics of any potential relationship. The CP’s first attempt at affiliation, in 1920, failed 
and another attempt, in 1922, did not fare any better. It was rebuffed by Labour at its annual 
conference, by 3,086,000 votes against and with only 261,000 in favour, on the grounds that 
‘the basis of affiliation to the Labour Party is the acceptance of its constitution, principles and 
programme, with which the objects of the CP do not seem to be in accord’; thereafter, the cycle 
of communist attempt, and Labour rejection, was to become an on-going occurrence. 69 Despite 
communist protests that these limitations were an attack on ‘democratic rights’ Labour’s 
patience with the CP’s enduring affiliation efforts had run out by 1946, and it was made clear 
that any further attempts would be a waste of the communists’ time. 70 Any attempt to build 
communist strategy from within also proved to be unpopular; for example, in 1925 2,870,000 
Labour Party members rejected the possibility of communists having dual membership. 71 Any 
attempt at forming a coalition also failed. Despite the CP’s effort of writing a ‘special political 
letter’ to all party members in July 1945,72 which pushed for the need to form a coalition with 
Labour, by 28 August 1945 the CP itself had admitted that it had miscalculated the chances of 
any coalition. 73  
Therefore history had proven, by the mid-1940s, that affiliation and coalitions were 
impossible strategies for the CP-Labour relationship. There was also an historic example of 
why the CP could never pursue another option, the sort of entryism that Militant Tendency 
would later adopt. In the 1922 general election the CP had gotten two of its members, Shapurji 
Saklatvala and Walton Newbold, elected as Labour Party MPs; but the Zinoviev Letter in 1924, 
with its allegations of communist subversion, served only to get the CP barred from standing 
its members as Labour candidates to Parliament. 74 This did not stop Pollitt wistfully trying to 
find a solution, though, and in 1953 he believed that ‘if our party was much stronger, then it 
could smash the bans and proscriptions and the way could be found to develop unity between 
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the Labour Party and the CP.’ 75 Thompson summaries the party’s assessment of the Labour 
Party: 
The Trade Union milieu formed the connecting link between the CP’s industrial and political 
strategies, as it not only represented power at the base of industrial society but also disposed of 
votes at the Labour Party conferences and in the selection of parliamentary candidates. The CP 
identified right-wing dominance in the leadership of the Labour Party as the major obstacle to 
a rapid radicalisation of the latter’s political outlook and purposes. It saw in the replacement of 
that leadership the preconditioning for creating a united left that would be capable of isolating 
and defeating the power of monopoly capital and initiating the transition to a socialist Britain. 
76 
 
1.4 Building British Bolsheviks.  
The inspiration for the CP was the Russian Revolution of 1917, which ‘brilliantly confirmed 
Lenin’s theory of the party’. 77 Moreover, the events in Russia acted as an immense source of 
encouragement to the oppressed in Britain; Harry Pollitt remembers how the event ‘sent a thrill 
of excitement through every revolutionary worker,’ and reassured him that ‘the knowledge that 
workers like me… had won power…kept me in a growing state of enthusiasm’. 78Lenin 
subsequently formed the Communist International (CI) in January 1919 and it was the CI that 
officially directed the various British groups to ‘drop their differences’ and form a united party. 
79 The aim of the CI was, quite simply, ‘to promote proletarian revolution on a world-wide 
scale’; moreover, as the world Communist Party, it envisaged that national parties would be 
sections of it. 80 
The events in Russia had a strong appeal in Britain, where the significant industrial 
militancy between 1910 and 1916 had failed to produce any tangible change.  Disappointed 
would-be-revolutionaries such as Rajani Palme Dutt, the future editor of Labour Monthly, 
commented with some frustration that collective bargaining in industrial relations was a 
reformist strategy, which served only to make the ‘best of a bad bargain’ and was ‘based on 
assumptions that are indefensible’. 81 The events in Russia were a catalyst for trade unions 
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being viewed as more than syndicalist associations. 82 Certainly there was no mass support for 
syndicalism by the early 1920s, either within the nascent CP or outside it. For British socialists 
the success of Leninism had proven that revolution would not be based on a cataclysmic general 
strike as advocates of syndicalism, such as Tom Mann, had predicted. Instead, argued Lenin, a 
strike might have been a ‘school of war’ but it could only be fully effective in causing broader 
changes if it was accompanied by the development of class consciousness. 83 The crux of the 
point was that the growth of class consciousness through trade unionism could only be fulfilled 
by the growth of political party, which would create and sustain it. 84 Lenin had said that ‘class 
political consciousness can be brought to the workers only from without, that is, only from 
outside the economic struggle, from outside the sphere of relations between workers and 
employers’.85 
The formation of the CP, therefore, was the manifestation of these developments and 
the obvious prototype of success guiding it was the Bolsheviks/Communist Party. As such, 
events in Russia would be the inspiration for early British communist industrial interventions.86 
History has recorded the horrors of Russia, but this should not blight an appreciation of the 
hope that the nascent British CP had. To British communists, quite plausibly, Russia was an 
untainted example of their ideology’s success.  Nina Fishman has suggested that these 
pioneering British communists simply ‘did not study the implications of democratic centralism 
nor the dictatorship of the proletariat’. 87 But there was no reason why when the CP was 
working out how to build British revolutionaries that the party’s relationship with its Russian 
father might be ever problematic; only from 1956 would this change, at least publicly. Even if 
astute observers had worried about the direction that Stalinism would take, it is probable that 
little could have been done about it; both the party and its membership were structurally bound 
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to accept all ‘directives and decisions’ of the communist strategy, and their ambitions for the 
dominance of their politics in Britain ensured that they were obliged to support it. 88  
By 1922, this relationship was further solidified in the party structure by Dutt’s report 
at the Fifth Party Congress, which bound the CP to Lenin’s Twenty-One Theses; the end 
product of this link was a strong organisation, cemented by democratic centralism. 89This 
strength, Dutt believed, could ‘organise the entire working class movement for the struggle’ 
and, in this spirit, industrial advisory groups were formed to coordinate the party’s work in 
specific industries and trade unions.90 By 1937 Arthur Horner, president of the Miners’ 
Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) and one of the founders of the CP, was able to report that 
‘the CP organises the advanced workers in a disciplined, revolutionary organisation’. 91Dutt 
saw the point of the CP’s work in trade unions as working to ‘transform them into mass 
organisations of the revolutionary struggle under the leadership of the party’. 92 Lenin’s 
argument that only a revolutionary party and not a trade union could bring about revolution 
had seen to that. This was an idea that would be constantly sustained by the party, even decades 
later. For example Gordon McLennan, Gollan’s successor, noted in 1977 that ‘it is not the task 
of the trade union movement to lead the political struggle for the transformation of society. 
This is what the political parties of the working class do…the most fruitful source of conducting 
the struggle for political and socialist consciousness amongst trade unionists is in the 
workplace’; hence the need for a ‘revolutionary party organised at workplace level’.93Party 
education guides, therefore, had always been keen to tell eager learners that ‘Lenin started from 
the basis of the need to prepare for revolution- not merely a voting party, but one that organised 
and led the masses in action’. 94  
 Marxist ideology now had a functioning methodology, Leninism, which had been 
proven to work, at least in Russia, and the British CP had to find a way to apply it. Callaghan 
has argued that the British CP adopted the principles of their industrial strategy from Lenin, 
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who had recommended ‘the capture of working-class organisations of every type’. 95 Although 
Lenin had envisaged that the revolutionary lead should come from the party, trade unions could 
potentially impede the struggle, and as such must not be ignored. Lenin had warned that trade 
unions needed an ‘unremitting struggle’ waging against them because, as ‘reformist’ 
organisations, they were ‘appendages of the bourgeois state inside the workers’ movement’. 96 
In Left Wing Communism: an infantile disorder, Lenin had addressed how this problem may 
be overcome, instructing potential revolutionaries to  ‘carry on communist work within 
them...whilst you lack the strength to do away with bourgeois parliaments and every other type 
of reactionary institution you must work with them’. 97Therefore the Cl, guiding its 
international militants, suggested that ‘it remains a condition of all party organisational activity 
that the centre of gravity is to be shifted to the establishment of factory cells to making them 
the foundation of the entire party organisation’. 98At its Fifth Congress in 1924, the CI could 
not have been more direct about the point of communist factory work, and the implications of 
getting it wrong:  
A Communist party that has not succeeded in establishing a serious factory-committee 
movement in its country….cannot be regarded as a serious mass communist party...no 
communist party will be in position to lead the decisive masses of the proletariat to struggle 
and to defeat the bourgeoisie until it has the solid foundation in the factories, until every large 
factory has become a citadel of the communist party.  99 
 
Therefore, the CP did their best to do the above in Britain; the party’s seventh congress in 1925 
repeated the CI’s line from the previous year, saying that ‘organisation on the basis of factory 
groups is the characteristic and specific form of Bolshevik organisation, in distinction from the 
organisation of the reformist parties’. 100 Like the sustained need to enact change through a 
political party, the emphasis on trade unions also remained pivotal to the CP’s thinking. One 
1955 guide, for example, suggested that the party should ‘organise the vanguard at the point of 
production- the factory is the best centre for the mobilisation of the working class’. 101 One 
party member writing in 1961 suggested that trade unions were ‘indispensable basic 
organisations, which protect not only the immediate working class interests, but which will 
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also play a major role in bringing socialism to our land’. 102 Although the root ambition 
remained the same, the way it was conveyed changed to reflect the contours of the party’s 
position in Britain, particularly after 1951 when the party formally abandoned the revolutionary 
struggle. 103 Vic Allen, a party member and academic heavily involved in the miners’ union, 
could in 1981 cryptically suggest that trade unions had a ‘duty to prepare the way for a 
qualitative change by education and propaganda’; the ultimate change being ‘structural’ 
changes in society.104 This was a much more subtle line than the 1924 instruction, when the 
point of communist factory cells was to take ‘the lead in in the struggle of the working masses 
for their daily needs, the factory cell should guide them forward to the struggle for the 
proletarian dictatorship’.105  
1.5 Perceptions of the strategy and party responses   
To those concerned about the development of communism in Britain the party’s industrial 
strategy was cause for alarm, and many observers were keen to discuss it. Ironically, although 
the party was never secretive about its politics, it was often perceived to be ‘infiltrating’ unions. 
These accusations were always a ‘slander’ that the party was quick to repudiate and, 
particularly after the Second World War, the CP was keen to present itself as the very epitome 
of British democracy.106 The party continually responded to these observations by being 
transparent in their union interventions; the entire point of the strategy was to build the party’s 
presence in the unions, and so being subversive would be futile. In July 1929, for example, 
Pollitt was publicly keen to demonstrate ‘why we work inside the unions and how we are 
getting a foothold inside them’.107 By 1955 Pollitt had reminded party members that they were 
obliged to ‘set an example’ in their trade union work; that they should uphold democracy within 
the unions by their willingness to ‘stand for periodic elections’; and that they should strive to 
be ‘the best leaders’ in their trade union work.108 The CP’s own educational guide from 1959 
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acknowledged that ‘the CP does not deny that it endeavours to influence the policy of the trade 
unions’. 109 
But the party’s open approach did not stop the accusations about its intentions, 
particularly prevalent during the Cold War. Sir Percival Griffiths, a former Indian civil servant, 
saw three purposes to the CP’s industrial strategy. The first had a theoretical basis: ‘the 
proletariat is to be the Marxist army’; the second was practical as ‘unions count for a great deal 
in the formation of the policy of the Labour party’; and the third was Soviet-prescriptive; 
‘Soviet foreign policy demands that that communists should be able to hamper industrial 
production in industrial production in the democratic countries’. 110 Such concern was 
embedded amongst even respected organisations, and in 1949 the Trade Union Congress 
(TUC) claimed that:  
Leaders of the CP have never regarded the trade union movement as a means of organising 
workers for either the protection of those workers, or to improve their standard of living. The 
so-called ‘intellectuals’ of the CP regard trade unions as being instruments for the development 
of ‘mass struggle’ to be used as a means of seizing political power. Once political power is 
achieved, then political power will be snatched away.111  
 
These concerns were substantiated by a network of dissidents, who were keen to tell anybody 
who would listen what the party’s illicit tactics were. Bob Darke, a former councillor for the 
party in Hackney, suggested that the party ‘acts like a mole’ and that it infiltrated the unions 
subversively. 112 Vic Feather, the future general secretary of the TUC,  noted how communists 
at one branch meeting wasted enough time to make sure that the last bus was about to leave, 
which allowed the election of a communist to the union’s annual conference. 113 Eric Wigham, 
in his 1961 analysis of what was wrong with the unions, was particularly concerned about the 
‘rise’ of communists in the NUM; he worried that wage militancy, designed only to further the 
communist concern with the policy of the Soviet Union, forced non-communists on the left 
into militancy, to try and curtail the CP’s power. 114 The extent to which these sort of claims 
damaged the party on the ground is negligible; trade unionists were mostly able to separate 
their local communist leader from Russia and its increasingly associated tyranny. For example 
William Pearson, of the Durham Miners’ Association, was able to ‘give credit where it is due’ 
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noting that although ‘the Soviet Union was a dictatorship’, the communists that Pearson 
worked with ‘are the most disciplined in our movement, and have worked very hard for a 
number of years in fighting the cause of the worker’. 115  
1.6 Perceptions of Strength  
By the 1970s the perception of the party’s industrial strength was often noted, amongst both 
the party and observers: the extent to which this had any accuracy will be considered 
throughout the thesis. Interestingly, however, boasts about the CP’s potency in industry always 
emanated from those within the party, rather than party members who were actually situated in 
workplaces and unions. Bert Ramelson, the party’s industrial organiser from 1965-1977, 
believed that ‘the CP can float an idea early in the year. It goes onto the trade union conferences 
in the form of a resolution and it can become official Labour Party policy by the autumn. A 
few years ago we were on our own, but not now’.116 In 1970, Ramelson had no qualms about 
boasting to The Times that ‘we’ve never had a greater influence. Our ideas are getting generally 
accepted after a shorter and shorter period’. 117Gollan was delighted to see the wave of 
militancy that gripped British industry between 1966 and 1974, scribbling in his private notes 
that the quantity of strikes was evidence that the party’s industrial efforts ‘had started to see 
fruit late 60s and early 70s’.118   By 1974 Dave Priscott, the party’s Yorkshire district secretary, 
also believed that the CP had been the catalyst for the Labour party’s move to the left, seeing 
the party as ‘the ‘decisive factor’ in the success of ‘left policy resolutions’ at the Labour party 
conference, the success stemming from the party’s work in trade unions. 119  
It was not only the communists who believed themselves to be in control in the factories 
and workplaces of Britain and by the early 1970s many newspapers had begun to comment on 
the extent of the communist penetration of the unions. The Financial Times believed that 
‘communists within the union are making an open attempt to wreck democracy. Of course there 
are no “reds under the beds” now, because they are all openly stating their views in public’.120 
The same newspaper also claimed that four specific regions of the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM), South Wales, Scotland, Derbyshire and Kent, had been ‘communist 
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strongholds for years’.121 Following the 1974 election, the right-wing ‘Aims of Industry’ group 
warned that the communists wanted to ‘destroy the system under which we live’. 122The News 
of the World reported that Ramelson was keen to ‘foster strikes and strife’ and that this was 
extended to encouraging unions to ‘walk off the job’ in pursuit of other unions’ grievances.123 
The Daily Telegraph worried that ‘the CP is leading extremists in their attempt to penetrate 
trade unions, manipulate industrial power and overthrow the democratic system’. 124  
 
The perception of communist strength in Britain’s unions even became a matter of 
concern for the Catholic Church; Cardinal Heenan urged Catholics in unions to attend all 
branch meetings because ‘the militants never miss a meeting’. 125 Concern about communist 
union activities also transcended the two dominant political parties, somewhat ironic when 
Labour was the subject of the communists’ endeavours. Norman Tebbit, a member of Margaret 
Thatcher’s cabinet between 1981 and 1987, suggested that the conservative’s defeat in the 1974 
general election was the result of ‘a tiny minority of communists and leftists trying to overthrow 
a legally elected government’. 126Nigel Lawson, also in Thatcher’s cabinet and the Secretary 
of State for Energy, painstakingly listed communist shop stewards and members of union 
executives in The Times, in the process inadvertently giving the communists more kudos than 
their rivals by saying that ‘Trotskyists are insignificant amateurs, compared with the highly 
organised and well-entrenched Moscow-inspired CP’. 127 Wilson viewed Ramelson as ‘the 
most dangerous man in Britain’. 128 It is worth briefly pausing to reflect on this comment; the 
industrial organiser of what was by all accounts a politically weak party was held to be the 
most dangerous man in the country by the Prime Minister of Britain. For both the party and its 
concerned contemporaries, there appeared to be no better breeding ground for communists in 
industry than in the NUM.  
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1.7 The CP and the NUM  
The NUM was in many ways an exceptional example, and so it provides a good case study 
through which to explore communist industrial politics. The conditions of the industry, which 
have been well-documented already and so do not need repeating here, theoretically created 
the ideal breeding ground for the kind of politicisation that the CP hoped to achieve. 129The 
structure of the industry could be viewed as a case-study of all that Marx had said; men toiling 
in a dangerous, demanding job, often for low pay, whilst the industry’s network of private 
owners profited. 130 The evidence suggests that were was, theoretically, plenty of potential for 
the ideology of communism to be intoxicating to the miners; in 1924 for example, 1,400 
colliery owners owned Britain’s 2,481 pits and, because just 323 owners monopolised 84 
percent of the total output, job insecurity was rife. 131 This weakened miners’ chances to do 
much about their situation. Of course, the CP was constantly able to compare this situation with 
the more congenial and civilised situation of Soviet miners. But the situation of the British 
miners presented opportunity for the CP’s industrial strategy and, just three years after the CP 
had been formed, the party reckoned that the miners were the ‘most advanced section of the 
working class’. 132 By 1925 the party noted the particularity about the mining industry that 
might give rise to support for communism and a factory building guide suggested that:  
Their conditions are bad, and obviously bad. They are largely free from the distracting 
influences of the cities. Their time is not so broken up, as it is with workers who live in the big 
cities, by the long journeys and the many varieties of amusement the big cities provide….their 
minds are more fallow. The fact of exploitation is very obvious to them….the pits themselves, 
provide opportunities for instance contact and the development of the sense of solidarity 
amongst them. 133 
 
The general strike of 1926 rapidly, if temporarily, swelled the party’s membership from 4,900 
members to 11,271 by the end of the strike. 134 Moreover, although this figure had decreased 
to 9000 members by January 1927, by March 1927 the CP could still count more than half of 
its total membership as being drawn from mining; in Tyneside for example 86 percent of the 
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district’s members were miners. 135 Thus the Comintern recognised this disproportion as a 
potential area for growth and instructed the CP to correct this balance by recruiting in other 
‘basic industries’. 136 The CP enjoyed a strong presence across the industry before it was 
nationalised; the United Mineworkers of Scotland (UMS), a CP-led dissident union, had 3,000 
members and was the area in which Abe Moffat cut his teeth. 137In South Wales Arthur Horner 
was the President and also Chairman of the South Wales Miners’ Federation (SWMF) from 
1936. 138 The CP-mining relationship was not just confined to the big names of the industry; 
some leaders of the South Wales Miners’ Unofficial Reform Committee joined the party when 
it was formed. 139  
The sense that mining was crucial to the CP achieving its objective remained after the 
Second World War and by 1945 the industry had the second-highest number of block votes at 
the Labour party conference. 140 Moreover, by 1947, Horner could say that the miners had a 
‘high political consciousness’. 141 The industry, nationalised in 1947, had an exceptionally high 
unofficial strike rate; in the first 11 months of 1965 there were 700 strikes.142 Although eighty 
percent of these unofficial strikes were confined to three coalfields, they were damaging and 
between 1956 and 1962 they had cost the National Coal Board (NCB) £25 million in lost coal. 
143 The strikes also spread quickly and increased rapidly, from 1,637 in 1951 to 2,365 in 
1952.144Along with South Wales and, later, Yorkshire, it was in Scotland where much of this 
unofficial militancy was concentrated in the post-war period. For example in Scotland between 
April 1947 and April 1948 there were not enough days in the year to accommodate the area’s 
374 unofficial strikes. 145 The miners’ willingness to strike, albeit unofficially, indicated that 
there was discontent but, to be effective in the way that the CP wanted, this militancy needed 
to be harnessed effectively; there was no national strike in the industry between 1926 and 1972. 
The problem was that this was grassroots militancy, lacking the organisation or support from 
                                                          
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Jupp, The Radical Left, op.cit., 179. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Fishman, Communists in the Coalfields, op.cit., 93. 
140 Howell, David, ‘Shut your Gob! The trade unions and the Labour Party’, in A Campbell, J McIlroy and N 
Fishman, British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: the post-war consensus, 1945-64, (London: Ashgate, 
1999), 119.  
141 Horner, Arthur, ‘Coal and the miners’, Labour Monthly, January 1947, 14. 
142 Allen, Militant Trade Unionism, 102. 
143 Joint National Negotiating Committee Digest of Mr J Crawford’s Reply to the Claims of the NUM for 
Increased Pay and Shorted Hours, 17 January 1962, 1, CP/CENT/IND/12/10. 
144 Heinemann, Margot, ‘Mines and the Coal Board’, World News and Views, Vol33, No 20, 23 May 1953.  
145 ‘Scots’ Miners’ Chief Hits Out At Warmongers’, Daily Worker, 9 June 1947. 
33 
 
union leaders to become national. Moreover NUM officials, including communists, enjoyed 
good relations with NCB officials until the late 1960s; Will Paynter, general secretary of the 
union between 1959 and 1968, considered that he and Horner were both ‘good friends’ with 
Jim Bowman, chairman of the NCB between 1956 and 1961. 146 
The NUM provides a good case study through which to analyse the CP’s post-war 
industrial strategy for four main reasons: the first is that by 1945 communism had something 
of a historic a presence in the industry, particularly in Scotland and South Wales; the second is 
that mining was an industry where the party was perceived to be both ubiquitous and nefarious; 
thirdly, mining had particular structural difficulties that might show how the party could adapt 
its strategy; and finally, both the CP and the mining industry ended the Second World War in 
a position of optimism, but by 1985 both were irreparably divided. The NCB started the first 
day of 1947, when the industry was formed, presiding over 1,000 pits and 700,000 miners.  147 
Nationalisation also achieved what the CP had been continually trying to implement in mining; 
the NUM was, at least in name, a single union. 148 One of the CP’s biggest criticisms of the 
MFGB had been that there was a lack of unity; a ‘far-reaching reconstruction’ was needed, 
which would mean that ‘there must be a general levelling process, until every worker in the 
industry can become a direct members on the same terms, whether he lives in Scotland, 
Yorkshire, Wales or Kent’. 149 The perceptions of the CP’s influence and presence in industry, 
which was outlined above, is more surprising because of the change that it represents. By 1968 
the NUM was ‘the model Marxist-Labour alliance’.150 But in the early 1950s, as Michael Crick 
recounts, one pioneering communist in the NUM struggled to get anybody to second his motion 
supporting nurses’ pay rises. 151 Frank Watters, the CP’s industrial organiser dispatched to 
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Yorkshire in 1953, arrived to find no ‘cohesive left organisation’, and in fact a left that was 
completely isolated and only three communists on the 136-delegate area council. 152  
Coalmining also provides an excellent case study through which to study the CP’s 
strategy because from being the embodiment of Attlee’s post-war ‘new dawn’, just ten years 
later the industry was in severe financial difficulty, with a five million pound drop in profit 
between 1956 and 1957. 153 One of the questions that this thesis will address is how the party 
adapted its industrial strategy to reflect this changing context. The human impact of the 
contraction was brutal and between 1958 and 1961 130,000 men lost their jobs, whilst 
numerous others migrated to more buoyant industries; it needs to be remembered that this was 
an industry that, just a decade earlier, was suffering a crippling recruitment shortage.  154By 
1964 the unemployment situation was serious enough for Abe Moffat to note that, were it not 
for the compulsory retirement and migration that the NCB had implemented, then the 
unemployment in the mining industry would ‘be back at the level of the hungry thirties’. 155 
But it was not just unemployment that threatened to undermine the cohesion of the 
national union; structural problems added to this. Even when it was nationalised the union 
lacked any genuine sense of unity, largely retaining its autonomous and federal nature, and it 
was split across some 20 areas. 156 The union’s complex pay structure also made the CP’s 
attempts to use wage militancy effectively difficult, as it required unity. Wages in the industry 
were based around a pit basic and also a complex price list, with additions or deductions, piece 
rates, and allowances for ‘special conditions’.157 In 1952, when a commission was set up to 
investigate the pay structure of coalmining, 6,500 different jobs were found, all similar in 
nature but with slightly different titles. 158  The CP had been pondering how to overcome this 
problem since the early 1920s, when district wages’ boards determined the wage settlement for 
each coalfield, making national action difficult to achieve. 159But, as we will see in more detail 
in chapter four, nationalisation did not resolve this perennial problem; in April 1953, for 
example, Pollitt was able to point out that Durham miners earned three shillings more per shift 
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than their colleagues in Scotland and Lancashire, despite the area producing less coal. 160 In 
the Armthorpe strike of 1955 Doncaster ‘flying pickets’ travelled to West Yorkshire to show 
their colleagues how poorly paid they were, only to find that the West Yorkshire miners were 
actually worse off.161  
1.8 Self-identification  
There was obvious potential for conflict for those individuals who occupied the dual role of 
CP member and trade unionist; where, if pushed, did their loyalty lie? Paynter identified 
himself and Horner as trade unionists before communists and dealt with any potential conflict 
by ‘acting as a communist who has accepted that his primary obligation is to the interest of the 
union and its members’. 162 Communists often chose their union duties before party careers; 
Horner, for example, replaced Pollitt as CP industrial organiser in October 1925 when Pollitt 
and others were imprisoned, but he relinquished this position in favour of his election to the 
SWMF Executive shortly after. 163 This meant that, whilst their communist politics was often 
not a barrier to their union work (although it did provide opportunities for criticism), it also 
meant that their politics was largely inconsequential. Thus even when individuals like Bert 
Wynn from Derbyshire left the party, his defection was, by all accounts, barely recognisable in 
his trade union work, allowing him to continue to enjoy amicable relations with communists in 
the area. 164   
Communists knew that the NUM membership, to whom they were ultimately 
accountable, could remove them: Jock Kane, the erstwhile NUM executive member from the 
Yorkshire area, found this out to his cost when he was removed from his lodge branch for 
opposing strike action. 165 There is an element of cynicism regarding communist trade 
unionists’ intentions that has been suggested in the existing literature; Dewar believes that, 
more than just being in step with the union machinery in terms of policy decisions, even 
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communists were motivated by the fact that sitting in the union office was better than going 
down the pit and so were likely to dilute their own politics if it made them accountable to the 
members, on whose support their seat in office depended. 166 The extent to which this was true 
is of course difficult to measure: but men like Horner and Paynter were noted for their integrity 
and some, such as communist dissident Lawrence Daly, remained working miners even when 
they occupied high-level union office. It was often the harsh environment of mining that often 
instilled in erstwhile communist trade unionists their politics.167 Through their experiences, 
they entered the union to advance the position of the workers that they represented, and their 
political convictions provided further evidence of why the need to change the miners’ position 
was necessary. This was particularly the case with the first generation of mining communist 
trade unionists, many of whom experienced blacklisting following the general strike: Kane was 
forced to move to Yorkshire from Scotland as he was unemployable after 1926. 168  To the CP, 
however, the dominance of an individual’s union position was not a problem. Pollitt 
commented that ‘when Abe Moffat spoke at the United Mineworkers of Scotland (UMS) 
congress it was a good statement from a miner, but not a political statement from the party’. 169 
The reason why the party realised it was shrewd to let trade unionists prioritise this position, 
without detriment to the party, was that members of the party’s industrial department were 
chosen for their ‘communist understanding of the work as a whole’, not because they were 
experts about any particular industry. 170  In the middle, designed to link these two groups, were 
the party organisers, men like Watters, who identified himself as a ‘professional revolutionary’. 
171  In theory, the CP had structured itself with a strong and loyal union base, supported by a 
dedicated and directed party unit. But in reality, the impact of this organisation was that 
communist trade unionists were more knowledgeable about particular industries than their 
communist leaders in King Street.172 The CP could not have been alert to this problem, 
however, because they took their lead from Russia, whose leaders instructed: 
WHEN OUR PARTY MEMEBERS BECOME TRADE UNION OFFICIALS THERE IS A 
TENDENCY TO SOMETIMES SAY: ‘NOW THAT YOU ARE A COMMUNIST TRADE 
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UNION OFFICIAL YOU MUST DO AS WE LAY DOWN, AND EVERY PART OF OUR 
POLICY MUST BE PUT INTO OPERATION. Comrades, this is an impossible attitude 
towards trade union officials who are Communists. We must not put the comrades in an 
impossible position. This attitude will lose influence for the Party. If a comrade’s influence as 
a trade union official is to be at least practical value, he has to keep himself down on the earth, 
and be practical. He must deal with the things that the workers want, leading them step by step. 
As we try to influence the Left trade union official towards Communism, so the Communist 
union official must try and influence the rank and file and Left officials towards Communism 
by practical steps. We have to be very flexible with our policy, we have got to be tolerant, 
because every worker does not reason alike. THE WORKING CLASS ARE NOT 
NECESSARILY THINKING AS COMMUNISTS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY ARE 
PREPARED TO ELECT COMMUNISTS TO OFFICIAL POSITIONS. A COMMUNIST 
TRADE UNION OFFICIAL, LOADED UP WITH DETAILS, WHO EVEN DRIFTS AWAY 
FROM THE PARTY LINE, SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED BECAUSE OF THIS ALONE 
AS A HOPELESS RIGHTWINGER. 173 
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II Literature Review 
2.0 Studying the CP and the NUM 
Chapter one broadly outlined the historical context of the CP, before considering the rationale 
for choosing the NUM as a case study. There are clear similarities between the CP and the 
NUM. Although 1945 brought reasons to be optimistic about the future, by the 1980s both 
organisations had imploded into civil war, largely the result of profound differences of strategy. 
As a historical topic there are also similarities, and historians of both organisations have in 
some ways been compelled to defend the organisation that they are studying.  Peter Ackers, 
particularly, has rejected the claim of many scholars, who say that the industrial relations of 
the coal industry has been over-worked.174 When the industry was nationalised on ‘Vesting 
Day’ (1 January 1947) the NCB became Europe’s biggest employer.175 Therefore the history 
of the NUM is a nucleus of many various currents, which affected many people in various 
ways. This review of the existing literature adopts a thematic approach, and is intended to be 
broad. It also purposefully excludes some areas which have been read in the preparation of this 
thesis, but have been deemed at the periphery of this research area. For example, I have 
excluded the literature around the ‘New Left’ and 1956, and the intricate divides within the 
party from the later-1970s.176 I have also excluded the broader histories of the NUM, 
particularly those which include discussions of the social and cultural history of mining, and 
the strike.177 
2.1 Why communist history?  
This is perhaps a more difficult question to answer; the CP was never anywhere near the size 
of the NUM. But the CP warrants historical attention because it encapsulates many currents of 
modern British history and, as Kevin Morgan has put it, the study of the party provides ‘a 
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window onto British society’.178  In some ways, perhaps the interest in British communism is 
generated because of what it did not, rather than what it did, achieve. Harriet Jones’s imagery 
of the party as a ‘Marxist dog that didn’t bark’ is in many ways an accurate perception. 179 The 
43rd Congress, which was mentioned in chapter one, was a disappointing end for what was, as 
Callaghan has noted, ‘the most important political phenomenon of the twentieth century’; 
although it was noted for ‘its monsters, rather than the monsters that it set out to slay’. 180  Is 
there a morbid curiosity associated with studying the CP, a party that was known to have 
disintegrated after just 71 years of existence, arguably leaving little in the way of a tangible 
legacy to British politics and society? A.J.P Taylor suggested so, arguing that the study of CP 
history is something of a ‘bizarre fascination’, beyond which ‘none of it mattered’. 181 At their 
most derisory, the party’s critics could dismiss the CP as ‘an insect of little consequence’; but, 
as we have seen, even hostile observers such as The Times perceived the communists to be a 
‘continual menace’ industrially. 182  
We have already established the perceptions of the party’s industrial presence in chapter 
one; is this, then, the motivation, perhaps even justification, for the scholarly attention that is 
out of proportion to a party that was perennially on the fringe of British politics? John McIlroy 
and Alan Campbell have suggested that the CP occupies a place in history only because of its 
trade union work.183 There is certainly a clear paradox to be explored, of a party that appeared 
to be disproportionately strong in one area of its work, yet weak in all others.  As Andrew 
Thorpe has argued, membership levels are ‘one of the key criteria that can be applied to test 
the vitality or otherwise’ of a political party. 184  The CP’s membership only ever improved in 
reactionary circumstances, and then only briefly; for example, during the General Strike and 
also in response to the Nazi’s invasion of the Soviet Union.  But, as we have seen, the CP’s 
presence in industry allowed it to claim that it dominated unions, and thus that its industrial 
strategy was working. But it was not until the mid-1990s that historians began to suggest that 
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more work needed to be done on the CP’s industrial efforts. As Nina Fishman stated, the party 
often attracted attention from ‘mainstream’ historians only when there was an event of 
significance, such as a protracted strike; all historians, Fishman argued, have ignored what the 
CP was doing in industry in the ‘troughs and lulls’. 185 The need to dig into the history of 
communists in trade unions was also accompanied by a need to explore contemporary labour 
history: writing in 1999, McIlroy and Campbell suggested that trade unionism between 1945 
and 1979 warranted further examination. 186  
2.2 Ownership of the communist past  
The party’s attempt to retain the jurisdiction of its own history is significant; its attempt to keep 
tight control demonstrates its paranoia around its self-image. The 1957 History Commission, 
formed in response to the demand of the party’s Historians’ Group following the events and 
mass exodus of 1956, ordered the writing of the party’s history. 187 But Pollitt was in principle 
opposed to any history of the party ‘prior to its attainment of power’ and Dutt was concerned 
about the potentially inflammatory nature of the documents necessary to write a history of the 
party. 188 A history of the CP potentially gave ownership of the party’s past to historians, rather 
than the party leadership; it represented a loss of control, in some ways. Perhaps the concern 
was that, should it relinquish control of its own past, it may impede its own future. Reflecting 
these concerns, the first volume of communist history was produced in-house, ensuring that 
the party could censor its own past. James Klugmann, the party’s official historian and the 
editor of Marxism Today, was commissioned to produce an account that was, according to 
Martin Jacques, Klugmann’s successor, ‘essentially narrative, descriptive and often 
celebratory’. 189 Eric Hobsbawn, himself a historian who was also in the CP, was less 
diplomatic, suggesting that the work was not befitting of an ‘extremely able and lucid man’, 
suggesting that Klugmann was ‘paralysed by being both a good historian and loyal 
functionary’. 190 But Klugmann was in an almost impossible position; he was in the unenviable 
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position of being obliged to submit numerous drafts to party committees, ‘with the requirement 
that all of them should be satisfied’. 191 
Despite these clear difficulties, Klugmann did have the advantage not afforded to Henry 
Pelling and Leslie Macfarlane; as much as his party card caused him problems with the writing 
of his book, it did provide a pass to the party archives. Until the party archives were opened, 
only communists could use the materials. This was an effective fort through which to keep out 
the critics. But it also prevented, as far as is ever possible, the writing of an objective piece of 
work by those not biased by their membership of, and loyalty to, their subject. Thus, without 
access to the party’s archives, those outside the party were seriously impeded in their attempts 
to study it. Morgan identifies Pelling’s difficulties with trying to write a history of what was a 
‘forbidden no man’s land’. 192 Leslie Macfarlane faced immense problems when trying to 
research his doctoral thesis, subsequently the controversial book. 193 Paradoxically although 
the party was committed to a democratic parliamentary methodology from 1951, and although 
it had always been overt in its union interventions, the construction of its own history remained 
one area where it retained the subversive and clandestine image that its critics had constructed 
for it. This issue continued, even when it was led by an arguably more ‘progressive’ leadership. 
Even when the party appointed an archivist, George Matthews, from the late 1970s, access 
remained restricted. McIlroy and Campbell argued that, until the 1980s, party histories were a 
reflux of the party line. 194 Even in 1991, one PhD study into party branch life opened its 
methodology section with a detailed discussion into the problems of studying a party with no 
archive access. 195 
2.3 Transparency 
The end of the party in 1991 also marked the end of the communists’ monopolisation of its 
own history. Aware that once the party ended there would be no CP left to control or manipulate 
the historical construction of the party, a month before the 43rd Congress the CP held a 
conference to encourage an open debate about the party’s history. 196 Once the CP had ended, 
however, some former members were able to adopt a more objective stance. By 1992 Willie 
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Thompson’s The Good Old Cause benefitted from Thompson’s long-term membership of the 
party, which allowed him to prosecute a comprehensive appraisal of British communism. But 
not all former comrades were able to be as critically objective and in 1997 there was one final 
attempt by Noreen Branson, who had been in the party and had been appointed Klugmann’s 
successor, to present a favourable construction of the communist past; her History of the CPGB 
1941-1951 is a sanitised account, especially when compared to Thompson’s more frank 
account. 197 Once the party’s archives were made available, there was the opportunity for the 
party to be studied from a more academic position. It was not until 2003 that a more robust 
history was presented in Callaghan’s Cold War, Crisis and Conflict 1951-1968. 198Lawrence 
and Wishart, the party’s official publishing house responsible for all the volumes, was at this 
juncture able to report a ‘much better access to archives and the views of party members’ which 
was written ‘from a more critical position than previous titles in the series’.199 This example 
was followed by the Geoff Andrews’s ‘final years’ of British Communism, Endgames and New 
Times, which developed some themes from Andrews’s PhD thesis; both of which conveyed an 
objectivity missing in the earlier histories.200 Both of these two books further elucidate the 
flaws and subjectivity in the Klugmann and Branson works. The opening up of the archives 
allowed scholars to consult, utilise and even present the very documents to which only loyal 
party functionaries had been privy; thus Callaghan and Ben Harker were able to write a 
comprehensive history of the party, presenting excerpts of these documents and making them 
further accessible. 201  
2.4 Debates 
Even when the party ceased to exist, the writing of the communist past has proved to be 
controversial. The best part of the party’s final two decades were characterised by profound 
strategic divisions, and so there is an inevitability that the CP’s historical legacy would be one 
of bitter sectarianism; ironically, even the protagonists of the sectarianism noticed it. Jones 
suggested that party histories were mostly only written by ‘party members/fellow travellers 
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and Trotskyists’, the conflict between the two having not been resolved in 1989 and so was 
fought out through historical study. 202 Hobsbawn, writing in 1971, suggested that CP history 
was invariably written from one of two perspectives; the ‘sectarian’ and the ‘witch-hunting,’ 
with apparently nothing in between.203 But both of these ‘schools’ were afflicted by the same 
incapacitating problem; they were unable to ‘stand at a sufficient distance from the polemics 
and schisms within the movement’. 204  
These debates were actively contested through academic outlets. Jones had organised a 
conference around CP history, and some of the contributors  continued their debates across the 
pages of Labour History Review, for months after the original conference, until the journal 
finally ceased to print anymore correspondence. The debates eventually descended into 
vehement debates about the CP’s ideology, structure and strategy.  Nina Fishman’s work 
proved especially controversial, and she separated historians into two camps: revisionists (who 
believe that Russia was the primary determinant of the CP’s policies in Britain) and 
essentialists (who view the CP as loyal to Moscow, but also believe that it had a certain amount 
of latitude). 205 McIlroy and Campbell took serious objection with many of her assertions, both 
regarding the lack of empiricism in Fishman’s evidence, and also alleging that those who 
disagreed with Fishman were purposefully excluded from the conference. 206 The debate 
extended to those historians who neither originally attended or were apparently involved. Keith 
Laybourn defended McIlroy and Campbell who, he said, had been curtailed in their ability to 
reply by the space permitted to their reply in the journal.  207 It appears then that even when it 
ceased to exist, the party had the ability to divide opinion; the difference being that historians, 
now armed with the party archives, could use them to deride each other’s position.  
2.5 The CP and the Soviet Union.  
Fishman’s attempt to divide historians of the CP into two groups had been met with 
controversy, not least from McIlroy and Campbell, but also by Laybourn, who rejected any 
point in ‘labelling’ these positions. 208 But subsequently historians have been broadly divided 
into three different positions. Andrew Thorpe has offered the most comprehensive synthesis of 
                                                          
202 Jones, H, History op.cit., 348. 
203 Hobsbawn, Revolutionaries, op.cit.,pp.  9-11. 
204 Hobsbawn, Revolutionaries, op.cit., 11.  
205 Jones, H, History op.cit., 350. 
206 See McIlroy, J and Campbell, A, Is CPGB History Important? Op.cit. 
207 See Laybourn, Keith, ‘A Peripheral Vision? A comment on the historiography of communism in Britain’, 
American Communist History, 4:2, pp. 159-166.  
208 Ibid. 
44 
 
these positions. The first, associated with earlier historians such as Pelling, believed that 
individual parties were originally semi-independent, but then became ‘slavish’ agents of 
Moscow, a theory rejected by Thorpe. 209 Phillip Deery, for example, argued that ‘Moscow’s 
control over the CP continued into the post-war period….there is abundant evidence 
demonstrating this “useless obedience” to the Cominform position in the post-war CP records’. 
210 McIlroy and Campbell suggest that the CP was subservient to a foreign state that ‘prioritised 
its own interests and played a part in discrediting socialism’. 211 The second view, Thorpe 
argues, were the revisionist historians, like Stuart Macintyre, who were less concerned with the 
‘high politics’ and more worried about what ‘communists on the ground’ were doing. 212Finally 
Thorpe identifies the post-revisionist historians, who claim that communists were by no means 
puppets of Moscow, but they were inextricably linked to it. 213 There is no doubt that, as 
Hobsbawn has demonstrated, the Soviet Union was ‘an operational necessity’ for British 
communism. 214  A mix of all these perspectives seems the most prudent approach and is the 
one that this thesis has taken, in relation to these polemics.  
2.6 The Cold War and industrial politics  
Whilst the party’s relationship with Moscow has become a matter of often vehement historical 
debate, to the CP’s more hostile contemporaries, the perception of the CP’s link with the Soviet 
Union often satisfied their agenda; thus there was no need to try and search for the reality of 
the relationship. As chapter one has demonstrated, the party’s association with Soviet 
communism, particularly when it became Stalinist tyranny, was often an easy blow for its 
critics. The notion that the CP was invariably up to no good could mutate in its severity: it 
changed from the hysterical worry that the CP was a puppet of soviet subversion during the 
Cold War, to the satirical in the 1970s as television critics who, watching Roger Graef’s 
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documentary, mocked the British Communists’ awe at a ‘real, soviet communist appearing in 
their midst’. 215  
This perception caused the party its greatest problems during the Cold War and 
historians have debated the extent to which communist trade unionists were limited in their 
activities. Keith Gildart has suggested that the Cold War restricted communist activities in the 
unions. 216 Thompson, however, has pointed out that in industries with relatively high support 
for communism, to become embroiled in anti-communism might make one unpopular with 
one’s workmates.217 Moreover, anti-communist propaganda did not always work, for example 
in the NUM, where attempts to remove Abe Moffat failed, and where communist trade 
unionists were still elected and able to serve their members. 218 McIlroy notes that from 1947 
the CP was perceived by the bulk of British society as ‘the enemy within’; but whilst it suffered 
some losses in trade unions, the Amalgamated Engineering Union for example, it remained 
strong in other areas such as mining, engineering and the Fire Brigades’ Union. 219 
The motivation of communist industrial interventions in the Cold War has also been 
discussed by historians. Pelling claims that communists ‘seemed anxious to secure industrial 
stoppages for political purposes only’. 220 Pelling points to the dockers’ strikes of 1948 and 
1949 as examples where he believes that ‘there is no doubt that this trouble was fomented and 
in several cases directly instigated by the party or by communists from overseas’. 221 This is a 
view also presented by Deery, who argues that instead of being infected by a ‘Cold War virus’ 
and an irrational fear of communists in industry, Clement Attlee’s fears around the ‘red 
menace’, and his perception of the CP as an ‘instrument of an alien dictatorship’, was justified. 
222 This is a view directly challenged by Robert Taylor, however, who argued that ‘communists 
were able to exploit rank and file grievances, but they did not manufacture this discontent’. 223 
Fishman adds to this view, by arguing that accusations of communist attempts at sabotage and 
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subversion, designed to unravel ‘the very fabric of British society’ as part of the Cold War, 
were inaccurate and lacking in evidence. 224 
2.7 The link between King Street and coalfield communists 
To what extent were communists in industry perceived as synonymous with the agents of 
Soviet misery, as outlined above, and what was the link between these people and the CP itself, 
in the existing literature? Largely, writers have concurred that the relationship between 
communists and their members in industry was relaxed, and that communists were elected in 
spite of, and not because of, their political affiliations. One of the examples to have received 
the most historical attention is the Electrical Trades Union (ETU) where in 1961 communists 
from the union leadership were found guilty in court of ballot rigging in the union. Some 
historians have deduced from the ETU example that these kinds of activities were prevalent 
amongst the party or its members in industry. Pelling, for example, uses the ETU example to 
argue that ‘once in control, a communist group may be exceedingly difficult to dislodge, for its 
members, not believing in genuine political democracy, will be quite willing to subvert the 
union’s electoral system in their own favour’. 225 Thompson suggests that the ETU militants 
were ‘unique only in getting caught’.226 But as Colin Barker points out, the ETU example was 
‘never central to the CP strategy… (and) was a temporary and foolish lapse… (it) was 
symptomatic of an electoral orientation’. 227 Callaghan’s focus on the ballot-rigging scandal 
found that the party leadership were ‘genuinely horrified’ by what had gone on in the union.228 
This raises a clear question: if the line between the CP centre and the ETU was so loose that 
ballot rigging could take place without the party’s knowledge, then why should we imagine 
that the relationship in the NUM was any tighter? The ETU had, after all, been the model 
communist union until 1961.229  
As Callaghan argues, ‘it was a convenient simplification to depict communist trade 
unionists as politically motivated robots under the central direction of King Street’.230  
Certainly, as Beckett has observed, it is unlikely that by the 1960s the party even had the 
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resources to control trade union leaders. 231 But it is doubtful that the party even wanted to do 
this; as we explored in chapter one, the party had structured itself so that trade union leaders 
could retain autonomy, and so that the party organisers and departments could make the 
decisions. Sometimes this worked well and communist trade unionists may have run on a 
similar agenda to the party; but, when they did not, the CP was limited in how they could 
challenge this. Ultimately, as the party knew, if it attempted to be directive toward its trade 
unionists they may well leave the party. In areas such as South Wales, where ‘it is as traditional 
that a communist be president of the South Wales NUM as it is that the Chairman of 
Cheltenham Women’s Institute be a Conservative’, being too forceful and potentially 
destroying this relationship could be disastrous for the CP. 232  
This was a potential problem that transcended industries and geographies. Communist 
trade unionists and the party well knew that it was not their communism that had got them 
elected. Malcolm Pitt, a miner who joined the CP after the 1972 strike, suggests that branch 
delegates in Kent were elected to an extent because of their politics, but primarily because of 
their knowledge of their industry, their ability to be good trade unionists, and even who was 
well-known in the miners’ social club. 233 Beckett makes this point too; trade unions were 
independent from the party and many leaders did not have the time to get involved in party 
work. 234 For the party, weak as it was in other areas, it was better to have a trade unionist who 
was a communist, even if the party was not controlling them, than run the risk of upsetting 
them by interfering in union affairs and risking them leaving the party. It was, as chapter one 
demonstrated, the numerical presence of communists that created the perception of strength. 
McIlroy shows how communist trade unionists and even their members understood the precise 
dynamics of this relationship, and where the boundaries lay. Tommy Coulter, from the 
Executive Committee of the Scottish area of the NUM by the 1970s, recalls how ‘the guys in 
the pit didn’t mind me being in the CP, provided it didn’t supersede what they wanted’. 235 
According to Vic Allen, it was the NEC of the NUM, not the party, which communist trade 
unionists should fear.236  Communists were in union positions because they were good trade 
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unionists, not communists, as Ralph Darlington points out.237 Upsetting the union membership 
and/or its executive might cost the communist trade unionist his career. There was no 
equivalent penalty to upsetting the CP.  
Callaghan suggests that communists ‘adapted to the milieu in which they operated, 
rather than moulded it for the party’s broader purpose’. 238 Ben Curtis cites one observer from 
South Wales, who noticed that ‘communists in South Wales found themselves in the 
disconcerting predicament of having become almost as respectable as an eisteddfod’. 239 
Communists were elected to their union positions in spite of, rather than because of, their 
politics and so, argues Callaghan, ‘given this dynamic, it is hardly surprising that they were 
tempted to keep the party’s politics in the background.’240 Roger Seifert and Tom Sibley have 
claimed that this was a strategic move, claiming that ‘he (Ramelson) understood that…they 
(trade union leaders) knew better than he what was possible within their organisations’. 241  
2.8 Proving the link: evidence. 
Earlier in this chapter we noted some of the issues with the access to archive materials when 
writing the party’s history; even when they became available, however, there were issues with 
them. Morgan identifies the scant covering of industrial politics in the party archives until the 
mid-1980s, perhaps suggesting the ‘conscious kicking over of some interesting traces’; as he 
points out, the task is to ‘look elsewhere’ to try and piece together fragments of information to 
form a cohesive whole. 242 Perhaps the evidence is in the records of the industrial advisory 
committees; but McIlroy has argued that by the 1960s and 1970s the CP had come to see them 
as more trouble than they were worth and they were simply effectively rubber-stamping already 
decided policies. 243 From 1965, when the party sought to reorganise its industrial apparatus,  
it was explicitly decided by the party that no written materials should be issued apart from ‘the 
bare details’ of meetings; but there is little to document the work of these advisories even before 
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this. 244Beckett places much emphasis on the party’s ‘Needs of the Hour’, which were 
essentially blueprints of the party’s industrial policies; Beckett asserts that Ramelson 
meticulously planned from this document who would say what at TUC conferences to an 
amazingly detailed extent. 245 This is a view shared by Seifert and Sibley. 246 Yet these 
documents, when consulted, are inconspicuous A4 double-sided coloured sheets, with single 
sentence suggestions; generally, they repeat the mantra ‘wage militancy and free collective 
bargaining’. Moreover neither Beckett nor Seifert and Sibley have considered what would 
happen if these documents were ignored: did anybody within the CP itself challenge 
disobedience?   
2.9 Horner and the party.  
Fishman’s political biography of Horner is one of the few detailed biographies of communist 
mining leaders. Her assertion of Horner’s social democratic responsibility is inarguable; 
Horner knew, as did the rest of the union, that the miners may well have used their strength to 
meet their demands.247 They also knew that, if the NUM should be seen to be irresponsible, it 
would vindicate the Conservative Party’s case for de-nationalising the industry when they were 
next elected. But the relationship between Horner the trade unionist and his party, often 
presented as near-breaking point by Fishman, is complex. Horner’s autobiography tells us that 
he never allowed the party to dictate union policy to him and he saw himself as in conflict with 
the Labour Party, not the CP. 248Horner repeats his support of the CP’s international policy, his 
anti-Americanism and his support (even through the difficult years of 1956) for the Soviet 
Union. 249  In light of these discussions, when many communists were in turmoil about the 
cause to which many had dedicated much of their lives, Horner was able to say that ‘I was quite 
convinced that the future still rested with communism’. 250Moreover one of Fishman’s other 
works, Horner and Hornerism, sets the precedent of Horner as a rebellious character, willing 
to contravene the party line in the interests of his union responsibility. 251 It is logical, then, 
                                                          
244 Various notes on the ‘reorganisation’ can be found at CP/CENT/IND/12/08.  
245 Beckett, Enemy Within, op.cit., 176. 
246 Seifert and Sibley, Ramelson, op.cit., 106. 
247 Horner, Incorrigible, op.cit.,  191. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Horner, Incorrigible, op.cit.,187.  
250 Horner, Incorrigible, op.cit., 216-218. Horner also took a position that John Gollan would repeat in 1976, of 
explaining the horrors of Stalinism through the cult of the individual; ‘I, like many other sincere friends of the 
Soviet Union, resented the worship of one man which grew up during the Stalin period’, said Horner.  
251 See Fishman, ‘Horner and Hornerism’ in Party People op.cit. John Saville argued that Horner was in dispute 
with the industrial and political strategy of the CP in the later 1920s and early 1930s, because he opposed its 
‘social fascist’ line. Saville characterises ‘Hornerism’ as an ‘opposition to the establishment of revolutionary 
50 
 
that the character of Horner should have been well-known to Pollitt, particularly, who knew 
him well, but Pollitt is presented by Fishman as perplexed at having to deal with Horner’s 
apparent intransigence, as though it was novel.   
It could be suggested that Fishman makes much of some sources and examples. 
Fishman uses the fact that Horner chose not to publish his 1960 autobiography with Lawrence 
and Wishart as evidence of the gulf between him and the CP. 252 But Paynter did not choose 
Lawrence and Wishart either, for his autobiography. 253There is much made of (one of many) 
exchanges recorded by the security services between Pollitt and Horner’s wife, Ethel, which 
Fishman perceives as evidence that Pollitt’s patience, politically, was wearing thin with Horner. 
254The full source, when consulted, may also be interpreted as a worried wife and friend 
aggrieved at Horner’s very public, and by many accounts embarrassing, alcoholism. 255 The 
party imagined, and its trade unionists were often perceived as, staunch defenders of workers’ 
rights, but also ‘men of integrity’.256 Alcoholism, particularly the chronic and debilitating kind 
by which Horner was by all accounts often afflicted, does not fit the image of the virtuous 
communist that the CP endeavoured to construct.  
The other issue with placing much emphasis on Horner and Pollitt’s often troubled 
relationship as evidence that errant trade unionists ran into trouble with the party is that it 
ignores the tensions within political relationships, generally. Thus Fishman ignores the fact that 
between 1949 and 1951 the security services found evidence that Pollitt himself was largely 
out of favour with the party, to the extent that they reported that Kerrigan was flirting with the 
idea of some sort of coup. 257 There are also other examples of those in the party having difficult 
relationships. One report from the Security Services, dated 08 August 1951, found that both 
Horner and Moffat were out of favour with the CP leadership; but Fishman does not report this. 
258  
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2.1.0 Post-nationalisation changes? 
One of the single most important changes to happen to the mining industry was the 
nationalisation of it, formally implemented on 01 January 1947. The extent to which this 
changed miners’ working lives, however, has been discussed in the existing literature, and the 
general consensus is that nationalisation brought little of consequence to the daily working 
arrangements of most miners. 259Pelling, like Michael Crick, sees little substantial change in 
the structure of the union, and suggests that the NUM was essentially ‘a somewhat stronger 
federation that its predecessor’. 260 Peter Ackers and Jonathon Payne also argue that there was 
little substantial change, suggesting instead that it was the expectation, instead of the reality, 
that changed quickly in 1947. 261This is a view shared by Church and Outram, who suggest 
that nationalisation changed little, especially at local level. 262 Similarly, Fishman has argued 
that in the immediate aftermath of nationalisation miners did not notice any change, but also 
that they were not particularly perturbed by this. 263  
But there is also the argument that, even if nationalisation brought little tangible change 
for many miners, the expectation and belief in it was, at least until the mid-1960s, enough for 
miners to retain some loyalty to the NCB and the concept of nationalisation. Andrew Taylor 
argues that miners’ despondency and the willingness to act on it, as opposed to ‘acquiescing’ 
was only evident from the later 1960s. Part of the reason for this was that a younger generation 
of miners had started to emerge, who were less constrained by the memories of pre-
nationalisation and particularly 1926; this, argues Taylor, was the primary reason why the 
union was able to engage in official strike action in 1972 and 1974.264 Gildart has demonstrated 
the predicament of many miners who, although unhappy with the shortcomings of 
nationalisation, remained loyal to the party that had taken them out of the conditions under 
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private ownership, arguing that ‘it has been easy to marginalise the impact of nationalisation 
and, although disillusionment was to emerge, this was not directed at the Labour Party’. 265 
2.1.1 Unofficial strikes 
The existing literature regarding the NUM has mostly been interested in the social and cultural 
history of the mining communities that built up around the pit, and it is also concerned with 
why there was a high instance of unofficial strikes in coalmining.  One explanation of the cause 
of these unofficial strikes is Kerr and Siegel’s ‘isolated mass’ theory. This theory suggests that 
miners were geographically isolated and their grievances were reflective of broader concerns, 
rather than only work, perhaps living conditions and so forth; strikes, therefore, were protests. 
266 This view was popular amongst some scholars on the left, for example Vic Allen, Raphael 
Samuel and Vicky Seddon. 267 But it has also been criticised. Ralph Darlington has suggested 
that the work focuses too much on structure, rather than agency. 268 Alan Campbell identifies 
an issue with this approach, namely that this methodology ‘seeks to reduce the complexities of 
miners’ history to a manageable number of quantifiable variables’. 269 P.K Edwards suggested 
that the theory simply described rather than fully explained the problem. 270 Edwards develops 
his criticism to a methodological one, suggesting that Kerr and Siegel’s claims were 
‘empirically falsifiable’. 271  
Much of the literature refutes the assumption that high incidences of unofficial strike 
action was the result of high communist presence. This assumption was often used as a 
convenient, if unfounded, explanation for the problem; thus Alf Robens, Jim Bowman’s 
successor, repeatedly found in his autobiography a correlation between areas where there were 
communists and areas where there were lots of strikes. 272 The picture is far more complex and 
the genesis of these strikes, as Church and Outram show, were sporadic and difficult to trace; 
they observe that ‘an individual strike might have no immediate cause but occurred when 
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diverse grievances produced the occasion for industrial action to take place’. 273 Church and 
Outram also suggest that the high level of unofficial strike action may be the result of the size 
of a coalfield and changes within it, arguing that ‘historically the most rapidly growing 
coalfields have often generated high levels of strike activity’; Yorkshire was both growing, and 
the largest coal producing region. 274 Moreover, South Wales and Scotland (the other two 
regions of the union that had the most strikes) were also large, and so their high strike pattern 
might in some ways be reflective of, and relative to, their size. 275 Moreover, explanations such 
as Robens’s ignore the deep-rooted traditions of certain coalfields, which Ackers and Payne 
draw attention to. They argue that deeply embedded cultural traditions help explain patterns of 
militancy, and use this explanation to demonstrate why there was high strike incidences in 
peripheral coalfields, like South Wales and Scotland. 276  The existing literature also draws 
attention to the fact that strike activity was variable, even within those coalfields supposed to 
be pre-determined to militancy. Church and Outram have argued that in South Wales and 
Scotland, some collieries did not strike, and some had only brief strikes or few participants. 
277Ben Curtis adds to this view, suggesting that even within the ‘militant’ South Wales 
coalfield, there were differences in the extent of this militancy between individual lodges. 278  
2.1.2 Official Strikes 
The mining industry is peculiar, in the sense that it was characterised by unofficial strikes, 
which never progressed or developed into official action, until 1972 and then 1974; even before 
this, however, in 1969 and 1970, there were two near-official strikes in the industry.279  The 
existing literature has focused on these examples of miners’ militancy. Both Paul Routledge, 
Scargill’s critical unofficial biographer, and Taylor have argued that this shift in the union’s 
mentality was first demonstrated in the 1969 Yorkshire surface workers’ strike. 280 The strike 
of 1972 has dominated the existing literature to a greater extent than the 1974 strike, and is 
largely perceived as a success in existing work. As Darlington and Lyddon have demonstrated, 
the 1972 miners’ strike extracted more from the government in 24 hours of negotiations than 
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the union had managed in the previous 24 years. 281 Jim Phillips has focused on the 1972 
miners’ strike and has challenged the perception that it was a ‘victory for violence’; this was, 
he argues, a view that simply vindicated Thatcher’s despotism in 1984. Phillips also disagrees 
with the ‘top down’ approach, which asserts that it was ‘hard men’ like Daly and McGahey 
imposing their militant will on a reticent membership; although only 40 percent of the NUM 
actually voted for strike action, once the strike got going, ‘support was almost total’. 282  
2.1.3 Agitators or Instigators? 
The more interesting question, in relation to this thesis, is what were communists doing in these 
official strikes? The perception was often distorted from the reality. As we saw in chapter one, 
the mainstream press and most of the party perceived that the CP was the organising brain of 
these disputes. George Bolton, president of the Scottish miners and a member of the CP’s 
executive, suggests that the CP’s role was mostly logistical, giving out pamphlets and building 
support. 283The consensus of the literature is that communists in the union during the strike 
were working hard to give support to the union membership, and following the train of the 
membership’s desires. Thus Phillips could write: 
Popular agency analyses the emergence of Daly, McGahey and Scargill as neither accidental 
coincidence nor a determined leftist conspiracy. Rather it reflected the impatience amongst a 
large body of miners with the willingness of ‘moderate’ trade union leaders to tolerate pit 
closures and agree wage restraints that saw miners fall behind many groups of manual workers 
in the wage’s league. 284 
 
As Darlington has demonstrated, it is inadequate to see communists (or any ‘extreme’ group) 
as causing, rather than agitating, existing grievances. 285 Phillips supports this view, and 
suggests that ‘the personal politics of NUM leaders had a limited bearing on union policy; in 
office they operated at their members’ calling’. 286 He further claims that their activities can be 
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described as ‘moderate conduct sometimes combined with militant rhetoric’ depending on the 
mandate of the union membership. 287 Phillips proves, through his use of the findings of the 
security service, that ‘the NUM executive had not taken its lead from the CP’, although 
McGahey had been in contact with Ramelson and union officials had co-ordinated picketing 
activities with CP branches. 288 McIlroy suggested that, even in the ‘peak’ of the party’s 
influence in the industrial disputes of the later 1960s and early 1970s, the party failed to give 
any organisation to them.289 Allen conceded that McGahey had not instigated or even lead the 
strike, either officially or unofficially. 290 The most recent piece of literature which challenges 
these arguments to some extent is Seifert and Sibley’s biography of Ramelson, which suggests 
that the party’s industrial organiser played a much more pivotal role. 291  
2.1.4 Wage militancy and surplus labour  
Just as the existing literature concurs that the CP played little more than an agitating and 
organising role in the miners’ militancy of the early 1970s, Callaghan has argued that there was 
no resultant growth for the party, as might be expected.292 To what extent had wage militancy, 
which the party believed would be one of the key criteria for its industrial strategy to achieve 
its goals, worked? As Callaghan has argued, by the late 1960s it is unlikely that the CP could 
have halted wage militancy even if it had wanted to, certainly not without losing credibility.293 
It was unfortunate timing on the part of Bill Warren (inside the CP) and Royden Harrison and 
Stephen Yeo (associated with the Alterative Economic Strategy, or AES) that they should 
question the effectiveness of wage militancy just as it took off.294 The CP, however, remained 
committed to wage militancy into the 1970s even though the NUM, including communists on 
its executive, were aware that ‘the protection of jobs might be at the expense of wage rises’.295 
But a detailed analysis of wage militancy in the particular context of mining, examining the 
minutes of the union’s annual conference in conjunction with the CP’s own files, has not yet 
been done. Coal was operating in a market of surplus labour and product competition, an 
environment where the labour force had been cut by 60 percent between 1957 and 1970. 296 
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Griffin argued that ‘a sharp increase in wages must increase prices and reduce the quantity of 
coal demanded’. 297 Robens tried to make the same point. 298 But Ramelson’s biographers 
demonstrate how he refuted the claim that wage rises priced workers out of jobs, instead 
showing that ‘increased demand in the economy resulting from rising real wages saves rather 
than destroys jobs’.299 Allen, who knew Ramelson well, concluded that inflation was not the 
result of wages; therefore, he argued, they should not be restrained.300  
2.1.5 Economism and politicisation  
Had the CP’s industrial strategy descended into economism by the late 1960s and early 1970s? 
The existing literature seems to suggest not although contemporary commentators, possibly 
with a different agenda, argued that it had. Seifert and Sibley are keen to demonstrate that 
Ramelson never used economism as a strategy. 301It is clear, from the existing literature, that 
the kind of demands that the party was making in the late 1960s and early 1970s did have a 
political edge. Allen had noticed that the strikes had reflected ‘not a raised political awareness 
so much as the imposition of political consequences upon ordinary economic demands’. 302 
Callaghan points out that the party’s efforts in trade unions, especially wage militancy, did 
have ‘political demands and appeals to join the party’. 303 McIlroy adds that the militancy of 
the CP generally, and particularly in the NUM, extended beyond just economism to ‘briefly 
embrace struggles against the state and challenges to the logic of capitalism’. 304 The charge 
that the CP was economistic was often used by the modernising wing of the party 
disparagingly, most notably Hobsbawn in his 1978 Marx Memorial Lecture. 305 Stuart Lane, 
writing in 1983, suggested that the unions failed to face up to Thatcherism because ‘their 
organisation, at all levels, are geared up to economism’. 306  
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Despite the intention to do more than reduce disputes to economic struggles, much of 
the existing literature suggests that the CP failed to politicise the union membership, as it had 
hoped. Bolton recalled that ‘the truth was it was pure economism in the pit’.307 This was 
observed by contemporaries; Ian MacGregor, the chairman of the NCB during the 1984 strike, 
suggested that the reasons why the miners had not returned mandates for strike action in the 
early 1980s was because they were not ‘politicised’ enough. 308 Bolton further points out that, 
after an arduous day in the pits, most miners would want to go home, rather than be ‘politicised’ 
as the CP wanted. 309 Discussing the inter-war period Malcolm Pitt, a Kent miner who joined 
the CP in the early 1970s, references the arrival of a cohort of Barnsley miners to Kent who 
were militant but for their own self-interest, and certainly not motivated by any ‘working class 
or socialist consciousness’. 310 Mike Prior and Dave Purdy suggested that trade unions had 
failed to realise, or capitalise, on the industrial conflict in any political sense. 311 This view is 
rejected by Seifert and Sibley. They suggest that party policy was thrust into the labour 
movement, ‘galvanising action, co-ordinating responses and developing socialist 
consciousnesses’. 312This is not a perception shared by Bolton, who suggests that the party’s 
growth in industry was not mirrored elsewhere and the party ‘built nothing politically’. 313 Ben 
Curtis has demonstrated how, in South Wales, from the later 1970s the CP was beginning to 
lose ground even within the union and, apart from Arfon Evens, all new NUM members to the 
area executive from the late 1970s and early 1980s were Labour members. 314  
Even in pits where the party was well-represented, the extent to which the level of 
politicisation was any better is dubious. Betteshanger colliery in Kent had a healthy 
representation of 100 communists by 1945. 315 Yet in Church and Outram’s study of the 
collieries that appeared in the ‘top ten’ for strike activity between 1943 and 1963, none of the 
Kent coalfields appear once. 316  Paul Rigg, through his analysis of two collieries, one moderate, 
one militant, argued that the militant colliery had a higher level of politicisation amongst its 
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leaders. But his method of evidencing this is dubious: although some officials in the militant 
coalfield had been to political study schools, only two of them were members of ‘extreme’ 
political organisations (the others were in the Labour Party) and neither of the two men attended 
branch meetings. 317  
Party membership did not assume militancy, which is the biggest criticism that can be 
made about Rigg’s analysis. The CP’s organisation department obsessed over how to get 
branches in a better shape, and how to recruit members from these workers. But membership 
of the party and total commitment to it within a workplace was not synonymous. McIlroy’s 
interview with Willie Clarke, a Scottish communist miner, suggests that some trade unionists 
joined the party because they felt it might be ‘a vehicle to a trade union job’. 318The CP never 
missed an opportunity to recruit, and as such membership was not selective.  Eric Browne, of 
the Armthorpe branch of the NUM, recalls how he bought the Daily Worker off Frank Watters, 
and donated the change to the fighting fund; ‘this put me down as a recruit’!319 Scargill also 
recalled how he joined the Young Communist League (YCL) as party representatives turned 
up to meet him when he expressed an interest in joining, unlike representatives of the Labour 
Party, where Scargill had initially registered his interest. It was possible to join the pit branch 
of the party and not do much after joining: one could be pressured to sell the Daily Worker, for 
example, but the party could only apply so much pressure before one might leave. This view 
is substantiated by Bolton, who suggests that it was possible to pay a membership fee, only to 
then do little in terms of ‘active’ involvement in the party. 320  
2.1.6 Scargillism  
The broad left, the idea of working in partnership with left wingers outside the CP, has also 
been discussed in the existing literature. Callaghan has argued that the broad left strategy 
emerged from mid-1960s, reflecting a ‘more realistic’ way of approaching its affairs. 321 This 
was obvious in the NUM where, as Watters recalls, the CP and left had stood a multiplicity of 
candidates in the 1960 presidential election which had allowed the right to win. 322 Seifert and 
Sibley suggest that the broad left came out the party’s broader calls for left unity.323 The broad 
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left strategy even allowed the right to somewhat encroach on the party’s tactics. Andrew Taylor 
demonstrates that Gormley, shrewd and certainly ‘no friend of the left’, knew that he needed 
to adapt to the new left-wing milieu of the early 1970s, and fought much of his successful 
election campaign on two main grounds: raise miners’ pay and improve conditions. 324 The 
broad left strategy actively encouraged the advancement of any left wing candidate, their 
carrying a party card was at best a bonus, an admission made in Ramelson’s biography. 325  
One of the most well-known products of this strategy was Arthur Scargill and the 
existing literature has debated Scargill’s personality traits.  John Saville, diplomatically, said 
that ‘Scargill was a very difficult miners’ leader to deal with’. 326 Routledge suggests that 
Scargill was a self-identified ‘hardest of the hardliners’. 327 To MacGregor, Scargill was the 
‘theatrical performer and Marxist autocrat’.328 To others, ‘Scargillism’ was a personality cult: 
Hywel Francis was accused by Kim Howells, the union’s official researcher, of criticising 
Scargill’s leadership precisely through his address at Paynter’s funeral praising Paynter’s 
‘qualities of leadership and hatred of the cult of personality’. 329 The literature has also 
attempted to address the complex question: what was ‘Scargillism’, politically? Taylor has 
suggested that Scargill was a syndicalist. 330 This is also a view supported by Francis, who 
notes Scargill’s ‘degenerate syndicalism’.331 The strategy of Scargill has also been described 
as ‘vanguardist’ by Andrew Campbell and Mick Warner in their analysis of NUM leadership 
elections. 332By his own admission, as Routledge quotes, Scargill was a student of his father 
Harold: ‘a communist. Not the Eurocommunist variety, not the New Realist variety, but the 
real communist who wants to see capitalism torn down and replaced by a system where people 
own and control the means of production, distribution and exchange. It’s called, quite simply, 
socialism’. 333  
The existing literature has also explored the relationship between Scargill and the party. 
Callaghan points out how Scargill had left the YCL, most probably because he realised that he 
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did not need the party machine to do well.334 Beckett suggests that, once not in the YCL but 
able to surround himself with the left caucus of the NUM, Scargill was able to make use of it 
or ignore it, depending on his own agenda. 335 Beckett draws the conclusion that Scargill was 
able to use the CP without giving anything in return, or the CP having any control over it. 336 
As Beckett suggests Scargill was intent, and able, to exploit the left unity that the CP had 
meticulously spent years constructing. 337 Bolton says of ‘the CP in Yorkshire, [that] Scargill 
killed it stone dead; he destroyed it for his own purposes’. 338 Seifert and Sibley argue that the 
CP played a ‘clear leadership position within the broad left’, of which Scargill was a product.339 
Yet at its most damaging, for the CP’s endeavours, Scargill and the party might be perceived 
as one and the same, even by the rest of the NUM executive: Roy Ottey recalls how McGahey 
was perceived as ‘the driving force behind Scargill’. 340  The misconception that Scargill was 
something of a CP puppet in the NUM was most clearly made in Nicholas Hagger’s Scargill 
the Stalinist, written in response to the miners’ strike. 341 
2.2.7 Main research objectives and originality 
Following an overview of the historical context and the literature review, four main research 
questions have been formulated. These questions identify the main research gaps, and thus 
indicate the thesis’s original contribution to knowledge.  
 To conduct the first extended study that singularly focuses on the CP in the miners’ 
union in the post-war period. Methodologically, the thesis is original because it uses 
materials drawn from the CP’s own archive and the minutes of NUM meetings, 
combining them throughout the period 1945 to 1985, to explore the CP’s industrial 
strategy in the miners’ union. From this, it seeks to draw a broader hypothesis that 
could, in the future, be applied to other case studies: if the NUM was theoretically meant 
to be the CP’s best example of its industrial interventions, then what can our 
observations here suggest about the party’s industrial politics more generally? 
                                                          
334 Callaghan, Cold War, op.cit., 252.  
335 Beckett, Enemy Within op.cit., 208. 
336 Ibid. 
337 Beckett, CP, op.cit.,209. 
338 George Bolton interviewed by McIlroy and Campbell as part of the CPGB Biographical project. 
339 Seifert and Sibley, Ramelson, op.cit., 121. 
340 Ottey, Roy, The Strike: an insider’s story, (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1985), 13. 
341 See Hagger, Scargill, op.cit for details.  
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 To explore and analyse the dynamics and structure of the relationship between the party 
centre, party organisers, and party members across all levels of the union. It is well-
documented in the existing literature that the link between the CP and trade unionists 
was weak, but how was the industrial strategy in the NUM conducted if this was the 
case? Whilst the observations about the latitude of the relationship have been made 
generally, they have not been analysed in detail specifically in the miners’ union. 
 To analyse the concept of conflict, broader than the well-known CP divides most 
addressed by Thompson and Andrews. By the nature of the fact that there is not yet an 
extended study on the CP within the NUM, the existing literature does not consider the 
contours of these intricate relationships. Did conflict occur between the three main 
groups listed above and, if so, how? Moreover, how did the CP deal with instances of 
conflict? 
 To conduct a thorough exploration of the role of wage militancy within the NUM. 
Although this has been discussed in the existing literature, mostly by Callaghan, there 
is scope to focus particularly on wage militancy in the NUM throughout this extended 
period. This can be done by using a combination of NUM annual conference minutes 
and the CP’s archives to understand wage militancy in the miners’ union. In this sense, 
there is scope to investigate if it is ever truly possible to measure and understand a 
complex concept such as wage militancy. Was the concept of wage militancy 
understood and applied differently by the three groups that I mention above and, if so, 
how was it addressed and what was its implications for the CP’s industrial strategy?  
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III Sources and Methods 
3.0 The Historical Method 
The research uses the historical method: this allows, as Susan Grigg put it, three main stages 
in the research.342 The first stage was the ‘location of sources and the selection from them’; the 
second was the analysis of the data; and the third was the interpretation of it. 343 The thesis adds 
an original contribution to the existing knowledge because of its methodology. It focuses its 
study of the CP in the NUM in an unprecedented timeframe, but it also combines sources 
grouped from both of these organisations, over the period studied, to draw its conclusions. 
Whilst most of the existing literature has used these materials there is no other piece of work 
over this period that combines the records, detailed below, to reach its conclusions. 
3.1 Sources 
The first stage of the research was a comprehensive review of the existing literature, in order 
to identify areas where further research was required. 344The next stage was to consult the 
published autobiographies, diaries and memoirs, in order to gain a thorough understanding of 
the broader context. 345These were, as Brundage notes, the ‘type of primary sources aimed for 
public consumption’. 346The initial observation based on the primary sources available was that 
there was something of a paradox: the NUM, always the larger organisation, had far less 
sources relating to it than the CP which, even at its peak, had a far more modest membership. 
347 The archives used, in the order that they were consulted, and what was drawn from there, 
are listed below.348 
 
 
                                                          
342 Grigg, Susan. ‘Archival Practice and the Foundation of the Historical Method’, Journal of American History, 
78:1, June 1991, pp. 228-229, 228. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Ibid. The literature review was revisited every six months, in order to check and add any ‘new’ literature that 
had been published.  
345 Along with Graham Stevenson’s comprehensive internet biography page. See: 
http://www.grahamstevenson.me.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&id=2&Itemid=92 
346 Brundage, Going to the Sources, op.cit., 16. 
347 As a rough comparison, the CP’s greatest volume of membership was during the Nazi’s invasion of the 
Soviet Union, when CP membership grew to around 56,000; a few years later, on the eve of the nationalisation 
of the mines, the NUM had around 750,000 members. This puts the NUM approximately 13 times larger than 
the CP.  Both declined somewhat proportionately and relatively. 
348 There are other archives relating to the CP that were not consulted because they were believed to be outside 
of the scope of this thesis, for example the Willie Gallacher archive in Glasgow.  
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3.2 Labour History and Study Centre, Manchester. 
Once the existing literature had been analysed, the next task was to consult the CP’s own 
archive, mainly concentrating on the files relating to the party’s industrial, economic and 
organisational affairs along with the files of key individuals; these materials represent the 
engine room of British communism.349 These files contain minutes of meetings, private hand-
written notes, leaflets, letters, and draft publications. 350One of the greatest issues that was faced 
was understanding the often illegible handwriting of individuals (John Gollan being a particular 
example), but another problem was that many of the minutes were recorded in shorthand and 
as such have not been able to be deciphered.  
The papers of the industrial department, as both Francis King and Kevin Morgan have 
pointed out, are sparse until the mid-1980s. 351 Morgan suggests that this may mean the 
‘conscious kicking over of some interesting traces’. 352 One particular file 
(CP/CENT/IND/12/10) relates directly to the party’s concerns with coalmining, but it is void 
of any detailed planning. This is unusual; Callaghan has noted that the party constantly 
documented what was going on, what was happening and how well it was doing it, a ‘sort of 
peer review system’. 353 The party, generally, was keen to record everything; even the lunch 
options at a particular weekend school have been preserved for historical record. It is also 
possible to see examples of correspondence relating to unknown party members being afflicted 
with mundane illnesses and therefore unable to attend branch meetings. The CP’s industrial 
work was essential to its strategy; it also represented an area where it was perceived to be 
ubiquitous, if not nefarious, whereas elsewhere it was quantifiably weak. The fact that there is 
a lack of primary documentation about the party’s interventions in a key industry is significant; 
it may suggest that communists within the miners’ union were given a certain amount of 
latitude. It may also indicate that the relationship and transmission of policy was done through 
conversation and was in many ways informal. Although the link between the party and those 
                                                          
349 For example, Bert Ramelson; John Gollan; George Matthews. Many of these collections have been used to 
construct autobiographies, for example Morgan, Kevin, Harry Pollitt, (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1993); Callaghan, Jogn, Rajani Palme Dutt: a study in British Stalinism, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1993); and Seifert, Roger, and Sibley, Tom, Revolutionary Communist at Work: a political biography of Bert 
Ramelson, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2012), 106. 
350 For a detailed discussion of the anatomy of these archives, see King, Francis, ‘Archival Sources on the 
CPGB’, Science and Society, Spring 1997; 61:1, pp 131-139. 
351 King, Archives, op.cit., 133. 
352 Morgan, The Archives of the British Communist Party, op.cit., 413. 
353 Quote from Callaghan. This is part of a wider conversation on the nature, and role, of CPGB history, which 
is noted in Jones, H, ‘CPGB history ?’ Conference Report, Labour History Review, Vol 67, No 3, December 
2002 pp 347- 352. 
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in the NUM, for example, is not transparent from the industrial department’s files we can 
surmise the essence of the relationship from other sources, not least the personal files of 
individuals. Gollan suggests through his private notes the interplay between party and union: 
‘if the final analysis or answer conflicts with own party policy- carry out decisions of union’.354 
Conversely, the papers relating to the organisation department are extensive. 355 They 
quantify the party’s industrial presence, for instance documenting how many factory branches 
existed in coalmining in a particular year. It could be interpreted that this was because the CP 
could easily control and maintain membership records, for example, whilst the contours of its 
industrial strategy was much more complex to track. Therefore, perhaps in order to 
inadvertently help the party construct its own notions of numerical strength as synonymous 
with influence, there exists more detailed records for the organisation department. The records 
of the organisation department portray the kind of fastidiousness that one might expect from a 
communist party. It is no surprise, therefore, that there was tension between the organisation 
department, who were tasked with building the party, and the industrial department, who were 
placed to formulate labour movement policy. 356  
The records of the industrial advisory committee for coalmining are sporadically 
preserved. They were the ‘transmission belts for the formulation and dissemination of party 
policy’.357 But, as chapter two showed, their details are sparse, even before this was an 
intentional policy in 1965. Their existence, however, raises a point of interest because their 
function was effectively denied by Gollan who suggested that the party ‘does not discuss or 
pronounce on the internal affairs of a union or trade union election’.358 The executive 
committee, however, was keen to record that, in coalmining at least, the industrial advisory 
committee met between two and six times a year. 359 The reality of the situation, the report of 
the executive committee in 1981 suggested, was that these branches were weak. They reported 
that ‘there are huge industries concentrated in some of our districts, in which advisory work is 
at a very poor level. This applies to most mining districts outside Scotland and Kent’. 360 The 
archive also holds most of the party’s journals, even the more ephemeral ones. The ones that 
were consulted are: 
                                                          
354 Undated, but assumed from his period as General Secretary, CP/CENT/GOLL/04/07.  
355 King, Archives, op.cit., 133. 
356 Seifert and Sibley, op.cit., Revolutionary op.cit., 106.  
357 Callaghan, Cold War, op.cit, 10.  
358 Gollan’s private notes, found at CP/CENT/GOLL/04/07. 
359 ‘Industrial Advisories’, 7 May 1981, CP/CENT/EC/18/03. 
360 Ibid. 
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Marxism Today and Comment. 361 
This journal, and to an extent Comment, became increasingly associated with the 
‘Eurocommunist’ movement and so it was particularly useful for tracing the line during the 
1984 miners’ strike.  
New Left Review.  
This journal, itself an eventual product of the 1956 affair, was most useful for this thesis 
because it is the only journal where Scargill gave extensive interviews. 
Labour Monthly. 
This journal was edited by Rajani Palme Dutt (as he was known in this context ‘RPD’) until 
his death in 1974. Labour Monthly contained the ‘Notes of the Month’, which were written by 
RPD and were the dissemination of party policy to the readership. Most notably there is a 
clearer sense of direction in the earlier issues, which evaporates from the 1970s. 
World News and Views. 
This journal did not comprise too much of the research, as it did not have a large amount to say 
about industrial interventions. It was consulted in the earlier stages of the research in order to 
gain an understanding of the broader context.  
Challenge. 
This journal, the publication of the Young Communist League (YCL), was useful for 
understanding what the party was doing in relation to younger miners who would go on to be 
the adults that the party wanted to engage with in order to fulfil its industrial strategy.  
3.3 Working Class Movement Library, Salford 
The Working Class Movement Library (WCML) contains a substantial run of the Daily Worker 
and the Morning Star; the newspaper was, as the party put it in 1957, ‘agitator, educator and 
organiser’. 362Approximately 14,000 days of the newspaper were consulted during the research. 
                                                          
361 Available online from the late 1970s, via the Amiel and Melburn trust. Marxism Today, established in the 
late 1950s, originally had a readership of around only 3000 people and was ‘extremely low’ in the party’s 
priorities. By the 1980s, not only had it become emblematic of the ‘modernising’ faction of the CP, but it was 
even stocked in outlets as mainstream as WH Smith. See Jacques, Martin, ‘The Last Word’, Marxism Today, 
December 1991, pp28-29, 28. For a detailed analysis of the distribution and broadening readership of Marxism 
Today, see Pimlott, H, ‘From the Margins to the Mainstream: the promotion and distribution of Marxism 
Today’, Journalism, 5:2, pp. 203-226, 2004. 
362 Marxist Study Themes, Role of the CP, May 1957, 23. The paper changed name in 1966. 
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Newspapers, as is well documented, need to be approached with caution but perhaps with even 
greater trepidation in the CP’s case. 363 During the party’s implosion, from the mid-1970s 
onwards, the newspaper was a main protagonist in these polemics, becoming particularly 
associated with the ‘traditionalist’ group. 364 In the research the newspaper became a way to 
view the perspective of this group during that period, a way of exploring what this group hoped 
to achieve via their commitment to the party’s traditional industrial strategy. Just as in the 
actual event, the research used the newspaper and Marxism Today (and, to a lesser extent, 
Comment) to understand the factionalism within the CP. Aside from this use, the newspaper 
also assisted in mapping a chronology through which important events in relation to this 
research could be found.  
The library also has a comprehensive run of pamphlets written by communists. These 
were used in two main ways: initially significant publications relating to communist policy 
were consulted in order to gain a narrative of key events and arguments. 365Then pamphlets 
written by communist mining leaders were consulted; these documents were then compared to 
see if there was any similarity or disparity between them, in order to understand the relationship 
between CP trade unionists and the party.366The library also contains the TUC and Labour 
Party annual conference reports for the period that the thesis covers and these were used to see 
what resolutions were being moved by members of the NUM at these conferences. This was 
used as a barometer to measure the union’s move to the left, which in turn was used to trace 
the genesis of these resolutions at the NUM annual conference. The WCML also has short runs 
of other publications that have been consulted, for example the Collier, the miners’ anti-
leadership newspaper in the 1970s. 
 
 
                                                          
363 From 1946 the newspaper had been owned by a non-party cooperative, the People’s Press Printing Society 
(PPPS). For more details, see Morgan, Kevin, ‘The CP and the Daily Worker’ in Opening the Books op.cit., pp. 
142-159. 
364 Another source of strife was the paper’s poor financial health. It lost 4,300 readers between February 1974 
and January 1976. See Chater, Tony, ‘The Morning Star’, Comment, 14:10, 15 May 1976, 151. During the 
party’s 35th Congress in 1977 a resolution was moved pushing a sales drive for the paper, and also seeking to 
expand the size of it, but were also critical of the party’s style and presentation. See Thompson, Good Cause, 
op.cit., 175. 
365 One of the most prolific authors was Bert Ramleson: for example, Donavon Exposed, 1968, and Carr’s Bill 
and How to Kill It, 1970. 
366 For example See Bolton, G, Act Now to End Unemployment, 1981 and Moffat, A, The Way Forward for the 
Miners, November 1945.  
67 
 
3.4 The NUM Offices, Barnsley 
Although not an archive I was fortunate enough to be able to visit and consult their range of 
NUM annual conference minutes. 367 These documents are initially difficult to understand: they 
assume a good understanding of the union constitution and processes, along with a knowledge 
of who key individuals were, as they are often referenced by an initial and surname.  My 
experience here certainly confirms Andrew Taylor’s argument, that there are methodological 
problems with the study of a large and complex organisation like the NUM. 368The chance to 
work in the building where many of the events I was writing about took place was fantastic. 
As E.H Carr pointed out, objectivity is often difficult because a personal interest is often a 
motivation to study a topic.369 Walking into the foyer, through the square-glass doors wooden 
doors that remain unchanged since the miners’ strike, was the closest I came to a conscious 
awareness of this. 
3.5 Modern Records Centre, Warwick 
The Modern Records Centre (MRC) holds the complete run of NUM annual conference 
minutes, as well as the summaries of the meetings of the Midlands area. In addition, the MRC 
has sporadic minutes relating to the NCB, but one of its most useful collections for the research 
has been the Lawrence Daly archive, in which I found private correspondence between Vic 
Allen and the CP. 370This correspondence, I believe, has not been used in any of the literature 
that I have read. 
3.6 The National Archives 
The main point of interest for this research at the National Archives (NA) was the broad 
selection of surveillance files relating to leading communists. Here the collection of files 
                                                          
367 This was a great experience. The building was known as ‘Arthur’s Castle’, because of its turret- shaped roof. 
The national office had controversially moved from London to Sheffield, before settling in Barnsley in the 
1990s, as the union shrank further. Little remains unchanged in the building, and it is a large building that now 
dwarfs the handful of staff who work there, a poignant reminder of the demise of the industry. I was allocated an 
office, which still had furniture and equipment from the period in it, creating a sense that the building was 
locked in the miners’ strike. Further evidence suggests this inertia: all taxi drivers knew where the building was, 
and expressed a keen interest in my reasons for visiting it, some of them being former miners themselves. 
Rested along the wall of the office that I was in was a huge portrait, with the image hidden; I suspected it was of 
Scargill, but was too polite to look! 
368 See Taylor, Andrew, ‘So Many Cases but so Little Comparisons: Problems of Comparing Mineworkers’, in 
Berger, Stephen, Croll, Alan, and  LaPorte, Norman, ed(s) Towards a Comparative History of Coalfield 
Societies, pp. 12-28. 
369 See Carr, E.H What is History? (London: Penguin, 1961),120. 
370 Daly, who we will come to later, was active in local Fife politics and was the NUM’s general secretary from 
1968 until February 1984. See Phillips, Collieries, op.cit., for more details (p23). 
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relating to the surveillance of Arthur Horner were found and consulted. 371 The bulk of these 
files relate to the Cold War period although, as Christopher Andrew pointed out in his official 
history of MI5, the NUM was also observed during the increase in miners’ militancy. Andrew 
found that communists in the NUM were trying to moderate Scargill’s policy, to no avail. Yet, 
even after consulting with the archivist who arranged the recent release of NCB files 
demonstrating that the Thatcher government’s planned run-down of mines was genuine, I could 
not find files relating to this. The NA also houses the minutes of the NCB, and these were 
consulted in instances where communists were present, and they also hold minutes of meetings 
between members of Heath’s government, which were also consulted.  
3.7 The British Library 
The British Library (both its London and Boston Spa sites) contains audio files of individuals 
who were interviewed as part of the ‘CPGB Biography’ project. I listened to the interviews of 
George Bolton and Frank Watters, both of which were immensely useful.  372 
3.8 South Wales’ Miners’ Library (SWML) 
This archive, largely established by Hywel Francis, contains (amongst other things) audio 
materials relating to communists and the broad left in the NUM. Most of these are interviews, 
although some are edited sections of the most poignant bits of the interviews, formatted into 
composite teaching cassettes, and some of the materials are also lectures delivered to miners 
by significant individuals373.  
3.9 Interviews 
The existing interviews, at the British Library and SWML, cover many leading individuals 
relevant to my research. Listening to the interviews at the British Library demonstrated the 
depth of information that interviews can potentially yield and it was a methodology that I had 
used to some extent during my BA dissertation, where I had interviewed a policeman and a 
miner. The decision to do interviews came fairly late in the research process and I was initially 
                                                          
371 These were most widely used in Nina Fishman’s biography. I also used them as a basis for a conference 
paper, ‘The Limits of Privacy’ at the University of Southampton in September 2014; I am currently producing a 
potential publication from this.  
372 The British Library also holds recordings of communists at meetings and talks; these were not consulted, 
because many of them were not directly involved in industrial matters, and they were the public presentation of 
communism, which has been well-documented, in this thesis and elsewhere.  
373 Sadly, some of the materials are polluted by sound interference from the tape itself, and some interviews 
initially appear blank, and long silences and inserts of random music have to be bypassed to find the interview. 
Future work might consider transcribing these interviews.  
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concerned about approaching individuals to be interviewed, given that the CP and the NUM 
both ended in effective civil war. I was concerned that interviewing individuals might be 
methodologically unreliable, and I was also unsure about how to protect the information I was 
given, particularly as it could be controversial. It seems that this is a common problem. In his 
1990 article, reflecting on the American Historical Association’s decision to produce seven 
guidelines for researchers using interviews, Oshinsky noted that oral history, although 
increasingly popular, ‘is often done and used without proper attention to professional 
obligations’. 374 
I initially submitted my ethical approval form, which clearly outlined what I hoped to 
achieve from the interviews, along with how the information and participants would be used 
and protected. The application also included examples of initial ‘recruitment’ emails, consent 
forms and proposed interview questions. Despite contacting numerous people I had a poor 
response rate.  For confidentiality reasons I have not included the list of individuals who I 
sought to interview and who either declined or ignored my contact. There are many speculative 
reasons for the poor response rate. It is possible that some contact details were incorrect. At its 
most simplistic, people may not have wanted to have been bothered by a PhD student. I also 
contacted some academics who had used the methodology, who all confirmed that they had 
had the same issue. I suspect that part of the problem in my case was that I am an unknown 
PhD student; there could be an issue of trust. I also suspect that many of the people that I am 
trying to locate could have succumbed to either old age or death. 
Therefore my sample is very small and I did consider not including my findings in the 
thesis for this reason. Additionally, I had to interview one individual through email, simply 
because that was their preference, and I felt that any information from them, however it was 
collected, was better than nothing. 375There are potential issues with this collection method: 
individuals have time to consider and edit their answers; they can under or over-answer certain 
questions; and there was no opportunity to press for more detail or adapt the interview as 
required. But even with these issues I still feel that the opportunity of speaking to these people 
gave the work more originality and depth. If interviews had been my primary methodology, 
then I expect it would have been a greater issue. Because the interviews were collected after 
much of the archive research had been done and used as extra information, I feel that including 
                                                          
374 Oshinsky, David, ‘Oral History: playing by the rules’, Journal of American History, 77:2 (September1990), 
pp. 609-614. This article lists the seven guidelines set out by the AHS. 
375 This pragmatism was compounded because, since my funding ended at the end of year three, I have been 
working full time in a non-academic job. 
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the material (with its limitations considered) was still a greater benefit than excluding it. 
Hopefully using the data from interviews to substantiate my existing findings will overcome 
the common criticism of interviews in historical research; that it can lead to a ‘narrow 
empiricism’ in which the results of the interviews are not fully explained.376 Furthermore it 
will also overcome the problem of their being enough data from interviews to draw 
conclusions; Carr warns that that can be problematic when looking at human agency. 377 
3.1.0 Analysis 
The data was analysed whilst other pieces of information were collected, simply due to the 
scale of the archives available and also because some sources needed to be revisited. This also 
made it clear where the gaps in the source material were, and what areas needed revisiting. One 
of the best ways that I was able to analyse the volumes of data was to capture it on a digital 
camera, which could then be uploaded, stored, and revisited. This allowed greater reflection on 
the source material, instead of trying to capture the gist of sources within the constraints of 
archive visits; photocopying would have been too expensive and time consuming. The majority 
of the primary sources that I looked at came from the CP and NUM themselves, and so it was 
important to be aware of subjectivity and agenda, particularly when both organisations began 
to implode. In one sense, though, these very problems were significant in helping me 
understand the particular context of the party’s industrial strategy in coalmining.  
3.1.1 Interpretation 
The structure of the thesis is chronological rather than thematic. I chose this because the 
ultimate point of the CP’s industrial strategy was that it had ambitions of facilitating some form 
of relationship between the party and Labour, and the test of if this ultimately worked has to 
be examined over time. Marwick has suggested that the chronological structure is the best 
approach for political history because it enables patterns to be examined over time. 378 A 
thematic structure would have been possible; for example, with sections such as ‘wage 
militancy’ and ‘party organisation’, but I feel that this would have been less clear to establish 
trends from. It is, however, an approach that I may consider if I was to consolidate the findings 
                                                          
376 See Samuel, Raphael, Theatres of Memory. Vol. I: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture (Verso: 
London,1995), 4 
377 Carr, History, op.cit., 70. 
378 Marwick, A, The Nature of History, (MacMillan Press: London, 1989), 242. 
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from the thesis for publication as an article, as I feel that it would be more succinct for that 
audience.  
3.1.2 Analysis of Methodology 
One of the biggest issues with the historical method is that it assumes a linear research journey, 
that sources will be consulted, analysed, and then interpreted. In reality I found that I had to re-
visit some archives; most notably the minutes of the NUM, which I was under-prepared for the 
first time that I used them. It became apparent, when trying to analyse the information from 
my first visit, that there were gaps or issues of clarity in my sources. I also realised, after a few 
months of researching, that it was much easier to take pictures of documents which I could 
then analyse and revisit later; this was much more effective but it meant revisiting documents 
that I had seen and not photographed. As the CP was a completely new area to me I also spent 
a lot of time looking at sources that gave a chronology of events. All three of these points would 
be much less of an issue in any future research. 
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IV War, wages, and nationalisation, 1945-1956. 
4.0 A National Miners’ Union 
In chapter one it was noted how coalmining might seem to best represent all the criteria of 
Marxist theory; certainly, the industry was not known for sending men to the ‘bowels of the 
Earth’ without some justification. 379 Between 1920 and 1943 some 517,000 men had left the 
industry, many of whom had reached the conclusion that other industries might provide a more 
favourable source of employment. 380 But it was war that best demonstrated the gross 
inefficiencies with the privatised British coal industry. In this environment, of a labour shortage 
and increased demand, the miners were in a strong bargaining position, a fact that both the 
coalmine owners and coalition government were well aware of. According to Paynter attempts 
to address the labour shortage through the Essential Work Order (1941) failed to direct enough 
manpower into the industry.381 Thus, the miners began to receive substantial monetary reward. 
The War Additions to Wages Agreement (1940) permitted wage rises in line with the cost of 
living. 382 The Greene Tribunal (1942) further raised wages and put a minimum weekly wage 
on all districts. 383  It also imposed compulsory arbitration, which effectively made official 
strikes impossible. 384 The ultimate result of these changes was that, in the immediate post-war 
period, miners suddenly found themselves elevated up the Ministry of Labour’s wage list, 
moving from 59th place to 23rd. 385  
But by far the biggest achievement to come out of war was the commitment to a 
nationalised industry, agreed at the Nottingham Conference (1944). Thereafter, change was 
rapid; the NUM was formed 1 January 1945 and, although the industry was formally 
nationalised two years later, the principals of nationalisation became a working reality from 
1945. 386The CP, quite legitimately, allowed itself a sense of satisfaction and involvement from 
                                                          
379 The National Coal Mining Museum in Wakefield offers visitors the chance to access this environment, 
through underground tours with former miners.  
380 Horner, Arthur, Coal and the Nation: A Square Deal for the Miners?, October 1943, 3. 
381 Paynter, Will, My Generation, (London: George Allen and Unwin ltd, 1972), 20. 
382 Handy, James, Wages Policy in the British Coalmining Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), pp. 26-27. 
383 See ‘Lord Greene Award summary of interpretations’ for details of the award and the MFGB’s reception of 
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these developments. 387 During the war both the CP and its members in the industry had 
encouraged production and chastised workers who went on strike; the party had turned from 
‘poachers to gamekeepers’, as Gildart has observed. 388 But the opportunity for the CP to take 
some credit for nationalisation had deeper roots and in their enduring efforts to secure an end 
to private ownership, there was commonality between communists in King Street and party 
members in industry, as pamphlets published though the party demonstrate. Pollitt had pursued 
this objective in Take over the Mines (1944), justified because it would help stimulate much-
needed production for the war effort. 389  
Similarly communists in the industry recognised the need for the industry to be brought 
into public ownership. Moffat’s The Way Forward for the Miners (1945) rejoiced at the 
realisation of nationalisation, ‘a fifty year dream’, and noted that ‘nationalisation will be a great 
step towards socialism’. 390 Horner’s Coal and the Nation (1943), for example, pressed for the 
‘establishment of a single control in the coal industry’. 391 Some four years later Horner, writing 
for the Daily Worker, could reflect on the benefit of the recent achievement: ‘We fought for 
nationalisation because it would permit the ordinary worker to unleash his initiative and genius 
in production without fear of consequences, in the sure knowledge of reward for his thought 
and effort’.392  
4.1 The post-war CP and Labour 
It is hardly surprising that the CP sought to support the party that had committed itself to 
delivering this much-anticipated goal and, with the arrival of the first majority Labour 
government, 1945 signified cause for tremendous optimism. The result of the 1945 general 
election evidenced a resounding level of support and Labour won 393 seats compared to the 
Conservative’s 213; even one of Labour’s own MPs wondered ‘if I should wake up to find it 
all a dream’. 393 In their delight, communists in the union and the party were in-step in their 
support for Clement Attlee’s administration. For the CP Labour’s success was ‘a glorious 
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political leap forward’, according to Dutt. 394 Similarly Moffat noted how Labour’s election 
offered unprecedented opportunities for the miners, which would ‘provide the possibility for 
more far-reaching and basic changes than we dared to imagine’. 395 Horner allowed himself a 
moment to savour the miners’ role in Labour’s unprecedented victory, in October 1945 writing 
that ‘it is largely as a result of the votes for Labour in the mining areas that the present Labour 
government has come into being’.396 The CP saw the Labour Party as the vehicle that offered 
them the best possibilities and the party was able to find evidence of socialist inclination, or 
even intent, in Labour’s election manifesto, Let Us Face the Future.  
But what motivated the CP’s support for Labour in 1945? 397 Neil Redfern has argued 
that the CP believed that Labour’s programme was a means to the communists’ revolutionary 
end, made possible because the ‘bourgeoisie had been so weakened by the war that they would 
have no option but to support a progressive post-war reconstruction that would ultimately lead 
to their demise’. 398 But this is a somewhat cynical proposition, which assumed that the CP was 
intent on playing only the short game; in reality, as chapter one demonstrated, the party was 
committed to gradualism in order to achieve its ultimate goal of working with, rather than 
against, Labour. More likely, therefore, was that the CP was living in the moment, attempting 
to take advantage of a favourable situation and imagining, as Callaghan suggests, ‘a role for 
itself in British politics alongside the Labour Party’. 399  
Labour would certainly need to maintain the miners’ support; however, once Attlee’s 
cabinet was in office, the government’s post-war economic recovery was based on utilising 
coal to increase industrial output and exports.400 But this was a gargantuan task and by October 
1945 there was a shortage of 16 million tonnes of coal.401 A protracted strike in this 
environment and/or falling production would be disastrous for both the country’s production 
needs and the success of Labour’s strategy; a fact that both King Street and coalfield 
communists knew full well. As such, there is again clear evidence of parity between the two 
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groups. Pollitt imagined that the CP had a role to play in winning ‘the political conviction’ of 
the workers, in order to secure greater production.402 Campbell warned that without increased 
production, there was a real danger of the Labour Party’s 1945 plan failing.403 Moffat urged 
miners to ‘cut out voluntary absenteeism. Work every shift there is to be worked. Let us entirely 
avoid sectional or pit stoppages’.404  
Due to the shared objective, namely the support of the Labour Party, there was a 
glimpse of what might happen if the party and its members in industry worked in tandem and 
both Horner and Moffat were able to promote the need to increase production into the TUC 
and NUM conferences throughout 1945 and 1946. At the 1945 NUM special conference 
Horner moved a resolution pledging support for production, which was carried unanimously. 
In doing so, Horner made it clear that dissidence would not be tolerated by the union: ‘if a 
person, having been made aware of our policy, flagrantly defies it, then in the interest of the 
membership we must apply sanctions against that person…he cannot be expected to be 
protected by an organisation whose policy he is defying’. 405 This commitment to production 
continued into the union’s 1946 annual conference. Moffat moved a resolution to attract 
manpower to the industry in order to secure increased production; Paynter, the delegate for 
South Wales, and Emlyn Williams, the party’s erstwhile broad left ally, both supported it. 406  
The result of all this was that communists in the NUM acted as foremen in Labour’s 
factory. In 1946, for example, both Moffat and Horner attended the TUC conference, where 
Moffat supported increased production, in order to ensure full employment. 407 Horner knew 
that miners were operating ‘in an industry which is at the base of Britain’s economic life’, but 
he also knew that without miners meeting the demand for coal ‘there cannot be a policy of full 
employment implemented in this country’. 408 Horner warned that without greater production, 
the country would grind to a halt. 409 Horner’s solution was the miners’ charter, a set of 
suggestions which covered both wages and bread and butter conditions, but which was also 
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intended to give ‘continuity to the life of Labour government’.410  In encouraging production 
to support the Labour government, communists in both the party and union were in sync with 
non-communists in the miners’ union. But how much did this parity represent a clear 
dissemination of the party’s line to its trade unionists or a coincidence? The latter seems more 
plausible as both communists in the industry and those in King Street wanted Labour’s policy 
to succeed; although it is doubtful that this was in any way motivated by altruism.  
But even with the significant support from the CP and communists in the NUM the 
Labour Party remained impervious to the CP’s good behaviour and advances. Branson points 
out that by August 1945 the CP had drawn its own conclusions about the prospects of any 
coalition between the two parties. 411 But there was another tactic to be tried and the 
communists persisted in their affiliation efforts with admiral tenacity; the party’s executive 
committee wrote to the party membership in January 1946, directing them to work ‘especially 
hard’ in achieving this task.  412 Hinton records how Attlee would never entertain this kind of 
offer for he worried (correctly, as it would later transpire) that the communists’ position in 
1945 may ‘somersault’, as it previously had. 413 Pollitt, trying to convince Attlee otherwise, 
attempted to justify the CP’s case in January 1946 on the grounds that an affiliation of the two 
groups would secure a united labour movement. 414  
But these efforts were in vain. At its 1945 conference the Labour Party had already 
convinced itself that the CP was not to be trusted. It organised its members in trade unions, the 
conference warned, and it was also willing to subordinate British interests to ‘outside’ ones. 415 
The NUM was also opposed to allowing the CP to become formally affiliated with a party that 
the union was inextricably linked to, and it voted against the proposals. 416 Although both the 
NUM and Labour were suspicious of the CP’s intentions when it was at its most friendly and 
conciliatory, the party may have persevered diligently and tenaciously in the hope that it would 
prove itself to be have legitimate and honest intentions. Although this may have been 
frustrating for the CP, its commitment to gradualism must have sustained its patience with the 
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task. What loomed on the horizon, however, would cause a change of tact that would also 
illuminate the gulf between the party itself and communists in the NUM. 
4.2 The Cold War  
It was the onset of the Cold War that was the catalyst for the CP’s sudden criticism of the 
government  that it had once supported  and which also created the conditions for the industrial 
strategy, outlined in chapter one, to be formulated.417 The Truman Doctrine, the Brussels Treaty 
and the formation of NATO all evidenced the CP’s new argument that the Labour Party had 
been polluted by right-wing reformism, which had allowed it to become a military ally of the 
USA. 418 This, the CP noted, made Britain subservient to ‘American big business and the 
maintenance of large armed forces’. 419There was, the communists argued, ‘a reserve of troops 
ready to be mobilised in the ideological war against the Soviet Union’.420 No longer could the 
CP encourage production, not whilst they held the view that it was geared only to ‘helping the 
American financiers and industrialists to help themselves to Europe’s markets’.421  
Pollitt set about deconstructing Labour’s victory of 1945 and by February 1947 he could 
write of the Labour Party’s ‘sunshine propaganda’ during the election.422 A sense of the Labour 
Party’s treachery henceforth became the CP’s dominant discourse. The Daily Worker started 
1948 by reporting that ‘Attlee swept to power in 1945 on the basis of socialist pledges, of 
promises of rising living standards, of lasting peace and of friendship with Russia, he now 
stands revealed as the betrayer of all these promises’. 423 The communists complained that ‘the 
militant members of the trade unions have supported the Labour Party because they believed 
the party was standing for a socialist programme, but the middle of the road policy now being 
operated is one that the militants are forced to fight’.424  This, of course, was based on the 
assumption that the so-called ‘militants’ in industry were answerable to the party, willing to 
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dance to the party’s new tune. This, in turn, supposed that the link between the CP and 
communists in industry was one of directed loyalty, and not autonomous latitude; as we have 
seen in chapter one, the party had not structured itself like this. It was not considered, however, 
how the CP would manage communists in industry in light of the party’s new position.  
4.3 The construction of the CP’s industrial strategy  
It was in Margate, at the party’s 19th Congress in February 1947, where Pollitt initially 
presented the new industrial strategy, which we outlined in chapter one, and it was 
disseminated with some repetition thereafter. As it had been repeatedly proven that attempted 
coalitions and affiliations with Labour were futile, the party turned its attention to the Labour 
Party annual conference, the policy-making forum where an array of bans and proscriptions 
made it clear that the party was not welcome. These restrictions evidenced the party’s extreme 
political marginality. Moffat, for example, was a member of both the CP and the Labour Party, 
but was prohibited from attending the party’s annual conference and, as he complained, ‘denied 
all democratic rights within the Labour Party’.425Nonetheless, the CP calculated that ‘to 
become a real driving force, able to carry through a Labour Party conference, the left must have 
its roots in the factories and trade unions and must be able to influence mass thought and action 
there’.426This strategy was fundamental to the CP’s agenda and was expressed with increasing 
confidence. By early 1949 the Daily Worker could write that ‘there cannot be a real mass 
movement unless we win support from the masses organised in the Labour Party, whether as 
individuals or through their trade union affiliation, united with the masses in the unions’. 427  
4.4 Nationalisation and the NCB 
Clearly, if the CP had reneged on its mission to champion support for production and the 
government, then it needed to find evidence to substantiate its new claim that the Labour Party 
was now an unprincipled class collaborator. The argument needed to be particularly strong in 
coalmining, whose nationalisation had been emblematic of the sense of optimism, of which the 
CP had been a most vocal advocate. The CP’s tactic was to disparage not the principle of 
nationalisation, for that may have been an admission of error on the party’s part; the critique 
rested on the implementation of Labour’s concept of nationalisation. That argument was 
propagated on multiple occasions, and came from the top of the party. Pollitt used World News 
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and Views to confirm that: ‘It is now clear that the aim of the Labour government in its 
nationalisation policy is to obtain cheap coal, power, transport for capitalism as a whole by 
creating a state capitalist industry run by capitalists, with the former trade union leaders 
occupying minor positions of responsibility on the boards’.428  The CP’s criticism of 
nationalisation extended to the governing structure of the industry, and in March 1947 Pollitt 
criticised the composition of the NCB for having only two of its nine members drawn from the 
working class. 429 But, just as Pollitt could make these criticisms, he was not willing to rectify 
the balance by sacrificing a key member of the party in the NUM to the NCB. In April 1947 
the security services observed that Pollitt was keen to make sure Horner’s wife continued to 
apply pressure to make sure that Horner refused the job that he had been offered on the NCB. 
430  
Where did this leave communists in the NUM? When the party had supported Labour, 
it was a merry coincidence that they were in-step. But, as the party changed tactic, subtle 
differences emerged between communists in the union; as there is no evidence that the CP 
prescribed a coherent line for these men to take, it is invariable that discrepancies and 
interpretations arose.  The temptation is to assume that ‘communists in the NUM’ were 
automatically working in synchrony with each other; in reality, largely due to the party’s 
relaxed industrial structure, there was often a gulf and the opportunity for conflict between 
communists in the NUM. A file from the security services suggested that there was antipathy 
between Moffat and Horner and that it was ‘scandalous that they never met, and that it showed 
what bad friends they really were’.431But the main evidence of conflicting opinions was not 
around the broader questions of Labour and nationalisation, but the NCB.432 At the 1948 NUM 
conference Moffat first expressed his suspicions about the composition of the NCB.  433 But 
when delivering the results of a report that had been sent out to union branches, seeking their 
comments about nationalisation, Horner claimed that the intention of the union in this exercise 
was not to attack, but rather improve, the NCB. 434 These differences become more apparent 
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through the men’s autobiographies. Reflecting on the first NCB in Incorrigible Rebel, Horner 
recalled that ‘I think that much of the success of coal nationalisation was due to the personnel 
of the first coal board’.435 But Moffat’s My Life saw the main problem as the fact that the first 
NCB was made up of ‘a majority of people who never supported nationalisation in their lives 
and never even supported labour’.436 
Moffat’s critique of nationalisation was also similar to the party’s in relation to the 
compensation that former coal owners were paid when the industry was privatised. In August 
1948, Pollitt predicted that in the first year of nationalisation the mines had a deficit of £23 
million, yet the former private owners had still received £164 thousand in compensation.437 But 
Moffat had criticised the policy two years earlier, before the union was even nationalised and 
when the CP was still an avid supportive of Labour. At the conference of Scottish miners in 
1946 Moffat reminded delegates that ‘we deplore the policy of huge sums of money being paid 
out in compensation to the owners who brought the industry to the verge of ruin’.438 
Interestingly, although Fishman places much emphasis on the sense of conflict between Horner 
and the party when Horner contravened the party’s position, here is clear evidence that Moffat 
was publicly adopting a different position to the CP itself. There is no evidence that the party 
challenged this. Moffat’s was a consistent critique and it eventually brought him more into 
synchrony with the party; by the summer of 1949 Moffat had a resolution opposing the levels 
of compensation being paid carried at the NUM annual conference. 439 In 1950 Moffatt moved 
a resolution at the TUC conference, which was carried, which proposed that the general council 
‘give early attention’ to the amounts of compensation being paid. 440 
Both Horner and Moffat would later claim in their autobiographies that they realised 
that nationalisation in 1945 was not perfect; it was clear, however, that Moffat had been the 
most vocal critic of it. Horner understood the realistic possibilities of nationalisation under a 
Labour government; whilst he would have liked to have asked for workers’ control and the 
nationalisation of coal distributors, he knew that nationalisation under capitalism was a 
completely different thing to nationalisation under socialism. 441 This logic of pragmatism and 
arguably gradualism was, to some extent, influenced by Horner’s Leninism, and he reasoned 
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that ‘Lenin once said that it would take three decades for men to adjust themselves to new 
circumstances’. 442 Horner was ‘conscious of the many deficiencies in the administration of 
this first great nationalised industry’ but equally was committed to ensuring that ‘whatever the 
faults…we will never go back’. 443 Wal Hannington’s papers suggest that one of the reasons 
for the CP’s ‘disappointment’ at nationalisation was because in 1945 they had assumed that it 
was synonymous with socialism. 444 It is probable, although not conclusive, that Horner and 
Moffat’s disappointment with nationalisation, conveyed differently, was at least in part 
political; but that it was also motivated by the sense that, as noted in chapter two, little had 
changed in practical terms for miners under nationalisation.  
4.5 Production and Saturday working  
The onset of the fuel crisis in February 1947, the result of the fuel shortage that had perennially 
dogged the nascent union, put further pressure on the men and their union to produce more. A 
report into the industry by the TUC noted that not only had the government grossly under-
estimated how much coal was needed, but also documented how 1,000 men per week were 
leaving the industry, seeking alternative sources of employment. 445  In March 1947, despite 
the CP now opposing increased production, Horner was able to use the Daily Worker to 
encourage production.446 Whilst the reason for Horner’s continued support was largely 
practical he also had a personal motivation for continuing to advocate production, particularly 
because he had committed the union to high levels of production when he had negotiated the 
five day week with six days’ pay for miners in 1947. As the production demands got higher, 
the endeavours to honour the union’s side of the agreement invariably got harder. Moreover 
there was a political motivation to this, which had been made clear in the letter that all members 
of the NUM had received in April 1947, calling for continued production to avoid discrediting 
the NCB and Labour government. 447 Horner’s position is not surprising: but the fact that he 
was able to express it though party publications, when the CP’s position had changed, is 
revealing. 
But the numerous unofficial strikes in the industry threatened to do just that. Sammy 
Moore of the CP and Powergroup noted that unofficial strikes threatened to ruin nationalisation 
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and place the ‘life of the Labour Government in jeopardy’. 448 At the 1947 NUM conference 
Horner’s frustration was clear and he told delegates that ‘following the greatest single 
concession in our industry’ there had been no decrease in strikes: his personal research into 
120 of these unofficial strikes, over three weeks, had demonstrated that in ninety-nine percent 
of them ‘men went back with nothing they wanted’. 449 At the same conference Moffat added 
his support for production, whilst absolving the miners and the Labour Government of any 
responsibility in the coal crisis.450 Moffat also refuted any claim that the five day week had 
failed. 451  
Such support was needed because at the NCB’s request, and in order to fulfil the 
demand for coal, an Extension of Hours Agreement was introduced by Horner at a special 
conference of the union later that year, although the blow was softened somewhat because 
districts were permitted autonomy regarding how to implement it. 452 The agreement was 
extended in 1948, however, and Horner justified it to the union on the basis of the commitment 
that he had made to the NCB.453 Horner’s actions evidence Fishman’s observation of Horner’s 
social democratic values; but Horner enjoyed Moffat’s support on the grounds that the 
agreement ‘supports the Labour government’.454 Horner, Moffat, and Moore were still 
supporting the government in July 1948, at least six months after the CP’s criticism of it had 
become most vocal. There is no sense of conflict between these men and the party; if there had 
been then, unlike Fishman’s focus on Horner, surely Moffat too should have been in the same 
position. 455Apart from criticisms of the NCB and levels of compensation, Moffat’s position 
only noticeably changed once Churchill’s Conservative party won the 1951 general election. 
456 Moffat’s autobiography suggests that it was the change of government that changed his 
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outlook, so that he came to believe production would only be driving rearmament and not 
direction from the CP. 457   
4.6 Anti-communism  
Invariably the CP’s new position served to make it synonymous with Britain’s Soviet nemesis. 
The extent to which the independent position of communists in the union was motivated by a 
desire not to be associated with the anti-communist Cold War hostility is difficult to ascertain. 
It is likely that these men were primarily motivated by what they felt was better for the union; 
but they must have been aware of their precarious position. The party was so isolated by 1948 
and 1949 that Watters and McGahey were called into the Scottish office of the CP to be told 
that ‘we could go underground’. 458 The CP was already small and, even during a period when 
it had been conciliatory, it had failed to make any political capital. Now, faced with the 
onslaught of hostility to the Soviet Union with which the party was presumed synonymous, it 
faced severe difficulties. In 1948 Morgan Phillips, the general secretary of the Labour Party 
and a former miner, produced a circular which warned that ‘we can expect communist-inspired 
attempts to foment discontent in the factories . . . we can expect intensified attempts to 
undermine and destroy the labour movement from within’. 459  
Subsequently further attempts to tackle the communist threat followed: the Black 
Circular (1949) stopped communists being elected to trades councils; the Common Cause 
(1952) was formed as a means to unite anti-communists;460 by January 1955 Charles Geddon 
of the TUC warned ‘beware the wicked communists, who are out to undermine industry and 
destroy Britain’s marvellous prosperity’.461 But there was also the approach of simply giving 
the CP enough rope to hang itself. Reflecting on Pollitt’s 1953 pamphlet, What Do Miners 
Need, the security services mused that attacking the pamphlet through counter-propaganda 
would only ‘lead to resentment at the interference in the internal affairs of the NUM’. 462 It 
would be much more effective, the report said, to leave miners to draw their own conclusions 
about ‘a party which puts up a boiler maker to tell the miners what they need’!463 The extent to 
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which all of this impacted the position of communists in trade unions is negligible, however; 
by 1961 only three of the 183 unions affiliated to the TUC had formally banned communists. 
464   
But this is not to say that life did not have the potential to get difficult for communists 
in the union who in some instances did face hostility because of their politics, even when they 
were only supporting resolutions made by right-wing areas. In 1951, for example, Paynter 
supported Yorkshire’s resolution that viewed the rising prices caused by importing raw 
materials as indicative of the rearmament policy of the Labour government and its subservience 
to America. 465Although the resolution was eventually passed one fellow South Wales delegate 
took the trouble to point out to the entire conference that Paynter’s view was anomalous 
amongst the South Wales coalfield. 466 Sam Watson, of Northumberland, used the 1953 Labour 
Party conference to encourage stronger proscriptions in the union against communists. 467 
Communists lower down the union had trouble too. Anti-communism was a convenient method 
through which non-communists could denigrate those in the CP, particularly in elections.  Kane 
recalled the hostility against ‘Kane the Red’ during his successful election campaign for 
compensation agent for Barnsley.468 Kane was told by the NCB area official that the miners 
wanted him to resign from the CP, which Kane refused to do. 469 When Kane asked the men if 
this was true he recalls being told ‘“No, we’ve never said nothing.” The bastard was making it 
up’. 470  
But even in these clear instances of anti-communism the NUM itself largely remained 
loyal to its members who were in the party. 471In 1955 a circular was in existence, which 
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suggested that the Lanarkshire branch of the CP was arranging meetings to capture trade union 
branches but, at least according to Moffat, the entire NUM executive committee saw it and 
drew the conclusion that it was nothing more than a general bulletin of the party. 472 Following 
the pressure that the press put on the NUM to remove Moffat after the Hungarian Uprising, he 
was able to remain committed to both his party and his job, later stating that ‘no one would 
succeed in compelling me to change my politics, no matter what the consequences’. 473  
4.7 Countering anti-communism 
The continuity of communists in the union during the Cold War was largely because of their 
adherence to union democracy; as such they refused to conform to the image of a hostile 
Russian emissary that their critics attempted to create for them. Thus when Moffat was 
challenged that his party was undemocratic in its trade union work he dismissed, with 
legitimate confidence, the accusations as ‘amusing’, claiming that ‘there is not one communist 
holding a union leading position in the miners’ trade union who has not been elected by a 
majority vote of the members’.474 William Pearson, the communist Scottish area secretary, 
recalled satirically that he had ‘infiltrated’ the NUM aged sixteen. 475 There is no sense that 
leading communists in the union rescinded from moving resolutions that they either had 
conviction in, even if they might be perceived as ‘progressive’. For example at the 1950 NUM 
conference, Moffat told delegates that ‘huge military expenditure, colonial wars and 
preparations for a third world war is having a serious effect on the living and social standards 
of the British people’. 476 In 1951 Paynter could second a resolution from the Scottish area 
seeking friendship between Britain and the Soviet Union, which was passed. 477In 1956 Moffat 
and the Scottish area were able to secure a resolution not only proposing unity between Britain 
and the Soviet Union, but advocated the ‘need for more trade and better understanding to the 
mutual advantage of both countries’. 478  
But communists in the NUM could also be shrewd in their actions when necessary and 
if it meant that they could avoid becoming the personification of the soviet threat. The most 
obvious example of this occurred in 1949 when Paynter, moving a resolution to ‘heal the 
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breach’ between the British trade union movement and the World Federation of Trade Unions, 
found that not only was his resolution rejected by the union executive in light of the Cold War, 
but that the conference descended into an attack on soviet communism. 479 In this example, 
however, the position of Moffat is interesting and demonstrates the ambiguous position of 
communist trade unionists in the NUM. Moffat (and Horner) both sat on the executive that 
rejected Paynter’s resolution, although it is unknown (and unlikely) that both men opposed it. 
But, certainly, there is no record that Moffat attempted to formally support Paynter’s resolution 
either. This may be surprising; Moffat was clearly interested in building links with the World 
Federation of Trade Union (WFTU). Just five months after the union’s conference 1949 
conference the security services tracked Moffat to France, with George Allison, where they 
suspected that the communists were collecting information on behalf of the WFTU. 480 This 
paradox is emblematic of the overall problem, of communists giving primacy to their union 
duties where it was needed. Therefore, in Moffat’s case, it was possible to be a senior member 
of a trade union that was pivotal to the government’s post-war economic recovery plan and 
simultaneously a potential enemy of the state.  
But was there a difference in the way that the party and communists in the union dealt 
with the problems that the Cold War brought? Whilst communists in the union could 
disassociate themselves with the claims made about their party by continuing to fulfil their 
trade union obligations, the CP could defend itself by pointing to the ‘gross confusion and 
perverse ignorance’ of these claims.481 Publicly, the party also refused to conform to its image 
of pro-Soviet saboteur. Despite trying, the security services found no evidence that a new CI 
was being formed, and the CP was notably absent from the Cominform. From 1951 the party’s 
new programme, the British Road to Socialism (BRS), put the CP in the paradoxical position 
of being viewed as ‘an agent of foreign power, whilst simultaneously advocating broad 
coalition politics’. 482 It was certainly in the party’s interest that they were disingenuous about 
the trajectory of the BRS, and they kept the fact that ‘Stalin was in favour of the sharpest 
possible expression of the main ideas of the programme’ confined to the party’s trusted inner 
caucus.  483 Leading members of the CP looked to the industrial strategy as evidence of their 
amicable intent. Campbell, hyperbolically, protested that ‘the communists do not infiltrate the 
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working class, they are bone of its bone and the flesh of its flesh’. 484 Pollitt used the Daily 
Worker to reassure those who needed it that party members were obliged to ‘set an example’ 
in their trade union work; that they should uphold democracy within the unions by their 
willingness to ‘stand for periodic elections’, of which no communist should fear; and that they 
should strive to be ‘the best leaders’ in their trade union work.485 There was parity between the 
party and communists in the union in their defence against these charges. Moffat, rebuffing ‘an 
attack’ by Herbert Morrison of the Labour Party regarding his communism, pointed to the fact 
that he had been democratically elected; he added that ‘the great majority of miners are not 
mugs because they vote for someone whose politics are not accepted by Mr. Morrison’. 486 
Pollitt’s insistance in the merit of democratic elections meant that the party could 
provide a legitimate defence. This respect for democracy was also shared by communists in 
the union; Moffat could point to the fact that in 1949 the Scottish area of the NUM, of which 
he was president, had submitted a resolution calling for all NUM officials to be re-elected every 
five years. 487Communists in the union could stand in elections, even during the Cold War, and, 
even if they did not win, they could draw a credible number of votes. 488Paynter’s victory in 
October 1951, where he became president of the South Wales area of the NUM, was a case in 
point. 489 In 1954 Moffat stood in the union’s presidential election and achieved 162,369 votes 
to Ernest Jones’s 348,391. 490 As an effect of Jones’s success Eddie Collins, a ‘close friend and 
ally of the party’ was elected to the position of Yorkshire area general secretary.491This in turn 
created a vacancy for a Yorkshire area vice president and the party was confident enough to 
field Sammy Taylor, who polled a respectable 13,000 votes against Sam Bullough, who won 
with 27,000 votes. 492  
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4.8 Building the party: project Yorkshire 
Yet there remained work to be done. In October 1953 this began in earnest when a former 
miner and CP area secretary for West Lothian migrated south to Yorkshire, much to the 
disgruntlement of his mother, but at the request of the party.493 The man was Frank Watters 
and his mandate, according to his memoirs, was to build up a ‘cohesive left organisation’ and 
insulate the miners from the strong right-wing element which dominated the Yorkshire pits.494 
Watters’s task was to unify Yorkshire’s 150,000 miners, who were situated across 130 pits, in 
order to form a ‘group of outstanding mining comrades’ committed to the party.495  The CP 
had identified a need for Watters in the area, recognising its potential, and in May 1951 a report 
from the Yorkshire district of the CP had indicated that the miners had been the ‘weakest, rather 
than the strongest, link in the economic struggle’. 496 A memorandum from Yorkshire to the 
political committee in 1954 suggested that area be graced with visits from leading communists, 
including Pollitt, Gallacher and Moffat; whether the party was receptive to these suggestions, 
and if the visits materialised, is undocumented. 497It is clear that the party had seen a potential 
for development, diagnosed a problem, and dispatched Watters, as the party organiser in the 
area, to build the solution. But there was over a two-year gap between the Yorkshire report and 
Watters’s arrival.  Although not mentioned in his memoirs, an interview with Watters in 2000 
revealed that the CP had previously had a ‘lad from London’ trying to build the party’s 
influence in the area’s mines. 498The nameless figure, whose identity Watters would not 
disclose, failed because he had not been a miner, thus he lacked the ability to communicate 
with the men. 499What Watters also did not disclose was if the decision to replace the original 
organiser with Watters was his choice, or the party’s decision. But the failings of the plan 
clearly demonstrated what would happen when communists who were not familiar with certain 
industries were parachuted into them to build the party. 
4.9 Wage militancy and wage restraint  
How did the CP envisage that the necessary politicisation would be achieved? Wage militancy 
was the crux of the strategy. Even during the war, Callaghan points out, Pollitt had already 
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‘justified wage militancy as a countervailing force to the inbuilt recessionary tendencies of a 
capitalist economy’.500 But there were further motivations. A report in 1950 by the party’s 
economic committee justified wage militancy because of its potential benefits, suggesting that 
‘an improvement in wages and conditions in nationalised industries would cause workers in 
the private sector to demand nationalisation also and so it would spread’. 501Tommy Walker, 
an NUM branch delegate from the Yorkshire area, suggested that wage militancy might be 
used to rid the Labour Party of its reformism: it would have a politicising function because it 
created a link between communists in industry and the party and it would also cause a conflict 
between the government and the union.  502 The party’s propaganda around wage militancy 
also presented the case on precise economic grounds, which it could then link back to its 
ideological position. British workers generally, the party claimed, had only seen a five per cent 
increase in real wages between 1949 and 1955, the lowest in Europe, especially in comparison 
to France, whose workers had enjoyed a 29 percent rise.503 Therefore, the communists argued, 
to maintain their standard of living workers were compelled to work overtime in order to offset 
the rising prices that were allowed to remain unchecked by Labour and, from 1951, the 
Conservatives. 504 Campbell blamed this on ‘the £1,500 million war budget that is driving up 
living costs’.505 The cost of the war budget, Margot Heinemann noted, was equivalent to 11s 
6d per week for every British man, woman and child. 506 This analysis could be applied to 
various industries, including the NUM. Heinemann reported how between October 1947 and 
April 1951 underground workers in the NUM had secured wage increases of between ten and 
twenty percent, but the retail price index had risen by twenty percent across the same period 
because of the war drive. 507 
The dominant discourse of both Labour and Conservative parties and governments was 
that increased wages caused inflation and the preferred cure to rising inflation was wage 
restraint, first used by Labour in 1948. 508 The Labour Party conference in 1951 suggested that 
without it ‘a wave of inflation, which could do utmost harm to our economy with great harm 
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to the living standards of the workers, would result’. 509 By 1956 Anthony Eden’s government 
had noted in its White Paper, the Economic Implications of Full Employment, the existence of 
a ‘perpetual, upward spiral in wage claims and the cost of living’. 510 Invariably a clear conflict 
between the government and the unions, which the CP predicted and hoped to nurture due to 
its expected politicising benefits, was sure to erupt. In this critique there was a similarity 
between the CP and communists in industry. Both Horner and Moffat had spoken out against 
wage restraint between 1948 and 1953. In Trade Unions and Communism, written by Horner 
for the CP in 1948, he was highly critical of the Americans who were ‘intensifying their 
campaign against socialism’ and the complicit Labour Party who had abandoned Let us face 
the Future in favour of ‘ill-conceived endeavours to keep wages pegged whilst profits riot 
unchecked’. 511 This was to some extent an enduring philosophy and in 1955 Horner criticised 
wage restraint through the Daily Worker.512 Moffat was equally critical of wage restraint and 
in 1951 he noted that the miners’ ability to push for, and in some cases secure, wage demands 
was evidence that workers would no longer accept wage restraint and imperialist policies. 513 
The following year Moffat gave the example of a successful wage increase which was the 
‘biggest single increase ever achieved by miners’. 514The claim had been cleared in three 
weeks, as evidence of the miners’ ‘strength and position’. 515 Whilst writing his autobiography 
in 1962, after he retired from the NUM, Moffat appeared to repeat the party line as regard to 
the relationship between wages, prices and profits, saying that ‘wage restraint under any 
government will always mean increased profits for the employing class, and that is the reason 
why it should be opposed’.516 
But although communists in the union wrote in party publications about the fallacy of 
wage restraint, and appeared to support wage militancy, this support did not always make the 
transition into their union duties. Theoretically, although the sentiment of wage militancy was 
not disputed, implementing it in the NUM was not as obvious. The NUM met in December 
1949 to vote on the TUC’s report, which advocated the government’s policy of wage restraint. 
The executive committee of the union (inclusive of Moffat and Horner) accepted the TUC’s 
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recommendation on the grounds of the ‘serious economic position of the country’. 517 Horner 
admitted that not all miners were well paid, but also noted the need to restrain the wages of 
some in order to resolve the ‘greater total problem’. 518 Paynter argued that it was prices that 
continued to rise whilst wages were checked and that was because of Britain’s links to 
‘American imperialism’.519 Moreover, Paynter said, ‘we should see the crisis of capitalism as 
an opportunity for an advance to socialism’.  520 Indeed, seven months later, Moffat went to 
great lengths to avert the possibility of the NUM breaching wage restraint. At the 1950 NUM 
conference Kent, Scotland, and Cumberland moved a composite resolution to secure higher 
wages; Moffat knew that this would breach the TUC’s recommendation of labour’s wage 
restraint. 521This was a potential for conflict, militant action on wages, according to the CP’s 
rationale. But Moffat actively tried to circumvent the problem of infringing on Labour’s policy 
by using the War Addition to Wages Agreement to claim that the wage increase could be 
justified under that agreement, rather than challenging the policy of wage restraint. 522 This 
position could cause communists in the union to work against each other. At the 1956 union 
conference, for example, Paynter moved composite resolutions 22 and 23 on behalf of South 
Wales and the Kent area seconded it; the resolution sought to authorise the executive to ‘claim 
increased wages to offset any worsening of real wages’. 523Horner followed the motion by 
making it clear that ‘if this resolution means the use of the industrial machine for the purpose 
of achieving political ends, that is not the sort of motion this conference should support’. 
524Paynter retorted ‘who suggested that it did?’, and the resolution was moved.  525 
Communists in the NUM also debated with each other if wage claims and wage reforms 
could be simultaneously pursued. At the union’s 1954 conference the reform of the wage 
structure for day wage men was the primary question. 526Paynter believed that it was possible 
to pursue both the new wage structure and wage claims simultaneously. Les Ellis, of the 
Nottinghamshire coalfield, who was also in the CP, wanted the two demands kept separate. 
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527Jack Dunn, from the Kent area, then sought a wage increase but Horner defended the urgency 
of the wage structure over the pay award. Wage claims, Horner suggested, took so long to 
negotiate that tying the union up in wage claims would delay the new structure. Perhaps this 
was also a way to move the focus of the conference away from wage claims. Moffat resolved 
the immediate situation but in doing so gave primacy to the need to address the wage structure. 
This was something to which Moffat had been consistently committed and in 1947 the Daily 
Worker reported him as saying that ‘nationalisation cannot be a complete success so long as 
we have the inequalities and anomalies which exist under the current wages structure, a relic 
of the days of private enterprise’.528 In 1954 Moffat suggested that the wage claim be paused 
for six months, to give the conference the chance to commence the new wage structure. 529 In 
October 1953 the security services had captured Kerrigan wanting to talk to Horner to get him 
to ‘lay off the wages structure thing’.530 But, in their primacy of the wage structure 
amendments, as opposed to the wage demand, both Horner and Moffat disregarded the CP’s 
instruction. 531This demonstrates one of the great and enduring issues with wage militancy; 
even if communists in the union might have theoretically supported it, practically they gave 
primacy to whatever was the greatest issue in the NUM, even if this meant edging toward wage 
restraint. Moreover, due to the way that the CP had structured its links with members in unions, 
largely because of direction from Russia, it could not overcome these kind of fundamental, 
strategic issues. 
4.1.0 Piecework  
The pattern that is being evidenced should not be surprising, given what we have already noted 
about the motivations of communists in the union. There were serious issues, mostly around 
pay, which threatened to obliterate the national unity of the union, and reform to the day wage 
pay structure was the tip of the iceberg; by 1951 there were 1,160 different jobs in the industry. 
532 The gulf between communist trade unionists supporting wage militancy, but applying it in 
the union, was made more complex by piecework.  Although miners had benefitted materially 
from the particular conditions of war pieceworkers had secured a disproportionate advantage 
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as a result of these developments. The Revision of the Wages Structure Agreement (1944) had 
over-compensated pieceworkers, who were already relatively well-paid, because it added flat 
rates to the piece rates. 533 By 1947 the agreement had caused a gap of 84.5 percent between 
the lowest paid and the pieceworkers. 534 There were even divisions between pieceworkers 
nationally and in Scotland rates were as much as 6 s lower than in England and Wales.535 Piece 
rates were negotiated within districts, but also within individual pits, and autonomy was given 
to local and area union officials. 536  Moreover, on top of the tonnage produced, there were 
multiple allowances that were calculated at the point of production. Piecework was generally 
calculated on a team, rather than an individual, production level, which created grievances. 537 
All of this meant that, as happened in the 1955 Armthorpe unofficial strike, Doncaster miners 
could try to bring their counterparts in West Yorkshire out only to find that when they waved 
their payslips at them the West Yorkshire men were actually paid less. 538 
But the CP saw potential, not problems, from this situation. The party used the Daily 
Worker to promote the case for higher wages, noting that the growing unrest in the coalfields 
was ‘like a match waiting to explode’.539 Watters found a coalfield ‘rife with rank and file 
militancy’ largely because of the piecework system, which did not reflect the amount of coal 
produced. 540 Watters’s great hope was that he could overcome these divisions through the 
‘right pit and the right leadership’ and push the ‘bushfires’ into something that would ‘set the 
entire coalfield ablaze’. 541 George Allison’s Coal and the Miners (1951), published by the CP, 
encouraged the view that ‘nothing will be given to the miners, unless they are prepared to fight 
for it and if necessary use their organised strength to fight for it’. 542The solution, he claimed, 
was not increased production, but ‘a fresh dose of old fighting trade union spirit’. 543 But these 
sorts of sentiments were generic and they were not tailored to the miners or the particular 
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conditions of mining. They ignored the federalism of the union and the high instance of 
localised and unofficial strikes; this demonstrates that the party could never understand a 
specific industry like communist trade unionists could. Therefore communists in the union saw 
in piecework and wage disparity the potential for strife, which might ultimately threaten the 
nationalised industry. Horner knew that piecework caused strikes which threatened to obliterate 
the ‘long and laborious work’ that trade unionists put in to unifying the NUM.544 But 
communists in the union also understood the potential for making a bad situation worse through 
meddling in the pay arrangements of pieceworkers. 545Horner knew that abolishing piecework 
would be ‘calamitous’. 546 Moffat also knew that ‘unofficial stoppages will never be eliminated 
in the coalfield so long as this bad system prevails’. 547   
4.1.1 Unofficial strikes 
Whilst conflicting policies between the party and communist trade unionists has so far been 
evidenced, and there have been occasions where communists at national level were in 
disagreement, it is in the area of unofficial strikes where the fragmented and chaotic structure 
of the CP’s industrial strategy is most obvious. Unofficial stoppages were a growing problem, 
and in one year alone increased from 1,637 in 1951 to 2,365 in 1952.548Communists at the top 
of the union were against these types of strikes. Paynter gave the best rationale for why this 
was the case: they usurped the authority of the national leadership, they were sectional and they 
were unconstitutional. 549 Moore worried that unofficial stoppages, lightening and stay-in 
strikes was a threat to the vitality of nationalisation. 550Part of the criticism tied into the sense 
that nationalisation had brought a profound change, where such tactics were not befitting of a 
nationalised union; as Horner waspishly told the Durham winders in May 1947 that ‘the time 
has gone when you had to resort to strike action to impress the union’.551 Communists in the 
union knew that these eruptions of sporadic militancy created the perception that the unions 
could not ‘keep order in their own house’, which might make a case for denationalising the 
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industry.552 Despite recognising the problem, the issue for the union was trying to resolve the 
tendency for men to down tools before attempts at a negotiation could commence. Horner was 
well aware of the major issue here and in 1947 he told delegates to the NUM conference that 
‘there is no force that can make these men do what they are convinced they ought not to do. 
There is no power in Heaven or Hell that can make miners do things against their judgement’. 
553  
The difficulty with controlling these unofficial strikes is most evident in the Yorkshire 
coalfield an area which by 1953 had a full-time communist organiser, Watters. In South 
Yorkshire collieries were organised into panels and in 1954 Edlington looked to the Doncaster 
panel for support for a wage claim that they were formulating for a ‘substantial increase’. But 
Bob Wilkinson, the communist delegate for Woodlesford, called a strike over the same issue, 
before he gave Edlington time to put their case to the rest of the panel. 554 The result was that 
flying pickets landed in Doncaster, whose miners (not wanting to cross a picket line) then 
moved the picketing into West Yorkshire; here, the pickets were evicted by police and the panel 
officials were obliged to sign an agreement to end the strike. For Watters this event had two 
main implications: in the long-term it ‘undid the years of work devoted to getting clarity along 
with the necessary preparation for an all-out coalfield strike’ and in the short-term it lost Kane 
support in the Yorkshire vice-presidential election that year. Bearing in mind that this area was 
under the jurisdiction of Watters, whilst other areas did not have a full time organiser, 
Wilkinson at least had the benefit of having his errors pointed out by a ‘furious’ Watters who 
told him that ‘he should have been consolidating his own area and then appealing for the 
support of others’. 555 
There was no sense that the CP learned from Wilkinson’s actions. The chaos continued 
into the Armthorpe strike in May 1955, where Kane was the delegate. 556 The source of the 
problem was allowances for pieceworkers and the Armthorpe men were able to secure 90,000 
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participants in the strike. 557 Fred Collinridge, the moderate Yorkshire area NUM 
representative, attempted to get a ballot in advance of the strike but Kane whipped up enough 
support at the mass meeting of Armthorpe miners that he was able to tell Collinridge ‘there is 
only one way we vote at Armthorpe, and that is with a show of hands…you know where you 
can stick your ballot paper’. 558 The Armthorpe branch was able to secure the support of the 
rest of the Doncaster panel for their strike. 559 The decisions of local communists to lead their 
branches into unofficial strike meant that Horner was compelled to negotiate with the NCB on 
the union’s behalf. Horner had originally been dispatched from London to try and persuade the 
strikers to go back to work, but had been unsuccessful. 560 Although Kane and Horner knew 
each other well, when Horner asked to meet Kane, Kane refused unless Horner would meet the 
entire branch committee’. 561  Moreover, Horner negotiated the resolution to the strike with Bill 
Sales of the NCB; but it was only through reading a tiny column in the Doncaster Post that 
Watters (the area organiser) heard of the settlement. Watters is rather non-committal about his 
role in the strike, saying simply that he and Ramelson (at this time the Yorkshire area secretary) 
‘were daily involved’. Where was the CP’s industrial organiser, Peter Kerrigan, in all of this? 
The role of the industrial organiser, according to Seifert and Sibley, was to be the link between 
the party and the union. 562 It could be argued that perhaps Kerrigan was too busy to bother 
himself with another small dispute in the mining industry. But the implications of the 
disorganisation of the party’s response to it, in a coalfield where the CP was trying to build 
influence, might suggest that Kerrigan should have been in some way involved.  Perhaps 
Kerrigan’s involvement was verbal, and undocumented; but, even so, we might expect to see 
it referenced in Watters’s or Kane’s account. Kerrigan is only mentioned by Fishman, who says 
that Kerrigan sought to encourage Watters and Ramelson to mobilise all available forces; but 
there is no footnote provided citing where this evidence comes from. 563  
What do these two strikes demonstrate about the party’s industrial strategy in the NUM? 
On one hand they evidence the disorganisation in an area that the CP had identified as needed 
a dedicated organiser. But they also demonstrate the clear lack of communication between the 
organiser and communists on the ground. Perhaps part of the problem was that these men, such 
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as Wilkinson and Kane, had some degree of authority within the union; this allowed them to 
make decisions and they were not compelled to liaise or discuss with the party. A comparison 
of the Edlington and Armthorpe examples also demonstrates that for communists on the ground 
there was a lack of instruction from the party; thus, when they took the initiative, they 
invariably contravened either the party’s line or the NUM’s policy. It is hardly surprising that 
communist trade unionists largely chose to keep their politics out of their union business.  The 
situation of a communist NUM leader having to negotiate with another communist who had 
called an unofficial strike must have happened on numerous occasions, if the volume of 
unofficial strikes is anything to go by. But Armthorpe, because it secured concessions and 
because it involved such large numbers of men, has been recorded in some detail. Armthorpe 
was a large unofficial strike: the CP could have either tried to develop it into an official strike 
or, more probably, suggested that it was an unofficial strike, and so advocate that it was called 
off.  There is no evidence that the CP arbitrated between Kane and Horner, or instructed Watters 
to do this, although it had apparently committed to doing so. Paynter told the CP the problems 
with these ‘tit for tat’ unorganised strikes, often involving pieceworkers. 564 He suggested that 
the CP ‘did what it could to reduce this kind of internal conflict’ but does not elaborate on how 
this was the case and suggests that the party later abandoned this effort. 
4.1.2 Prospects for unofficial strike action  
Communists at the top of the union knew that these pockets of disputes were emblematic of 
the frustrations that miners faced; they also knew that they were unlikely to cause any positive 
change. There was a structural reason why these unofficial strikes would never be able to 
graduate to official strike action and the union’s compulsory arbitration machinery, which did 
not disappear until 1961, effectively made official strikes illegal. Moffat was aware that 
‘national strike action in support of wage claims was ruled out by the compulsory arbitration 
agreement’. 565 Thus, at a special conference of the union in December 1950, he voiced his 
intention to try and change the conciliation machinery of the union; he envisaged a ballot vote 
to see if a deadlocked dispute should go to arbitration level. 566 Paynter knew this too; he knew 
that ‘national arbitration is now the vehicle for operating wage restraint’. 567Bolton knew that 
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the long-winded trajectory of taking a grievance through the arbitration process caused walk-
outs. 568 Pollitt identified the need for the end of compulsory arbitration, but it did not appear 
to prompt him to evaluate the difficulties with the application of wage militancy in the union. 
569  
There was another problem. The conciliation machinery in the union was brilliantly 
effective at curtailing their full potential; ninety percent of disputes in the industry in the 1950s 
and 1960s were resolved without a stoppage of work. 570  At colliery level there was the Pit 
Conciliation Scheme; this was where a miner could discuss their grievance with their 
supervisor, gradually progressing within the colliery hierarchy until a resolution was found. 
571After fourteen days, if there was no resolution, then the dispute would go to the district 
conciliation board and an umpire could arbitrate, before reaching a binding decision. There was 
also a National Negotiating Committee, comprised of thirty-two representatives, sixteen of 
which were from the NCB and NUM and, if the NNC could not resolve the problem, the 
National Reference Tribunal, with its four assessors and three part timers, would resolve it. 572  
If nurturing unofficial strikes into effective battles was made difficult because of pay 
disparity and the union’s arbitration machinery, was there any prospect of politicisation, 
another of the party’s rationale for wage militancy? Bolton suggest that aside from these 
structural problems the CP was unable to counter this potentially powerful force into something 
more productive that might have a political benefit. 573 Even miners who were in the CP were 
often ‘raw materials, just members’ rather than ‘agitators or organisers’. 574The prospects for 
changing this and politicising them was weak, suggests Bolton: ‘the truth was, it was pure 
economism in the pit’; the unofficial strikes that I have outlined appear to demonstrate that.  
4.1.3 Dissemination of the strategy  
Seifert and Sibley have argued that ‘the party cannot simply hand down a line for all its 
members to fight on’. 575 This is a fair comment, but we have already seen examples of where 
the party might have been expected to provide some guidance, which it could have done 
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without being dictatorial. Therefore, the subtleties of dissemination of the strategy need to be 
explored, and the first thing to note is a clear sense of informality in the arrangement; the 
mining advisory committee was held in Watters’s dining room. 576 This causes a 
methodological issue for historians, which was explored in chapter three; if these meetings 
were so informal then there is likely to be little record of them and even less chance of any 
evidence being preserved. But this should not stop us seeking to understand the question; even 
if this were the case, it in itself is significant. This either meant that the result of these informal 
meetings was not disseminated formally outside of however many people were present 
(assuming that Watters had a modest house, as his book suggests, then not many), or that the 
crux of them was relayed verbally; this, in itself, poses all sorts of questions around the extent 
to which the CP could control how this information was transmitted.  
This observation can be broadened out from what was happening in the Yorkshire area. 
Evidence demonstrating communications between leading communists in the union and the 
party are rare but one letter, from Moffat to Pollitt in December 1951, exists. It was written in 
response to Pollitt’s request that the entire CP executive evaluates how the EC worked. 577 The 
reliability of this, in the sense of what it tells us about the relationship between King Street and 
communists in the NUM, needs to be considered. Not only is it the only letter of its kind that 
has been found during this research, but it represents a dialogue between an individual and their 
leader; it is expected that Moffat may well tell Pollitt what he imagined the general secretary 
may want to hear. Moffat may have been keen to give the letter his full attention- it was written 
on Boxing Day, when perhaps his mind was clear of other union business- and he told Pollitt 
that his ‘connections with the executive committee has been very helpful to me in carrying out 
my work in other areas of activity’. 578 Through his response Moffat used the opportunity to 
tell Pollitt, very generally, that he had outlined the ‘policy of the party in relation to the 
industry’ and that this yielded ‘positive results’. 579  
Despite the sense in the letter that Moffat was diligently carrying the party’s line into 
the NUM and so conducting the industrial strategy, there were two clear examples in 1951 that 
may prove otherwise. Moffat’s letter was framed by the events of August 1951, when Moffat 
had dissuaded miners to strike, and had infuriated the rest of the CP executive in the process. 
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580 Moreover in 1951 Moffat had missed an important party meeting before the TUC 
conference because he was on holiday; why was a leading member of the CP and the NUM 
taking a holiday before a key event in the party’s strategic calendar?581 These meetings were, 
as Bolton later revealed, one occasion where communists met beforehand, unlike the NUM 
annual conference where none of the communists on the executive met beforehand to discuss 
tactics. 582 So, given both of these events, did Moffat want to use Pollitt’s request to inflate the 
extent to which he was carrying the party line into the union in order to make up for these 
misgivings? Did the letter also reflect the intuitive deference, demanded through the party’s 
structure? All of this is speculative and we will probably never know; but the sentiments in the 
letter should not be taken at face value, not least because there is little supporting evidence that 
Moffat, or any other communist in the NUM, was consistently and actively doing as he 
claimed. 
The Moffat letter demonstrates another issue for individuals who occupied high-level 
positions in the NUM and the CP; they simply did not have time to attend to everything in 
detail. Moffat explained his poor attendance at his own NUM branch meetings, saying that he 
was busy with ‘other commitments’. 583 His branch, therefore, had a leading communist in it 
but this did not benefit the party as Moffat rarely attended meetings. This invariably gave rise 
to an element of hypocrisy; just five months after the letter, despite Pollitt knowing that Moffat 
was too busy to attend his own branch’s meetings, Moffat wrote a propaganda piece, Coal for 
War and Peace, urging ‘more political discussion in the lodges’. 584 There is no evidence that 
Moffat attempted to circumvent this problem. Perhaps there was a reason for this; Bolton  
suggests that it might not have been just business that kept Moffat away from grassroots 
unionism and suggests that Moffat’s absence from branch meetings was more intentional and 
in fact symptomatic of a general problem with communist trade unionists who ‘once in office, 
turned into above their accountability in a certain sense’. 585 When asked if Moffat had 
continued to go into the branch meeting of the NUM where he had previously worked once he 
was elected into office,  Bolton’s response was laughter and ‘no, no, no’! This may evidence 
that communist trade unionists were drawn into the careerism of their positions; given the 
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nature of mining, this is hardly surprising. But did the party realise this? Did they do anything 
about it? There is little to suggest so. Perhaps, and this is a speculative observation based on 
what happened later, there was an element of careerism amongst the party too; whilst their 
members were moving up the union, they were satisfied that this provided evidence that their 
industrial strategy was working.  
The problem appeared to be evident across other union branches. In South Wales a 
security service document suggests that party policy was disseminated in a fashion similar to 
Chinese whispers, noting that Frank Jackson ‘often acts as a liaison between Pollitt and 
Horner’. 586But Jackson, a communist from the Rhonda, was not a miner; misinterpretation and 
general chaos was probable. 587 Why would the CP not choose one of the many communist 
miners in the area to be its messenger? In 1946 the roll call of communists in the area was huge: 
Morgan Jones was secretary of Coegnant Lodge; Perry Jones was chairman; at Werntraw 
Lodge, F Hayward was secretary; Bryn Williams and Glyn Thomas were chairman and 
secretary of Cilely Lodge, respectively; D. W. Evans was chairman of Dillwyn Lodge; and F 
Thomas was chairman of Caerau Lodge. 588  
The party’s chances of success in a particular pit was down to many variables and even 
more senior communists were not immune from these; prior to his arrival in Yorkshire Watters 
had been warned that if he did not get along with Tommy Degnan, a local mining communist, 
then Watters’s chances of success were nominal.589 Other ingredients for communist success 
included the quality of the pit delegate, who was ‘the most important thing in the pit’. But the 
CP also failed to overcome these challenges by maximising opportunities where it could do 
well. For example, although the CP went to the trouble of holding an NUM fortnightly school, 
there was no follow up programme or correspondence to maintain the involvement of those 
who had bothered to attend, unless individuals actively sought this.  590 The sense is that, just 
as the union was federal, so too was the party organisation in it; as Bolton suggests, ‘the party 
was not as organised as it should have been in the sense that it tended to be not syndicalist but 
almost pit orientated’. Communist branch members would primarily be engaged in propaganda 
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activities; selling the Daily Worker, and knocking on peoples’ doors. The sort of interventions 
that leading communists made into branches was as guest speakers where they presented the 
issues of the union although often, as in the case of Horner in March 1952, these meetings were 
‘poorly attended, very orderly and most unprovocative’. 591The failure to address what may 
well have been teething problems, as the industrial strategy became established, was a huge 
oversight on the part of the CP and it was the origins of future weaknesses, although it was not 
until 1979 that Costello conceded that the party was paying the price for decades of neglect in 
this area. 592  
The CP instead looked to things that it could quantify as areas where it could improve. 
Paradoxically the party managed to be simultaneously incredibly fastidious and complacent. 
The party’s enduring, obsessive focus on numerical criteria for measuring how well pit 
branches were doing invariably caused a failure to address these greater structural problems; 
one of the best ways to politicise through the branches may have been to make sure leading 
communists in them, such as Moffat, attended their meetings, but this did not happen. This 
created a tendency for a superficial appraisal of the situation. Bolton suggested how the CP 
would see a pit branch with 50 communists in it and assume that it was a model branch. 593This 
claim is substantiated from the minutes of the organisation department; members often wrote 
in boasting of their recruitment successes, documenting exactly how they had done it. Moffat’s 
autobiography boasts that of 20,000 miners in Scotland, 1000 of them were communists. 
594Watters saw the main problem in terms of numerical presence, also, suggesting that ‘there 
were many members in the well-organised pits, but there were other areas where we were well 
represented’.595The party’s tendency to judge the situation by numerical criteria, rather than 
active participation, meant that Watters’s initial diagnosis of the situation in 1953 was 
conducted in precisely this fashion: the party had less than 100 miners of the 150,000 men from 
the Yorkshire area, with influence in only twelve from 130 pits in the area. 596 Pollitt used the 
same criteria in November 1953. He said that 5000 copies of the last party mining pamphlet 
had been sold and that 60 miners had joined the party during the period covered, although there 
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are still a number of mining villages where there are no party members at all.597Reuben Falber, 
later the assistant general secretary of the party, made a similar observation: 
We have very few pit branches and in most mining areas our members are entirely organised 
on the basis of residential branches and there is no concentrated drive to win miners for the 
support of our policy. Some experiences in Scotland show that where we build pit branches a 
very big change takes place. One or two of our best pit branches have made a very remarkable 
transformation in our village…as many of one-third (of the workers) have bought the British 
Road to Socialism and our mining pamphlet, and the political levy of the village has been raised 
through the activity of the pit. 598 
 
 
Beckett suggests that Pollitt might have ‘told communist trade union leaders what to do’.599 
But this somewhat spurious reasoning lacks substantial evidence and even outside 
contemporary observers noticed the flaws. The security services overheard one of the leaders 
of the WFTU telling Pollitt that ‘in view of the number of prominent trade union leaders who 
were supposed to be controlled by the CP, it was strange that so little was done in the trade 
union movement to speed up re-affiliation with the WFTU’. 600 By May 1951 the security 
services also noted how ‘the leadership…is gradually disintegrating…its influence on its 
members is steadily decreasing…in most cases members are just carrying on their work in 
industry, but in a completely syndicalist manner’. 601 Of course, even if instructions were given, 
communists could always choose to ignore them: Horner, for example, could choose to ignore 
these suggestions when he felt that they were ‘more than his job was worth’. 602 As Horner put 
it ‘no one suggested, or indeed could suggest, that my membership of the CP meant that I went 
to my party for instructions or consulted with them on matters concerning the union.’ 603 The 
problem was that the party was not evaluating if or how this structure, by now thirty years old, 
was impeding its progress in light of its new strategy. 
4.1.4 Other work 
One area where the CP appeared to prosecute a coherent strategy was in its youth policy, 
primarily undertaken through Challenge, the publication of the YCL. It appeared that there was 
a much more concerted effort at carrying the party’s policies to the youth of the NUM than to 
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than to the adults. Moffatt urged young miners to consider ‘very seriously’ joining the YCL 
and becoming readers of Challenge. 604 One keen young miner, who may have seen Moffatt’s 
1954 recruitment drive, was Scargill, who himself joined the YCL in 1955. 605 The party’s 
youth strategy was recognisable but was also tailored to particular issues that the younger 
miners faced and in 1951 the party established a working committee in order to press for a 
man’s wage at 18, two weeks’ holiday and better facilities in the workplace. 606 By 1952 the 
party led a campaign for young miners to receive higher wages, based on the adult rate, and 
also held a conference in Scotland where delegates unanimously called for a wage campaign.607 
The NCB rejected these concessions, not only because they were worried that young miners 
might ‘squander their rise on beer’, but because the NCB’s losses for the previous year stood 
at £1 million.608 How successful the party was in their campaign is difficult to assess but the 
NCB’s patronising dismissal of the wage claim may have come back to haunt them later; the 
18 year old youth, who sought an adult wage in 1952, would be 38 years old in 1972 and 50 
years old in 1984, old enough to have family responsibilities, because of which declining wages 
and increasing unemployment would cause him far greater concern than how much beer he 
could buy. 
There was another problem obvious by the end of our period here, which made the 
industrial strategy complex. It is difficult to differentiate between militant action and trade 
unionism; this becomes increasingly more complex in subsequent chapters. Communists were, 
by their positions in the union, elected to serve the membership on a broad range of issues; this 
was also what allowed them to remain in their positions, even in the Cold War. Thus 
communists were often moving resolutions that would be identifiable with non-communist 
unionists; this would be the start of the later issue, that militant action on wages was not the 
monopoly of the CP. The problem was that the CP had based its entire strategy on being 
accepted in the union, which it believed would develop into influence; but to the membership, 
this made communists indistinct from non-communists. This was clear from the type of non-
wage resolutions that communists consistently moved. At the 1947 annual conference, for 
example, Horner moved successful resolutions that aimed to give miners help with transport, 
increased sick pay; all bread and butter issues that most trade unionists would be able to justify. 
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609At the 1951 annual conference Horner was able to move a resolution advocating reforms to 
miners’ welfare, which was seconded by Paynter. 610 The following year it was Horner who 
seconded Paynter’s resolution proposing subsidised transport for South Wales’ miners. 611In 
1954 Ellis was able to move a resolution that was carried seeking better health and wellbeing 
in pits and subsidies for refreshment and travel. 612 The following year Ellis moved another 
resolution, seconded by Dunn, seeking improved safety. 613 
4.1.5 Conclusions 
Chapter four has contributed to the existing knowledge though its analysis of the role of Moffat 
and his difference with Horner regarding the shortcomings of nationalisation. This is interesting 
for two reasons: firstly, it adds another dimension to the work of Fishman who emphasises the 
theme of conflict between Horner and the party. Moffat, as we have seen, criticised the 
compensation given to former coalmine owners at a time when the party was incredibly loyal 
to the Labour government and its 1945 programme. But there is no evidence of any dialogue 
between Moffat and the CP; why then, in line with Fishman’s thinking, did the CP take such a 
hard line on Horner? But secondly, the role of Moffat at this time has largely been ignored in 
the existing literature; whilst McIlroy and Campbell dedicate a third of their book chapter to 
him, their interest lies in Moffat’s earlier career in the UMS. Understanding Moffat 
demonstrates that there were differences between communists in the union; even if this did not 
dissolve into active conflict (in this case), unpicking their subtle differences, as this chapter has 
endeavoured to do, demonstrates further the latitude that these individuals had and reiterates 
that being a trade unionist was the primary identity of communists in the NUM. Moreover the 
chapter considers the subtle theme of conflict; between the union and the party but, more 
originally, between individual communists themselves. This occurred at all levels of the union 
and provides further evidence of the consequence of the CP’s latitudinal approach to industrial 
politics.  
This chapter has also made some observations that should be carried into future 
chapters. The party’s industrial strategy, barely a decade old by this point, had already 
evidenced fundamental shortcomings. The strategy was a reaction to a particular situation 
whereby the CP, following a brief hiatus, had found itself pushed back to the fringes of British 
                                                          
609 NUM Annual Conference, 1947. 
610 NUM Annual Conference, 1951. 
611 Ibid. 
612 NUM Annual Conference, 1954. 
613 NUM Annual Conference, 1955. 
106 
 
politics, and personifying the role of pro-soviet menace. To counter this the party had publicly 
manoeuvred itself into a British mould although the extent to which this was arduous is 
negligible. Its programme reflected its respect for democracy and so too did its emphasis on 
getting party members to win trade union elections, which was credibly achieved in the NUM 
in this period. But the ultimate end game was to monopolise the union block vote at the Labour 
Party conference which, the CP imagined, would rid it of the reformism that had polluted the 
more utopian prospects of 1945. It needed to politicise the union membership to really achieve 
this, and it certainly tried to build influence: but the extent to which it had made inroads into 
this objective by 1956 is negligible.  
The CP’s misplaced obsession with numerical achievement as synonymous with party 
strength in pit branches only served to illuminate the chaotic link between King Street and 
coalfield communists. There was a bottleneck of information, a problem that transcended all 
levels of the union, not least because some of it was relayed second hand by non-industry 
individuals. But the party still felt aggrieved when the line was misinterpreted or ignored by 
communists in the NUM; this may add another explanation for why most communists left their 
politics out of their union duties. The CP also failed to arbitrate when it really should have done 
and Armthorpe was a clear example of this. The impact of this was to cause conflict, 
demonstrate the weakness of some communists in the union and, in the case of Wilkinson, 
destroy the election campaign of another communist.  Sometimes the CP remained blissfully 
or even wilfully unaware of the major structural particularities of the union. This was made 
most apparent around wage militancy and the need to pursue changes to the wage structure, 
where there was a clear gulf between some communists in the union and/or the party. Moreover 
the overall confusion meant that it was possible for communists to attend the union conference 
and fight against each other. This happened year after year, but there appeared to be no effort 
by the party to address some of the obvious problems, such as communists on the executive 
committee not liaising before the meeting, or making sure miners who had been interested 
enough in the party to attend its  schools were cultivated into effective comrades. If there were 
problems in the favourable environment of a labour shortage, then the foundations of the entire 
project would really be put to the test should the industry begin to contract which was, of 
course, what began to happen from 1957.  
 
 
107 
 
 
V The changing context of coal, 1957-1968 
5.0 Response to Change  
Chapter four considered the CP’s industrial strategy in the NUM during a relatively buoyant 
and prosperous period in the industry. Wages had, as we saw in chapter four, been a divisive 
issue: the regional variation to pit closures would compound the problem. Between 1956 and 
1957, however, profits in the coal industry dropped by some five million pounds.614 The 
increasing possibility of using oil for fuel began to diminish the indispensability of coal and 
The Coal Plan (1965) demonstrated the reality of the situation. As the plan made evident, thirty 
million tonnes of coal production had been cut back between 1957 and 1965, but a further 180 
million tonnes was forecast to be cut back by 1970. 615Some men, taking advantage of the 
prospects of employment in safer, better paid, and more secure industries, voluntarily left 
coalmining of their own accord. 616 For those that chose to stay it did not take long for fear of 
unemployment to grip the industry and in July 1958 the NUM’s president, Ernest Jones, 
conveyed a sense of imminence when he reminded the Daily Worker readers that pit closures 
were creating ‘tremendous anxiety’ amongst the men. 617 The men were right to be concerned 
and by 1968, the end of our period here, even ‘safe’ coalfields in the East Midlands, such as 
Kirkby Colliery, were due to close. 618  
 The human consequence of this sudden depletion in finances was almost immediate 
and between 1958 and 1961 130,000 men across the industry lost their jobs; it must be 
remembered that the crisis that had afflicted the industry until this point was the inability to 
produce enough coal to meet demand. 619 Moffat suggested that around 10,000 miners were 
displaced from the Scottish coalfields between 1957 and 1960, a higher rate than in any other 
area.620 Many men from Scotland were relocated to Yorkshire conveniently, if not 
coincidentally, creating something of an aggrieved and potentially militant diaspora in the very 
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location to which the CP had dedicated Watters. But no area was immune from the problem, 
and by 1961 unemployment had spread to England, where twenty-eight pits were threatened 
with closure; 621 in South Wales 49,000 men lost their jobs between 1958 and 1968. 622  
The NCB tried to arrest the problem by forcing men aged sixty-five and over to retire. 
623 The Board also ceased to recruit new labour, except for youth and craftsmen.624 The sense 
that the union ‘fiddled while Rome burned’ did not immediately cause dissatisfaction amongst 
the rank and file. 625 The fact that some miners’ leaders, such as Sam Watson from Durham, 
were instrumental in establishing a platform where colliery closures could be justified as both 
inevitable and progressive did not appear to cause unrest either. 626 But more critical observers, 
perhaps with an agenda, noted that the union leadership, inclusive of its communist members, 
was slow to react to the new situation. Two dissidents of the CP from 1956, Lawrence Daly 
and John Saville, were particularly keen observers of this situation. 627 Saville, although not 
formally connected with the miners, was able to diagnose the situation effectively. Writing to 
Daly and discussing how Daly’s Fife Socialist League might gain support, Saville suggested 
that Daly should appeal on more than just pit closures, which were simply ‘fighting thunder’: 
what the miners wanted was ‘security’ and Saville reminded Daly that ‘this single facet can 
make tremendous appeal’.628 Jim Allen’s The Miner noticed that: ‘during the last twelve 
months the leadership of the NUM (both at local and national level) has failed to put up any 
real fight to defend the miners of this country against the attacks of the NCB and Tory 
Government’. 629 
 The CP, however, remained firmly and optimistically focused on applying to mining 
their generic industrial strategy, by this point a decade old. Although the party accepted the 
need to develop the strategy across industry generally, there was no sense that this should be 
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approached differently in the particular context of coal. In 1958 Finlay Hart observed that: ‘the 
potential strength of the British trade union movement is greater today than it has ever been. 
But it is not fully mobilised, nor united under a militant leadership for the struggle that lies 
ahead’. 630 This was not least because by 1958 5,627,690 trade unionists were affiliated to the 
Labour Party: the chance to use the block vote of the NUM to influence the annual conference 
was still a prize worthy of pursuit.631 
5.1 Pit closures  
The failure of the CP to understand the difficulties of applying wage militancy in the NUM in 
this context is more surprising because the party and communists in industry had reached the 
same diagnosis of the cause of the industry’s problems. The party held the failings of 
nationalisation as one of the factors that was culpable for the new problem that afflicted the 
mining industry, arguing that mining had only been nationalised to ‘rescue derelicts’ and had 
inherited defective industries. 632 Tom Drinkwater, of the economic committee, surmised that 
‘so long as the bourgeoisie controls the state, it will always be in a position to use the 
nationalised industries for its own purposes’. 633In April 1958 Monty Meth, the party’s 
journalist, reported in the Daily Worker that 300 miners in Durham were to be laid off without 
alternative employment.634 Some communists in the union, for example Jack Dunn, began to 
make observations about the nationalised boards, criticisms that were similar to the ones that 
the party had started to make in the late 1940s. 635 For example in April 1958 Moffat blamed 
the declining consumption of coal on the government’s ‘disastrous policy’. 636 Mick McGahey 
argued that the situation was caused by the ‘policies of those in control’. 637 Moffat used his 
invitation to appear on television to debate the industry’s problems, to suggest that it was a 
mistake that oil was cheaper; government propaganda had suggested as such, he argued, but in 
fact it was government policy to switch to oil. 638 The party made a similar critique in 1959 
when it suggested that the NCB was responsible for the situation because they had allowed the 
                                                          
630 Hart, Finlay, ‘The CPGB and Trade Unions’, June 1958, 14. Hart was an organiser within the party until 
1963, although his personal trade was shipbuilding.  
631 Figure from Callaghan, Cold War, op.cit., 215. 
632 ‘Nationalisation: problems of theory and practice’, April 1960, CP/CENT/ECON/06/01. 
633 Letter from Tom Drinkwater to J.R. Campbell, 24 April 1960, CP/CENT/ECON/06/01. The letter added that 
‘Labour will be in the same position as regards nationalisation as a Tory government’.  
634 Meth, Monty, ‘Coal Board Starts Sack Policy’, Daily Worker, 3 April 1958. Until this point alternative 
employment had been almost guaranteed, even if it was in another industry. By 1962 the inability of the industry 
to accommodate displaced miners from other areas was noted by Paynter at the TUC conference.  
635 NUM Annual Conference, 1959. 
636 Moffatt, Abe, ‘Paynter Points the Way for Mining’, Daily Worker, 20 April 1958.  
637 McGahey, MICK, ‘Coal- what now?’, Labour Monthly, 47: 8, August 1965, 350. 
638 Moffat, My Life, op.cit., 188. 
110 
 
Conservative government to strengthen oil interests. 639 Horner used the union’s 1958 special 
conference to reproach the government’s decision to import coal. 640 Paynter’s Outlook for 
Mining (1958) argued that the government’s policy of wage restraint was responsible for 
unemployment, which also reduced the purchasing power of the working class in relation to 
perennially rising prices. 641 The party suggested that higher wages would ‘bring an increased 
demand for coal’.642 At the union’s 1959 conference Paynter claimed that the Tory government 
was purposefully causing unemployment and that a fuel policy, giving primacy to coal as an 
indigenous resource, was required. 643 Moffat supported him, condemning the declining 
production, unemployment, and closures. 644 Ellis suggested that the situation was worse than 
the 1920s because this time there was an alternative fuel. 645 Kane’s Spotlight on Coal (1960) 
claimed that the crisis in the industry was caused by government policy, which aimed to 
promote the use of oil. 646A similar argument was presented by Sammy Taylor’s Britain Needs 
Coal (1962), which argued that coal was sold at a loss. 647 
Communist mining figures also constantly used the party’s publications to express their 
views, notably with a much higher frequency than previously. In 1959 Dutt’s Labour Monthly 
ran an article by John Wood that argued that although pit closures caused ‘shock’ this was not 
a ‘shock of paralysis’ but ‘action’.648 Dai Dan Evan’s investigation into the decline of the 
industry, carried in the Daily Worker, criticised the exploitation of the ‘nation’s resources in 
order to meet the short-term goals of the capitalist economy’.649Such short-sightedness, Evans 
claimed, was evident from the fact coal was being sold at a price lower than the cost of 
producing it, leading to the conclusion that the miners were ‘subsidising’ the industrial 
concerns of Britain.650 Moffatt also made this point, again via the Daily Worker, arguing that 
                                                          
639 CP, ‘The Coal Crisis in Britain’, 1959, CP/CENT/IND/12/10. 
640 NUM Special Conference, 1958. 
641 Paynter, WILL, Outlook for Mining, March 1958, 5. 
642‘National Fuel Policy: the coal crisis in Britain’, 2, CP/CENT/IND/12/10. 
643 NUM Special Conference 1959. 
644 Ibid. 
645 Ibid. 
646 Kane, Jock, Spotlight on Coal, 1960, pp 3-5. 
647 Taylor, Sammy, Britain Needs Coal, 1962. 
648 Wood, John, ‘Miners Fight Back’, Labour Monthly, March 1959. According to Bolton, in his previously 
cited interview, Wood was a miner from Kelty colliery but was lacking in the ‘political training’.  
649 Evans, Dai Dan, ‘Behind the Clamour of the Coal Muddle’, Daily Worker, 17 March 1959. Evans listed the 
causes as: repayment to the previous owners the capital cost of acquiring the industry; interest on this capital; 
payment of interest on subsequent borrowing; payment of losses incurred on imported coal; losses incurred 
through the selling of coal to private industry at an uneconomic price; the payment of profits, when industry is 
allegedly making a loss; the present policy pursued by the NUM. 
650 Ibid. 
111 
 
coal cost 86s per tonne to produce, but was sold at 77s per tonne. 651 Paynter was unusually 
caustic in his appraisal of the situation to Labour Monthly readers in 1960, suggesting that 
‘anybody who thinks that inevitable economic and technological changes in fuel consumption 
are solely responsible for this three years’ crisis must be either a simpleton or somebody doped 
by the propaganda of the capitalist newspapers.’652 By 1964 Moffat mused that were it not for 
the compulsory retirement and migration that the NCB had implemented, then the 
unemployment in the mining industry would ‘be back at the level of the hungry thirties’. But, 
like the support for the Labour government in 1945, was this similarity planning or 
coincidence? There is nothing in the archives to suggest anything in the dynamics of the 
relationship. Instead this similarity showed the ability of the communist mining leaders to view 
the situation in light of their political convictions. 653  
5.3 The difficulty of applying wage militancy in the NUM  
If wage militancy had not been applied by communists in the union as the party had hoped 
during periods of full employment, then the situation was even less promising in the context of 
increasing unemployment, as we saw in chapter four. Compulsory arbitration, which both the 
party and individual communists in the union had sought to abolish, ended in 1961 but there 
was no eruption of official militancy and the event passed uncelebrated by communists in the 
party and the union.654 Even with official strikes decriminalised the union’s constitution 
contained another effective barrier through which to extinguish militancy. A two-thirds 
majority was needed to permit official action, and it was this rule, for example, that halted the 
South Wales area’s attempt at official action in May 1964, the catalyst being a rejected wage 
claim.655  
Additionally wage militancy was made more complex because the causes of unofficial 
strikes were different across various regions. As the following table demonstrates, in Yorkshire 
between 1962 and 1965 just three per cent of all unofficial strikes were caused by allowances 
and bonuses; yet in Scotland allowances and bonuses accounted for just over fourteen per cent 
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of unofficial strikes in the same period. 656 Price lists caused just over forty-two per cent of 
unofficial strikes in South Wales between 1958 and 1961, yet caused only twenty-five per cent 
of unofficial strikes in Scotland in the same period. 657 The fact that the highest volume of 
unofficial strikes in all three areas came from ‘other’ sources of strife, which remained largely 
unquantifiable, further demonstrates that the federal nature of the NUM acted as a barrier to 
securing any mass grievance around wages. Moffat’s autobiography conveys a clear sense of 
the regional fragmentation that continued into the late 1950s, to the extent that in 1957 the 
Scottish Miners’ Union secured a special pay arrangement for face workers that only applied 
in that area. 658 
Table demonstrating the causes of strikes across the three coalfields perceived to be the most 
militant. 
  
Percentage Annual Average  
 
Division 1958-61 1962-65 
Scotland   
Price Lists 25.0 29.4 
Allowances/Bonuses 12.7 14.3 
Other 62.3 56.3 
Yorkshire   
Price Lists 40.7 40.1 
Allowances/Bonuses 8.0 3.0 
Other 51.3 46.9 
South Wales   
Price Lists 42.1 52.6 
Allowances/Bonuses 7.2 3.5 
Other 50.7 43.9 
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5.4 Wage increases in a declining industry: fighting inflation   
Chapter four noted how the CP’s prosecution of wage militancy and the government’s belief 
that wages caused inflation would invariably cause conflict, if wage militancy was transmitted 
into unions as the party planned. These polarised positions became more pronounced during 
this period. Callaghan has pointed out that by the early 1960s the party was aware that inflation 
was the main economic problem in Britain. 659 The CP’s claim was that inflation was not only 
a ‘manifestation of a crisis’ but also one that was ‘a definite act of economic policy’. 660 The 
most sophisticated transmission of this line was in For a Militant Wages’ Policy (1962), which 
criticised incomes policies as responsible for slowing down the British economy, making prices 
rise, and imposing pressure on trade unions to restrict wages.661 It also suggested that there 
should be a willingness to use ‘solidarity action’ at unprecedented levels. 662  
Such a critique became the dominant discourse of the CP and it was transmitted in 
various ways. Analysing ‘Britain’s Crisis 1962-1963’, for example, the economic committee 
noted the ‘fraud of wage restraint’. 663 Campbell claimed whilst the purchasing power of the 
capitalist class had continued to push prices up, the brunt of these price increases had been felt 
by the working class.664 But the party explained this by a familiar analysis of wage restraint. 
Allen claimed that ‘given full employment, prices would rise whatever trade unions do about 
the level of wages’.665 Incomes policies, Ramelson claimed, existed only to disguise the ruling 
class’s wage objective which was to ‘achieve state regulation of wages at a level below that 
which would be attained by the trade unions on the basis of their present organised strength in 
free collective bargaining with the employers’.666 Such statements by Ramelson, who became 
the party’s industrial organiser in 1966, clearly proved that wage militancy would remain an 
indispensable component of the party’s industrial strategy.  
This was even the case in coalmining, although the evidence suggests that the party was 
fully aware of the precarious economic vitality of coal. In order to ensure that incomes policies 
would work, Campbell argued, a ‘great unemployed reserve’ was necessary; an example that 
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Campbell believed mining demonstrated.667 In January 1958 Idris Cox sent a memo to the 
executive committee of the CP informing them that competition from oil threatened to create 
a situation where ‘the just demands of the mineworkers can be resisted’.668 In April 1958 the 
economic committee convened a special conference dedicated to analysing the ‘Coal Surplus 
in Britain’. 669 But, even though it appeared alert to the problem, the CP continued to justify 
wage militancy as the solution although by 1960, two years after the conference, the party’s 
economic committee recognised that manpower in the industry had dropped from 784,000 men 
in September 1954 to 733,000 five years later, and it predicted a further forty-six pit closures 
by September 1961. 670  
5.5 Commitment to wage militancy   
Despite all of this, delegates to the party’s 28th congress sustained their commitment to the 
economic analysis that had justified wage militancy as the solution. The congress called for 
‘no incomes policies’ and the need to ‘increase wages’. 671 The congress clearly recognised the 
limitations with the industrial strategy in the miners’ union, noting that despite party presence 
in the union ‘we have not seen these translated into a comparable political advance in mass 
consciousness’. 672 But the party remained characteristically sanguine and delegates were also 
told that ‘our party is the organised, united and socialist force of the movement, for giving 
political leadership and generating mass action. Experience shows that nothing can replace it, 
and no other force in the labour movement can fulfil its function’.673 But, certainly in the NUM, 
there was little evidence to substantiate these grandiose claims. 
By 1964 the party was keen to discuss the ‘trade union problems’ of the year, yet it still 
concluded that there must be ‘no suppression of the wage struggles’ because ‘in a capitalist 
society, where productivity and prices are rising, the workers have to maintain continual 
pressure for wage increases’. 674 Wage militancy and the preservation of free collective 
bargaining remained an explicit instruction for communist delegates attending the TUC 
conference in 1963 and 1964. 675 A private letter in 1964 between Tom Drinkwater and 
                                                          
667 Campbell, J.R, ‘Back to the Old Stop Go’, Comment, 3:11, March 1965. 
668 Memo from Idris Cox to the EC, January 1958, CP/CENT/ECON/5/1, 5. 
669 There is nothing in this document that questions if wage militancy in this context was a good idea. See CP, 
‘Coal Surplus in Britain’, April 1958, CP/CENT/ECON/5/1. 
670 CP, ‘Economic Prospects for Britain’, 1960, CP/CENT/ECON/5/1. 
671 CP, 28th Party Congress 1964, 3, CP/CENT/PC/14/33, 3. 
672 CP, 28th Party Congress 1964, 3, CP/CENT/PC/14/33, 5. 
673 ’Britain’s Crisis and the Way Out: CPGB 28th Congress’, Daily Worker, 13 April 1963. 
674 CP, ‘Trade Union Problems in 1964’, CP/CENT/PC/07/17. 
675 CP, ‘Needs of the Hour’, CP/CENT/IND/12/07. 
115 
 
Campbell suggested that an incomes policy to control inflation as ‘phoney’. 676 Was the 
continuation of wage militancy a bad choice by the party or were they bound to it? As Campbell 
pointed out in 1966, ‘if we raise a clamour for an incomes policy, we are in effect raising a 
clamour for disciplining the unions’.677 The rejection of incomes policies remained on the 
agenda at the party’s 29th congress later that year. 678 Campbell’s statement had resonance in 
the militancy that erupted across industry between 1966 and 1974; but in the NUM, there was 
no significant strike until 1969. There was no evidence, in 1966, that wage militancy in the 
miners’ union was embedded. 
5.6 Debates around the effectiveness of wage militancy  
But some party members were beginning to challenge the merit of the CP’s black and white 
view of the wage restraint/wage militancy polemic. It was largely Bill Warren who most 
publicly challenged the party line, claiming that the ‘main revolutionary party of the working 
class is wielding a very limited direct political influence’.679 The post-war period of full 
employment, with its material benefits for the working classes, had demonstrated that ‘the state 
can control unemployment’ and had raised a question of ‘what has happened to the 
irreconcilable contradictions of capitalism’? 680 Therefore, Warren noted, the CP needed to 
‘develop a policy on inflation, not just wages’.681 By 1968 Warren had advanced the necessity 
for a gradual and traditional programme which ‘must be seen to be economically and politically 
feasible…this implies that nonsensical ‘solutions’ such as more for everybody and all round 
plans for nationalisation have to be ruled out’; instead, there should be ‘an eventual 
transformation of strategic struggle into a revolutionary and successful trial of strength’.682 
The party was also privy to a critique of wage militancy specifically for the NUM; John 
Hughes, of Ruskin College, published his observations in 1963. The fact that the document 
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was found in the party’s archives suggest that at least somebody in the CP read it, but its 
observations had no impact on King Street’s policy for the NUM. Hughes’s investigation 
started with the observation that the union was in character federal; that there was a lack of 
unity within it; and that it lacked a distinct industrial policy. 683 Hughes noted that this situation 
presented a ‘favourable moment for thrashing out a new set of industrial policies’, but not based 
around wage militancy; he explicitly noted the ‘utter inadequacy of money wage militancy’. 
Hughes went on to say that: ‘The reason is patent enough. A further development of a price 
scissors movement as between coal and oil (e.g. persistent rises in coal production costs due to 
the still high wage and material element) would seriously impair the bargaining position of the 
NUM’. Hughes observed that wage militancy in the declining context of coal would make the 
industry ‘less profitable’; and, with a remarkable degree of foresight, he noted that these issues 
would be ‘particularly important in ten to fifteen years’. Hughes was not suggesting that 
miners’ pay should be allowed to stagnate but instead argued that the NUM needed ‘economic 
policies that will organise significant real wage advances in ways that do not involve rapid and 
persistent upward pressure in costs and prices’. Yet there is no evidence to suggest that these 
observations were considered by the party. 
5.7 Wage militancy in the NUM? 
Increasingly there were two perspectives within the CP regarding wage militancy. But to what 
extent did this theoretical division have any implications within the NUM? Moreover where 
did communists within the NUM align themselves within this debate, assuming they even 
thought of it in this way? At the 1958 union conference Paynter withdrew his wage claim 
because of the ‘forces raged against the trade union movement’. 684 If wage militancy had 
permeated the NUM via communists in it, as the CP had hoped, then Paynter should have 
pursued the claim for the ‘substantial increase’ on the grounds that the potential conflict that it 
would cause would have some politicising element, as the CP had predicted. There is further 
evidence for this line of argument. Between 1958 and 1964, as the table below demonstrates, 
every wage claim that the union presented was settled with a substantial shortfall from the 
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published by the union. The NUM 1962 annual conference passed a resolution in favour of a publication, but the 
first issue was not published until January 1969.  Paynter suggests that it was only because the NCB started to 
publish Coal News, and the union journal had been stalled because of concern that it may ‘become a medium for 
purveying left-wing views’. Paynter, My Generation, op.cit., 151. 
684 NUM Annual Conference, 1958. There is nothing to suggest that the party challenged this.  
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original amount. 685 So why were leading communists in the union accepting lower wage claims 
when they may well have exploited the gulf between the expectation and reality of the miners’ 
pay in the spirit of wage militancy, as the party had envisaged? 686 Clearly the answer remained 
the same; communists in the union prioritised their union obligations. Pressing for the higher 
amount permitted negotiation, which would secure the increase that the union really wanted, 
and which it knew was realistic. But, even with the clear evidence that wage militancy was not 
being prosecuted in the union as the party hoped, the CP continued to advocate it, as we have 
seen. 
Wage claims (The desired amount and the agreed amount) 
Year Desired Rise Settlement  
1958 10s 7s 6d 
1960 12s 5s 
1962 £1 per week 7s 6d 
1963 £1 per week 9s 
1964 15s 11s 
 
At the 1964 special conference Paynter reported how the Board had offered a rise of 8 s 10 d a 
week, in relation to the original claim of 15 s: Jack Collins congratulated the NEC for rejecting 
the offer and a resolution was passed to carry on fighting for more money.687 At the year’s 
annual conference, however, Paynter reported that the claim had been settled with an award of 
11 s because it ‘represented the climate’. 688 But Paynter had to convince Cliff True, a 
communist from South Wales, not to reject the offer, whilst Ellis and Moffat supported the 
NEC’s decision. 689The lack of uniformity amongst communists in the union about how to 
pursue wage militancy shows not only a lack of conviction in the policy by some mining 
communist leaders, but also a lack of direction from King Street.  
                                                          
685 NUM Annual Conference, 1964. The miners got no pay increase in 1959. See Moffat, My Life, op.cit., 192. 
686 Table drawn from data at NUM Annual Conference 1964. 
687 Ibid. Collins had left the CP in 1983, according to Graham Stevenson, due to the party’s Eurocommunist 
position, and also due to the union candidates being moved for the Kent area. See 
http://www.grahamstevenson.me.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=113:jack-
collins&catid=3:c&Itemid=99 Further evidence of Collins’s own position within the internal disputes of the 
party is evidenced from the fact that, in 1972, he had been of the belief that even more could have been 
extracted from the NCB had the NEC of the union ‘held out for a little longer’. See Pitt, World on our Backs, op 
cit.203 for more information, and for general discussions around Collins. 
688 Ibid. 
689 Ibid. 
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But those NUM communists who did not embrace wage militancy were not acting in 
defiance of the party line for any other reason than pragmatism. This was the same issue that 
was evident in chapter four; the party had always urged its union militants to give primacy to 
union business. Therefore when communists in the union, like Paynter, moved too far from 
central party policy, because they were acting in the interest of the union, then what could the 
party do? This was something of a perennial problem; we saw evidence of it in chapter three, 
and Fishman’s Horner relies heavily on the theme of conflict. But I find no sense of conflict in 
this example; the party was rendered impotent by this ongoing problem. It was only those who 
were willing to challenge the party line who made an alternative argument; and in some ways 
the early challenges to wage militancy demonstrate a digression from democratic centralism.   
Paynter demonstrates the reasoning here. At the 1964 conference he was keen to tell 
the delegates at the conference that the union could only extract so much from the board and 
there was little else that the NUM could do. 690 Paynter knew that the NUM was in a precarious 
position: strikes, he claimed, would place ‘the security and employment of men at risk, for the 
state of a few shillings’; a one-day strike, he argued, was just an ineffective protest and, 
regarding an overtime ban, there was no guarantee that everyone would want it. Paynter 
understood the difficulty with asking men in the union to refuse overtime; the simple solution 
for the pit manager was to never ask the man to do overtime again, and to isolate him. Paynter 
also knew full well that miners who challenged the NCB and, ultimately, the state through 
militancy would ‘fear that action of that kind would precipitate their own closure’. 691 
According to Robens this had some grounding and he claimed to have known pits be shut ‘by 
reason of being grossly uneconomic, because of incessant industrial disputation and general 
bad behaviour on the part of the union’.692It was this knowledge, gained by being experts in 
their industry, which permitted communists in the union a comprehensive understanding of 
their environment; equally, it was this that communists in King Street were obliged to defer to. 
5.8 Good trade unionists? 
But there was another increasingly apparent problem: even when communists in the union did 
move wage resolutions they were in-line with, and often supported by, non-communists. 693 
Many of the resolutions that were moved by communists were composited.  Moreover, in 1959 
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691 Paynter, My Generation, op.cit., 135. 
692 Robens, Ten Year Stint, op.cit., 16. 
693 Even before the ‘broad left’ became a formal policy.  
119 
 
Ellis told the union’s conference that wage restraint was weakening the miners. 694 But the 
following year he presented a wage increase for day wageworkers, although he knew that ‘it is 
true that over-all we are facing a fall in the effective demand for coal…the only hard economic 
facts are that many of our members have a struggle to live’.695 So true was this that Moffat 
seconded it, but it was Dennis Skinner who suggested that the miners should use ‘every weapon 
at our disposal’ to secure it. 696  
Sometimes communist-led wage claims were in line with the union’s policy. At the 
NUM’s 1959 conference, for example, Moffat moved a wage claim for day wageworkers on 
the grounds that their wage claim at the 1958 conference had only achieved fifty percent of the 
original claim: Moffat justified this on the basis that wage claims did not lead to inflation and 
that it would be ‘criminal and suicidal on our part in this situation to accept any form of wage 
restraint’. 697 But in 1957 the NUM nationally had joined the TUC in ‘rejecting the principle 
of wage restraint in any form’ with both formally voicing their willingness to ‘take whatever 
action it deemed necessary to protect and improve the living standards of its members’. 698 The 
resolution that Paynter took to the TUC conference in 1966, on behalf of the NUM, opposed 
the Prices and Incomes Act. 699  
The ability of communists in the NUM to work with those outside the party did not just 
occur in relation to wages. In 1960 the government mooted the idea of decentralising control 
from the NCB centre to divisional coal boards and Paynter moved an emergency resolution at 
the union conference, noting that decentralisation could be ‘the first step to breaking up our 
national agreements’.700 Moffat was quick to second this, echoing his determination to do 
everything to prevent the suggestion becoming a reality, even mobilising ‘the industrial power 
and strength of this organisation’ if necessary. 701 Sam Watson and Joe Gormley added their 
support to Paynter’s resolution. 702 The rejection of decentralisation then became a resolution 
                                                          
694 Ibid. 
695 NUM Annual Conference, 1960. It was carried. 
696 Ibid. Skinner was already a member of the Labour Party at this time.  
697 NUM Annual Conference, 1959. Moffat’s claim, although supported by the EC, was rejected and ended up 
with the Joint National Negotiating Committee.  
698 Moffat, My Life, op.cit., 163. 
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that Paynter took to the TUC, where Moffat reassured delegates that the NUM remained 
opposed to unofficial strike action, to the extent that they were paid no strike pay. 703 
5.9 The National Power Loading Agreement (1966) 
In chapter four it was argued that the party had given Horner the instruction to stop trying to 
reform the wage structure although Horner (and Moffat) had largely ignored these instructions. 
Moreover debates amongst communists, regarding the possibility of simultaneously pursuing 
structural reforms and wage increases, had been made at the union’s annual conference. The 
party’s views in this area continued and in 1964 they noted that ‘reforms in the wage structure 
can become more urgent than formal wage increases’.704 This was the argument that had been 
put forward in For a Militant Wages’ Policy (1962), where the party had noted a particular 
disparity of pay in mining, but suggested that gaps in earnings could easily be solved without 
‘intricate wage structure negotiations’. 705 By 1963 the Fabians had become determined to 
abolish piecework in the industry in order to create unity, yet in October 1963 Campbell 
continued to argue that retracting piecework would mean a cut in workers’ pay and ‘a rise in 
bosses’ profit’. 706  
But communists in the union remained committed to amending the wage structure of 
the union, particularly the removal of piecework from 1966, and Paynter was instrumental in 
the construction of the National Power Loading Agreement in that year.707  But this was a 
gargantuan task. Paynter’s private notes indicate that he was concerned about the logistics of 
implicating the NPLA: scribbled notes say ‘£5.00 a shift?! How are we going to implement 
it’??? 708 Data submitted by the NUM to the Joint Negotiating Committee in 1966 demonstrated 
the range of average earnings across the coalfields, the highest being Kent, with an average of 
                                                          
703 TUC Annual Conference, 1960. Although communists were often in-step with non communists, there was 
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89 s 5 d and the lowest being Durham, with 66 s 11 d. 709 But to what extent was wage 
uniformity motivated by wage militancy? Paynter’s fellow communist, Joe Whelan, was 
opposed to the scheme and used the 1966 special conference to make the point that 
Nottinghamshire miners, if they accepted the NPLA, would see wages decreased; the removal 
of piecework would mean a guaranteed wage if you did ‘owt or nowt’, Whelan said. 710  
But, despite Whelan’s reservations, Nottinghamshire did accept the NPLA. 711Thus, 
some miners saw a stagnation or even decline in their wages whilst the lower paid ‘caught up’; 
for example at Cresswell Colliery men received ‘less for doing the same job’.712 The 
implementation of uniformity caused disparity in itself and in Nottinghamshire and Kent 
miners received increases of between 4.4 per cent and 9.5 per cent between 1967 and 1970, 
whereas their colleagues in West Wales received increases of 17.4 per cent in the same 
period.713 Wage parity was finally realised in December 1971. 714 As Phillips has pointed out, 
the NPLA ‘diminished the extent of localised fragmentation….and fostered an unusual degree 
of solidarity across the coalfields’.715 Moreover, as Ackers and Payne argue, the NPLA created 
‘equalised pay…but in doing so, low pay was nationalised and the unforeseen effect of NPLA 
was to nationalise dissatisfaction over wages throughout the NUM’.716  For Dai Francis the 
impact was clear: the NPLA ‘removed the contention from the wages’ movement’. 717Did this 
make wage militancy, as the CP imagined it, more applicable? Or did it simply unite a divided 
group around a common issue, which they could now hope to address? Both could be 
legitimately argued; but, as the following chapter will demonstrate, there was no sense that CP-
sponsored wage militancy prospered to a greater extent than in the pre-NPLA period. 
5.1.0 Winning leadership positions  
Despite the problems in the industry communists continued to win leadership positions during 
this period, although the extent to which the CP benefitted from anything other than being able 
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to boast of its potency in the NUM is questionable. Abe Moffat had retired in September 1961 
and his younger brother, Alex, had replaced him as the Scottish miners’ president, a position 
that he held until 1967. 718Alex was, by all accounts, less able than his brother. 719Watters barely 
knew Alex, whilst he had known Abe from childhood, who was ‘very capable, very 
disciplined’. 720 Bolton also viewed Abe as disciplined but ‘hot headed’; sibling rivalry 
penetrated the brothers’ union work, however, and it was clear to Bolton that they did not have 
‘the best relationship’.721 Nonetheless, despite these apparent shortcomings, in the vote to find 
Abe’s successor Alex secured a credible victory over his opponent, securing 23,124 votes 
compared Alex Eadie’s 20,325.722 The general secretary of the NUM remained communist 
when Paynter replaced Horner upon his retirement in 1959, securing 249,638 votes against Sid 
Ford, who got 197,334.723 Even Sam Watson, who was in public ‘a rabid anti-communist’, 
announced at a union executive dinner that Paynter would win, which caused some 
embarrassment to Ford, who was also present. 724 
There was also a fair dispersal of electoral success across different areas of the union. 
Sammy Taylor became the first communist from Yorkshire to get elected to the NUM 
executive committee in 1959 with a majority of forty seats, and he would later become the 
area’s compensation agent in 1961. 725 McGahey was elected onto the Scottish area executive 
committee in 1958 and would follow Moffat to the area’s presidency in 1968, whilst Kane was 
elected to the position of area agent for Doncaster in 1962.726 McLean became the Scottish area 
secretary in 1968. 727 Whelan, who had only joined the party in 1965, became a full time official 
in the same year. Through the election campaign, however, Whelan’s new found political 
affiliation was to cause him problems. 40,000 leaflets, with the slogan ‘a vote for Whelan is a 
vote for the communist control of the Nottinghamshire coalfield’, only ended when Whelan 
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went to the police, who subsequently found that the East Midlands district of the Labour Party 
had paid for the printing of the leaflet.728 There is no evidence to suggest that there was any 
support from the CP or guidance regarding how its erstwhile executive member should deal 
with this kind of political discrimination in the contest to secure union office. Instead, the party 
left the matter to be dealt with by the police, an agent of the capitalist state that Whelan and his 
political allies eventually hoped to replace.   
Were these successes the result of clear management on the party’s part? The elections 
where the party members did less well seem to suggest not. The disorganisation that was 
evident at local level in chapter four continued and was particularly evident through the union’s 
1960 presidential election. 729 In the presidential election of 1960, which Alwyn Machen won, 
there had been no communist candidate; Machen’s untimely death, before he took office, 
facilitated another election. 730 This time multiple communists stood, a problem compounded 
by the union’s transferrable vote system. 731In the first round of the vote Alex Moffatt was 
23,000 votes in front of Sid Ford, but Ellis had his 102,000 votes divided between Moffatt and 
Ford: the result was that Ford won with a 9,981 majority over Moffatt.732 The same issue arose 
in 1961 during the contest for the Yorkshire vice president, whereby both Sammy Taylor and 
Jock Kane stood, divided the left’s vote, and permitted Sam Bullough to triumph. 733 Such 
confusion was permitted to ensue by the CP itself: Gollan claimed that the party ‘does not 
discuss or pronounce on the internal affairs of a union election’. 734 This suggests why Alex 
Moffat, from Scotland, and Ellis, from Nottinghamshire, were able to effectively become 
opponents in 1960. There was no clear cohesion or dialogue from the party, the absence of 
which meant that communists in their respective areas fielded the candidate that represented 
their area best. The fragmentation could occur even within coalfields, as in 1961: Taylor was 
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734 CP, private notes, untitled and undated, CP/CENT/GOLL/04/07. Gollan replaced Pollitt in 1956.  
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from the Barnsley area, whereas Kane was from Doncaster. 735Gollan recognised that ‘if 
members of the CP get together in any way by themselves or with others to promote candidates- 
that is their business, not ours’. 736  
Gollan, in his private notes, used Paynter as an example of how ‘(the CP) does not 
control trade union officials. They are responsible to their office. Do not need to give Paynter 
e.g. his instructions’. 737Chapter four discussed in some detail the claim that Pollitt told trade 
union leaders what to do. Here is clear evidence that this was not the case. Was this a change 
of line, Gollan’s disingenuousness, or a continuation of the previous organisational structure? 
The first suggestion supposes not only a clear line of communication but also clarity of 
interpretation and obedience from the party to members in the NUM: as should be clear from 
chapter four, the evidence suggests that none of these conflicts were in place. The second 
suggestion infers that Gollan would want to play down the party’s influence or role in the 
union. This does not seem logical: chapter one not only demonstrated how the party had lofty 
ambitions for itself as the indispensable force for the development of workers’ class 
consciousness, but also that Gollan was not reticent about identifying the later 1960s as the 
period of success for the party’s industrial strategy. The third option seems most likely: if 
Gollan did not need to give Paynter his instructions, this infers an understanding on the part of 
Paynter of the dynamics of the relationship between him and the party; namely that communists 
in the union, not the party, were the dominant group.  
This claim is substantiated by the frank appraisals around the state of the party’s work 
in industry, particularly the advisory committees, which noted that ‘we are a long way behind 
now, we do not anticipate events, we seek to deal with the reactionary issues too late and after 
the damage has been done by the right wing at the top’.738 There remained a lack of 
communication between the party centre and its members in industry, as one participant at the 
same meeting noted: ‘we fail in practice at the lowest level to involve industrial comrades in 
both discussions on policy and political problems, and in becoming activists in the fight for 
policies’. 739 There remained no effective mechanism for checking progress in this area, and it 
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was noted in 1965 that members of the industrial department needed ‘to check and lead on 
industrial work’. 740  
The party was clearly aware of the problems but there is no real sense of any practical 
ability, or even effort, to overcome them; a sense of frustrated inertia permeates the documents. 
In 1962 the 28th congress had noted that ‘today we are paying a high price for the long neglect 
of our workplace organisations and for the widespread failure to integrate the factory branches 
into the campaigning by the party as a whole’ and had recommended a ‘turn to industry’ in the 
party. 741The fact that the trade unionists were still debating the same problems three years later 
demonstrates the extremely rigid nature of the CP’s industrial strategy. The situation did not 
improve and, despite setting a target to add an extra 50 branches by 1966, by 1968 not only 
had the party failed to achieve this target but it had lost a further nine of its original 1966 figure. 
742 
The industrial advisories had been designed to bridge the link between the party and 
individuals in industry, ‘to work on ways for the application of the line of the party’, but in 
reality individuals often viewed the advisories as exclusive, leading to suspicion and even party 
members leaving the CP. 743 Moreover there is little sense that that weak link between the party 
and its factory branches, that chapter four discussed, had improved during this period. This is 
despite the fact that the party recognising in 1965 that ‘the most effective’ factory branches 
were those connected to the local party branch. 744  
5.1.1 The broad left 
But there was one development to emerge from the appraisals of the mid-1960s. The growth 
of shop stewards across industry, plus the fallout from the ETU case, forced the CP into a new 
methodology. 745From the mid-1960s the party actively encouraged party trade unionists to 
work with anybody with a similar outlook through the ‘broad left’ strategy. The executive 
committee’s annual report for 1965 noted the need to form a ‘broad alliance of broad 
progressive people’.746 Allies of the party did not need to be ‘near’ the CP; this reflected an 
admission of the bitter reality of the party’s marginality in industry. It was noted that ‘if we are 
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only looking for the near ones, then we won’t get the army that will be active on many 
fronts’.747 In constructing the broad left, however, there was an unusually clear sense of 
coherence; a sense that the party could, when it wanted, push clear policy decisions into the 
union. Dutt used Labour Monthly in November 1965 to discuss who ‘the left’ were. The left 
that the CP wanted to work with and influence was: 
The potential majority of the people which can be won, and which needs to be mobilised and 
won, against the policies of monopoly capital…the role of the relatively limited number of 
active socialist propagandists or militant trade unionists, whether communist or non-
communist, is to work together on the basis of the common and immediate issues of struggle, 
to mobilise the majority.748  
 
In the NUM the broad left had a very specific aim, which began to be implemented from 
around 1965. 749 This date is significant. Dutt and the EC report were dated late 1965; did 
the fact that the broad left was nascent in the NUM at this stage suggest that either 
communists in the union were quick to adapt to a new strategy, which would be anomalous 
in comparison to how new ideas were usually dealt with, or does it suggest that communists 
in the union had already been practising the broad left before the party disseminated it as a 
strategy? Allen describes that what the ‘left-wing miners’ leaders’ wanted was to ‘be able to 
control the NEC’ through committing the NEC to ‘their own resolutions, leaving it no space 
to deviate from them’.750 Primarily this suggests that there was at least an element of 
grassroots dissatisfaction with the type of resolutions that the NEC, with communists on it, 
was recommending. 751 Allen is clear that the intention to move the NEC to the left emanated 
from ‘left-wing miners’ leaders’, who were lower down the union and not on the NEC, rather 
than the CP. This view is substantiated by Bolton who suggests that the aim of the broad left 
was to ‘build a left in the national union in order that the left could take a grip of the union 
and pull it in the right direction, as up to then it was right wing on all kinds of issues’.752 
Somewhat paradoxically the ‘broad’ left was initially insular and clandestine. The early 
stages of the strategy explicitly excluded the NUM regional leadership, which potentially 
included communists, to the extent that members were encouraged to be dishonest about its 
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purpose. Meetings were explained as a forum for discussing compensation cases and when the 
Yorkshire president, Sam Bullough, compelled members to sign an undertaking to stop them, 
members simply ignored his instruction. 753 Such dishonesty and defiance was, as should be 
clear from chapter four, interdicted by the CP; a bitter reminder of the reasons why this was 
the case had presented itself in 1961 through the ETU case. 754 The entire ETU debacle had 
demonstrated what may happen when communists in the union, acting in the party’s name, 
were permitted too much autonomy, to the extent that they were found guilty of ballot-rigging. 
Secrecy in the NUM continued for two years, until the more overt Barnsley Miners’ Forum 
made itself public in 1967.  But the extent to which the CP itself was involved in these debates 
is dubious. Watters, in his autobiography, claimed that he made sure that he distanced himself 
from the meetings because he did not want to ‘offend’ any members who disliked the party; 
but his physical absence simply disguised  that fact that he was involved, and  he claimed to 
have ‘kept in close touch with what was going on’.755  
5.1.2 Scargillism: syndicalism and the broad left? 
As would become increasingly apparent, even before the CP identified the broad left as a 
strategy, CP membership was not a pre-requisite to progression within the union. 756Scargill 
reached this conclusion in the early 1960s when he left the YCL. There is no sense that he 
made much of an impression in the communist youth section. At the party’s 25th Special 
Congress, Scargill was evidently not well known and the party’s report of his speech in World 
News and Views referred to him as ‘Arthur Skargile’. Scargill’s message to delegates was 
designed to boost recruitment to the YCL, recounting as part of this his own experience from 
his pit of how ‘young miners will fight’; but the party also published a section of the speech in 
its own press that criticised the CP’s ‘criminal’ neglect of the YCL. 757 
The reasons for Scargill’s departure remain unconfirmed, although in 1977 he claimed 
to have been expelled from the party because he refused to stick to ‘any rigid party line’.758 
According to Crick Scargill was particularly unhappy about the conflicting demands put on 
him by the party and the union; he was asked to sell the Daily Worker on Fridays but he also 
                                                          
753 Crick, Scargill, op.cit., 23. 
754 See Callaghan, Cold War, op.cit., for a details of the ETU case. Also Laybourn, Keith, Marxism in Britain: 
Dissent, Decline and Re-Emergence, (London: Routledge, 2005), 61. The original documents are also available 
in the party archive.  
755 Crick, Scargill, op.cit., 21. 
756 Callaghan, Cold War, op.cit., 252.  
757 25th Special Congress Report, World News and Views, 4:18, 4 May 1957, 281.  
758 Crick, Scargill, op.cit., 33. 
128 
 
had ‘union business to look after.’759 It is probable that Scargill had reached the conclusion that 
communist membership might actually hinder his fledging union career; in 1961 his 
Worsbrough union branch wrote to the area leadership asking them to expel all communists 
from NUM membership.760 His own retrospective account conveys a personal recollection of 
anti-communist hostility during the late-1950s.  761  
Scargill, who in all accounts is presented as the driving force of the Barnsley Miners’ 
Forum, organised weekly meetings and drafted in speakers, both communist and non-
communist, to address them. 762Meetings soon found a home in the Albert Club in Cudworth, 
just outside of Barnsley, which was booked ‘on the cheap’ and meetings often had an ‘informal 
agenda’ and various people chairing them.763 But what was ‘Scargillism’? 764It could be argued 
that it was in some ways syndicalist, though this is unlikely to have been a conscious strategy 
by Scargill himself. There are numerous examples of Scargill’s rhetoric and method that seem 
to suggest syndicalism, although it is arguable if Scargill actively viewed himself as a 
syndicalist. 765 He recalls how: ‘I gradually began to be interested in the union itself, because 
it appeared to me that, irrespective of what I did politically…in any political organisation, the 
real power…lay either with the working classes or the ruling classes’. 766 But one of his most 
confident expressions of is as follows: 
They (miners-edit) don’t want to see anybody going onto a platform and yelling: ‘I am a 
Marxist and I want to see dialectical materialism brought in as the order of the day’. They 
couldn’t care bloody less, but I’ll tell you what they could care about: they care about what’s 
in their wage packet on a Friday, they could care about what their conditions are like. 767 
5.1.3 The logistics of the national broad left 
The broad left represented a more coherent organisation than had previously existed. A national 
miners’ forum met for the first time in August 1967. It was at this meeting where Lawrence 
Daly was chosen to be the left’s candidate in the forthcoming general secretary election, due 
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in December 1968. Paynter had previously ‘earmarked’ Daly as a successor, and Daly had been 
projected ‘throughout the major coalfields in much the same way as a new packet of soap flakes 
was introduced to consumers’. 768The meeting was attended by party and non-party mining 
leaders: Daly; McGahey; McLean; Dunn; Dai Francis; Emlyn Williams; Kane; Taylor; Owen 
Briscoe; and Tommy Mullany. 769 The Moffats had continually refused to enter Scotland into 
any debate around the broad left, but Abe had by this point retired, and Alex was ill. 770 The 
brothers’ reasoning had been there was no distinction between communism and anti-
communism; they were inherently suspicious that communists could build any form of alliance 
with the Labour Party and not be subverted in the process. 771 At the meeting the area was 
represented by Daly and McGahey, who deputised, and committed the area to the broad left. 
772  
Allen was the link between the regional broad left and translated it into a more national 
capacity. But Allen is himself a curious figure and it would be fascinating if his papers came 
to light. 773Bolton, certainly, is uncomplimentary about him, suggesting that he was ‘a 
disaster…so hard left, so sectarian, and so much a Scargillite and so on, it was just disastrous’. 
774 Moreover Bolton suggested that McGahey was ‘a bit blinkered by Allen…it took him quite 
a bit of time to see through him’.775 Nobody seems to know how Allen, a professor from Leeds 
University with apparently no connection to mining, ended up in this position; Bolton, 
certainly, ‘couldn’t work it out’. 776  
But the evidence relating to the lead up to the 1968 election really demonstrates the role 
that Allen played in the building of the broad left. Paradoxically Daly, the dissident, received 
clearer instructions from the party than the CP’s member ever had. Allen’s letters to Daly 
demonstrate this but, by the nature of them, the transmission of the information was not first 
hand.  The process was Ramelson-Allen-Daly, not Ramelson-Daly. The party was also happy 
to allow Allen to write letters to Daly and there is no evidence that the CP checked them, even 
when they contained details of the CP’s policies. For example in 1967 Allen wrote to Daly 
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relaying a conversation that he had had with Ramelson, where Allen disclosed to Daly the CP 
strategy, future ambitions, and even courted his opinion on party policy. 777 
These letters have a clear instructional tone and are the only evidence of clear policy 
transmission that has been found. They have not been used in the existing literature but they 
are immensely significant. Allen informed Daly that the party’s work should largely focus on 
Yorkshire but that it should also attempt to spread into Durham and Lancashire, where Joe 
Gormley ‘has the advantage’.778 Allen reported that Ramelson had suggested a similar idea to 
the Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions (LCDTU) in the Yorkshire area, based 
around education, and suggested that Daly should be central to these meetings, which should 
take place ‘at least once a quarter.’779 Allen told Daly that the CP were planning a new energy 
policy and that Ramelson wished to have Daly’s thoughts on it. 780 But the letters also suggest 
that, in a sense, the CP was aware of its own marginality. The point of Daly’s involvement in 
the CP’s energy policy was to present the policy as ‘acceptable to a broad left wing front in the 
union.’ 781 A similar exchange between Allen and Daly took place in October 1968, this time 
around a Labour Party meeting which  miners were likely to attend and where the CP wanted 
Daly to be ‘the only speaker’, and where Daly was instructed to ‘talk about the situation in the 
mining industry’.782  
Daly’s Miners and the Nation published by the Scottish area of the NUM in 1968, was 
very similar to the CP’s policy. Daly’s manifesto suggested that the government should 
underwrite the industry at its present level; take on the social costs of pit closures; and attempt 
to use coal to its fullest capacity. It also argued that the union should push for higher wages for 
miners. 783 The party’s energy policy, which the year earlier Allen had asked Daly for his 
opinion on, suggested that the main source of fuel should be indigenous, with imports used 
only when there were no natural resources left, and proposed that the government should 
underwrite coal at its current output and also accept responsibility for men and families 
impacted by closures. 784 The security services noted in 1967 that the party hoped to ‘develop 
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and expand the coalmining industry as a source of indigenous fuel’.785 The party’s A Future 
for the Miners (1965) had called for the underwriting of the coal industry, a national fuel policy, 
inclusive of research into coal use, and no closures on grounds other than exhaustion. 786 
Just as the party had courted Daly’s opinion on their energy policy the CP had 
reciprocated and offered comments on Daly’s draft. Alex Moffat noted that Daly was correct 
to deal with the question of wages but suggested that he could use the miners’ increased 
productivity to justify it. But this was not necessarily wage militancy and Moffat added that 
the fight for higher wages was ‘what they expect the union to do and that’s the reason they pay 
their contributions’.787 Allen noted that: ‘I do not think you have made out as strong a case as 
you would’, claiming that Daly’s argument could be supported by Gormley and the right, 
allowing them to ‘steal your clothes’. 788 Allen advocated that a more ‘defiant and aggressive 
stance’ should be promoted and reminded Daly that ‘when we discussed closures, it was agreed 
that once we admit the right of the government to close pits, then the only thing that we could 
argue about is the rate of closure’. 789 The section of emboldened text, that I have highlighted, 
is immensely significant. The use of the word ‘admit’ might suggest that Allen thought that pit 
closures were in some way justified. It could be argued that the CP viewed the fight against 
closures as a method to raise militant consciousness, when in reality the situation in the 
industry, regarding pit closures, was irreparable. Allen was certainly close enough to know the 
situation. Ramelson’s comments substantiate this suggestion with more clarity: ‘I like very 
much your argument for the need to take militant action…the absence of such action by the 
NUM, being content to offer verbal opposition but when it came to the crunch to acquiesce, 
which encouraged the government to develop its closures, confident they could get away with 
it’. 790  
5.1.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated that, despite being aware of the continuing unemployment in 
the industry, the CP continued to advocate wage militancy. Although this was often a general 
policy, even when evidence emerged that it was problematic in the NUM the party did not 
change direction. Perhaps criticising the CP for this is slightly unfair; it is the benefit of 
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hindsight that permits this analysis. Given the growing number of communists across the 
leadership of the union it may have appeared that politicisation through wage militancy was a 
plausible tactic. But the issue was that communists in the union were not applying wage 
militancy as the CP thought; this was evidenced by the fact that many resolutions that 
communists presented, pushing for higher pay, were composited. Militant action around 
wages, arguably a generous description of what was really motivating these wage increases, 
was not exclusive to the CP; this was the case even before the broad left became a tactic. 
 The broad left is interesting; in some ways it evidences the fact that the CP could 
disseminate a policy decision effectively. It is likely, however, that the parity between the 
party and communists in the union was coincidental, in much the same way as the 
commonalities in chapter four were. But within the broad left we can see a clear example of 
policy dissemination in the Daly letters; this is the chapter’s biggest contribution to original 
knowledge, as they have not been used in other work. The broad left was in itself a paradox; 
it furthered the illusion of ubiquity, whilst simultaneously diluting the party’s potency. As the 
1984 strike would prove, through ‘Scargillism’, the broad left policy was ultimately fatal for 
the CP in the NUM. But even when it originated in the Yorkshire area the broad left had an 
element of the maverick about it. Its defiance and challenge to the official leadership 
evidenced grassroots dissatisfaction, a sense that the union was not doing enough; but it also 
marked a departure from the sort of policies that social democratic communists, like Horner 
and Paynter, had worked hard to achieve. The way that the broad left developed in Yorkshire 
was in some ways a more sophisticated form of defiance than the numerous unofficial strikes 
had once been. Despite all these subtle changes, the period that this chapter has considered 
marks a sense that there was a significant change in the mentality of many miners and the 
temper of the union: the manifestation of this is the focus of chapter six. 
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Chapter VI: Miners on the Offensive 
6.0 The end of acquiescence  
This chapter considers the period when the NUM engaged in its first official strike since 1926; 
this is the period where the remaining barriers to organised militancy ceased to exist. The 
NCB’s ability to control the miners by reminding them how good life under nationalisation 
was in comparison to private ownership began to evaporate in the stark reality of pit closures 
and declining wages. Kane recalls that the NCB had adopted a strategy of controlling through 
congratulating, or perhaps patronising, and he remembered how ‘we couldn’t get off our bloody 
knees with the weight of the medals they had given us for being good lads’. 791  Robens 
substantiates the claim that reward sapped dissent through the following story, which he 
proudly recalled in his autobiography without a hint of irony. The NCB ran a national safety 
competition and offered a prize for the biggest improvement in the accident rate, both of which 
were awarded based on the number of working days lost through accidents. One worker at 
Silverdale Colliery broke his leg but ‘insisted on coming to work with his limb in plaster…he 
didn’t miss a shift, so the pit suffered no penalty’; and, presumably, did not blow the pit’s 
chances in the competition.792  
This change was one of the catalysts for the official militancy that history records; of 
course, the NUM was by no means exceptional in reaching the conclusion that militant action, 
coupled with political sentiment, was necessary to resolve falling pay and conditions. The 
miners, in the context of these problems, and their waning patience exacerbated by unwelcome 
and increasingly draconian government intervention in industrial relations, refused to be 
appeased any longer. In the tough, patriarchal world of the pit, even the later accounts of this 
change in mentality convey a sense of frustration, anger, and despondency; the historical 
narrative that is available has, across various accounts, preserved the blunt, masculine 
articulation of these problems. Summarising the temper of the miners in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, Malcolm Pitt recalled a particularly unfortunate acronym that the NCB acquired 
from the men: ‘No Cunt Brothers, which neatly sums up the bitter sense of betrayal and 
injustice which the NCB has managed to inspire in the minds of the miners in its thirty years 
of existence’.793 George Bolton recalls that when men had previously tried to go on strike they 
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had been told ‘we’ll shut the fucking pit’, but during this period men would be prepared to take 
other jobs, if needed, and had simply developed a new attitude of ‘fuck ‘em’. 794 Addressing 
delegates to the 1970 conference, in pursuit of a wage claim, Scargill reminded his audience 
that:  
No longer will our membership accept that a small increase is better than none. They are fed 
up with being asked not to rock the boat. We have been told to remain passive. We have 
remained passive since 1956 and where has it got us? Half the coalmining industry has been 
obliterated in Great Britain. If this is what passiveness brings us, then we want none of it!795 
 
Sid Schofield made the same, if more measured, observations at the union’s 1970 conference, 
reminding delegates that: 
If we had exploited the circumstances that prevailed in the ‘50s…we could have demanded a 
much better deal for our members…but increases in the price of coal…would have been 
inevitable to pay for our demands…we did not take advantage of the private enterprise 
philosophy because…we cherished the ideals of nationalisation, as we understood them, and 
there was no place for exploitation of those ideals.796 
 
The CP had long imagined that wage militancy, at least in its theoretical form, would act as an 
agent of politicisation, as the previous chapters have argued. The clash between state and union 
that characterises this period provides no better laboratory for the party’s theory; but, as 
Callaghan has argued, the CP did not benefit from this event as it expected. 797 But the battle 
lines were, in principle, drawn from the arrival of Edward Heath’s government in June 1970.  
Heath had barely unpacked his belongings when in July 1970 the Ministerial Committee on 
Economic Strategy sat. It noted that:  
The main point of attack on current inflation should be wages…while restraint on prices would 
have a psychological impact on the level of future demands and on the readiness of employers 
to concede them, it would in practice take a very long time to affect the cost of living index…in 
order to change the present climate, of expectations of extravagant wage settlements, the 
government needs to take a firm stand against such settlements…this may also mean facing up 
to major strikes in basic industries.798 
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This chapter is set in the context of these developments; for this reason it covers the period up 
to the end of the 1974 miners’ strike and the events of later 1974 are dealt with in the next 
chapter. During this period the miners moved from being a relatively dormant union to one that 
became emblematic of militant trade unionism. Because of this perception communists in the 
union have received more attention in the existing literature than in previous periods, especially 
around the role that they played in the 1972 and 1974 strikes. The general consensus, most 
pronounced in the work of Phillips and Darlington, is that communists were a force of agitation, 
encouragement, and logistical assistance. 799 Thus McGahey’s Miners and Energy reminded 
the union membership that they were ‘militant and aware’ and should use ‘their collective 
strength to exploit their market position’ and not rely on the NCB as an ally against the 
government. 800  
6.1 Debates within the party around strategy  
In a sense there had always been an element of disunity around the CP’s industrial strategy, 
manifested in two ways. The most consistent, and arguably primary, absence of unity was 
apparent in the actions of the communist trade unionists who, rather than actively opposing the 
CP’s industrial strategy, were permitted sufficient latitude to act somewhat autonomously. 
Their ‘defiance’ was passive in its intent but also in its manifestation; the general absence of 
instruction circumvented the opportunity for conflict between the two groups. The link between 
the CP and industrial comrades was weak and individual communists, or units of communists 
in particular branches, simply occupied themselves with the ebb and flow of union life. But 
there was also a more active, sophisticated and increasingly vocal manifestation of discontent. 
In terms of the genesis of this current we might see Eaton’s tentative recommendations from 
the 1950s as the first stage and Warren’s more overt critique as a more confident, sophisticated 
example. The willingness of people to question the method of the industrial strategy increased 
in tenacity and conviction in the later 1960s and early 1970s. Betty Matthews, writing in 
November 1971, suggested that the Labour Party’s ‘reformism’ had weakened the workers’ 
confidence in the Labour Party. Therefore the strategy was re-asserted: 
The Labour Party can be moved to the left and the way to do it is through the trade unions…the 
close connection with the union which, through affiliations, constitute the mass membership 
of the Labour Party, means that the power of building up to a victory of the left in policy and 
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leadership of trade unions is also the means of winning a victory over the present leadership 
into the Labour Party.801 
 
But Matthews saw the weaknesses of this strategy in its existing form. Mostly there was an 
absence of an attempt to make political capital out of what was primarily a wages’ struggle; 
only this, Matthews claimed, would change the right-wing balance in the Labour Party. 802 
Observations such as Matthews’s were symptomatic  of the more general developments of 
communism, most associated with the international ‘Eurocommunist’ movement, but 
manifested in the CP around the likes of Mike Prior, Dave Purdy and, of course, Bill Warren. 
803This was, as history records, highly problematic for a party that had shamelessly constructed 
itself based on an ethos of monolithic unity. Facing criticism from within the party had, in the 
earlier days of the CP, been structurally prohibited through the party’s rule of ‘democratic 
centralism’; the notion that debate was healthy, but once a policy had been decided upon, it 
must be supported.  
6.2 Economic approaches 
A further challenge was evidenced in the economic strategy of the left, which emanated from 
the Labour left with the involvement of the CP. The AES was a means of ‘resolving the crisis 
of the 1970s in a way conducive to socialist values’. 804 The CP defined it as ‘a series of 
demands which, taken as a whole, would break the power of monopoly capital in Britain, solve 
the perennial crisis of the economy and put the country on the road to socialism’.805 The means 
of achieving this was to expand the economy through a programme of large-scale public 
investment and nationalisation and to increase democratic control over publicly owned 
industries.806 The CP were keen to note how the ‘AES does not propose the wholesale takeover 
of manufacturing industry’ as this might ‘seem too many people like out-and-out socialism’. 
807 Sam Aaronovitch argued that, once committed to the ideas that the left had presented 
through the AES, then people might support the need for a programme of socialist change. 808 
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The proposals, Aaronovitch pointed out, were an immediate solution rather than being a set of 
proposals for ‘a government of the left’. 809 The role of the AES was as a path, a stepping stone 
to a government that would impose more radical changes, which had previously been 
unobtainable. 810 Ramelson saw the AES as a step in the right direction for socialism but noted 
that the problems could never be eliminated ‘for all so long as capitalism remains the system 
under which we live’. 811 The AES was emblematic of the changing strategy of the left. 812There 
were variants within the detail of the AES. Some people saw the AES as needing to incorporate 
workers’ control whereas others, such as private sector unions, viewed it as a way of diverting 
resources to manufacturing, whereas public sector unions viewed it as a means of expanding 
state employment, therefore reducing unemployment. 813 For the CP there was no better 
evidence of the party’s view that it was ‘having an impact on mainstream Labour opinion’. 814  
6.3 Protests 
It was noted in chapter one how the CP and the NUM had parallel trajectories and as debates 
began to arise in the party so too was there opposition within the NUM, manifested through 
the Collier, an ephemeral rank and file newspaper set up in the wake of the 1972 strike. It is 
unclear if the Collier signified an act of political protest but I would suggest that it was certainly 
a manifestation of frustration and discontent. It was an organ of grievance, without much 
potential to cause strife; however its existence has been ignored in the existing literature and I 
suggest that it provides good evidence of the mentality of the miners at this time. The Collier 
sought to use its influence to protest against the NUM leadership, who voiced their concern 
against pit closures but then appeared, at least in the Colliers’s view, to concede them. This 
view was expressed in a letter from Jim Deakin, a miner from Dodworth, who said that ‘only 
rank and file coordination can stop pit closures AT A STROKE’. 815 Moreover once the union’s 
discontent swelled into official action in 1972, the Collier sought to reprimand those officials 
who ‘had the Coal Board and Tories down yet they didn’t go the whole way’. 816 Of course we 
should not over-emphasise the words of one sectarian element within the union; the run of the 
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Collier, at least in the sense of its preservation in the archival records, could never be described 
as prolific. But it demonstrated that there existed a militant element in the NUM; one that had 
no link with the CP.  
6.4 Daly and Labour  
It is interesting that the Collier existed in the same region where another rank and file, anti-
leadership organisation had originated some years before. By the late 1960s one of the 
advantages of the broad left was that its members, for example, Daly, Briscoe and Williams, 
could attend the Labour Party conference as members, whilst the CP was still listed as a 
proscribed organisation. The sorts of resolutions that were moved by the NUM at the Labour 
conference were progressive; Daly, often described as being ‘constrained’ by his union 
position, presented many of them.817  Through the broad left the CP had created a Trojan horse 
to get deeper into the very context that they had geared the industrial strategy toward eventually 
influencing; and, in the case of the NUM, it appeared to be working. But as Callaghan has 
demonstrated there was no resultant growth of the CP or any material benefit gained from this 
development. 818Almost in recognition of the fact that the CP no longer presented a threat, the 
Labour Party removed the CP from its list of proscribed organisations in 1973. 819Was this as 
a mark of its own respectability or progress in British politics? Or was it instead symptomatic 
of the party’s marginality and weakness, signifying that it was no longer deemed a substantial 
threat?  
6.5 Elections  
The perceptions of communist influence and ubiquity, which were explored in chapter one, 
characterise the existing literature. The party was, at least superficially, doing well enough 
nationally to convince itself, and those who were hostile to it, of its nefarious ubiquity.  McLean 
became Scottish general secretary in March 1969, when he polled 11,503 votes compared to 
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his opponent, who got 5,264 votes, mostly by campaigning on wage rises and opposition to 
Government legislation. 820 Nationally the party was also doing well in 1969:  Kane, who had 
been part of the core militant base in Yorkshire, stood against 47 other candidates and was 
elected to the executive of the NUM with 48,250 votes, with his nearest rival receiving just 
40,350 votes. 821 In 1955 Kane had been disciplined by the NUM for leading an unofficial 
strike at Armthorpe; yet not fifteen years later he was credibly elected onto the union’s 
executive. Clearly the zeitgeist of the miners’ union had changed and there was further evidence 
of this. Whelan, of the CP and Nottinghamshire, was initially elected to the union executive in 
March 1971, gaining the support of sixteen branches in comparison to his opponent, who won 
the support of twelve branches. 822 A re-election took place in May of the same year, after one 
delegate had voted against the mandate of his pit; the errant vote was a protest against Whelan’s 
politics. 823But the second result, where Whelan polled 402 card votes compared to his 
opponent’s 284, further demonstrates the conviction that the miners had in their communist 
candidate. 824 There is no evidence to suggest, however, that this represented any sort of 
endorsement on the grounds of Whelan’s politics.  
Even where communists did not triumph the figures that they polled in elections were 
impressive; in the 1971 NUM presidential election, for example, the main contenders were Joe 
Gormley and McGahey. Gormley, the Lancastrian, secured 55.9 per cent of the 210, 546 votes 
that were cast; but in areas where the CP was traditionally perceived to have a large presence, 
like Scotland and South Wales, McGahey polled 80.6 per cent and 77.4 per cent respectively. 
825Although incredibly disappointed at his defeat in 1971, as Bolton recalls, McGahey was 
elected to the position of union vice-president in 1973. His rival, Len Clarke of the Labour 
Party, drew 126 votes in comparison to McGahey’s 155. 826Yet it was never guaranteed that 
communists who did well in one electoral milieu could translate their success into other areas. 
In the same conference where McGahey won the vice-presidency, he also lost the vote to 
represent the NUM at the TUC annual conference, losing out to Gormley and Daly. 827  
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The general consensus in the existing literature is that communists did much better at 
the top of the union; this is certainly true. But the pattern outlined in the previous paragraph 
was also apparent in the period covered by chapter four. But to what extent did these successes 
represent a victory for the party, and to what extent were these victories the result of the party’s 
instruction, or involvement? Certainly they represented a victory in the sense that they allowed 
the party to appear to achieve what its industrial strategy had planned to do; to get officials 
elected into important union positions, in order to influence policy. But where did it go from 
there? The CP was not a pressure group, it was always intended to be a political unit with its 
own identity; but in the successes in the NUM, largely inextricable from the broad left, the 
party had, at best, lost its identity. Moreover the perennial problem of union communists acting 
relatively autonomously persisted. The most problematic element of this dynamic, in this 
particular context of militancy and the perception of party influence, was that is masked the 
realities of the situation. All of this combined to evidence the case of Warren, Matthews, Prior, 
and Purdy, for example, who had identified what they believed to be the bigger flaws in the 
strategy.  
6.6 Strikes 
The greatest charge that the party’s critics could level at the traditional strategy was that it was 
purely economistic, a claim most often directed at Ramelson, and one that is heavily refuted 
by his biographers. The CP, despite the shortcomings of the strategy, had always intended to 
be much more than a force fighting purely economic issues. Wages remained a key issue for 
both the party and communists in industry. Whilst the CP’s motivation for increasing wages 
had always had a political motivation, there was increasing evidence of parity between the 
party and members in the union. But, as with the other examples of similarity that we have 
seen, this is representative of coincidence, rather than orchestrated policy-forming. For 
example Gollan recognised the strikes of the period here as being much more than economism, 
writing in his private notes that the ‘wages struggle has become politicised’. 828 In the NUM, 
meanwhile, communists sought to use the fight for higher wages to convey a sense of political 
organisation. A national campaign on wages must be conducted, argued McLean in the 
Morning Star, ‘so that the membership can see we have a policy and a national leadership 
prepared to fight for it’. 829   McLean’s statement is one of the most clear evidences of the 
potential to conduct militant action on wages that we have seen so far; was this the CP’s 
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projection of wage militancy, politicisation, coming to fruition? It is probable that this was a 
particular militant reaction to the conditions of the industry; but, even if it did evidence the 
kind of politicisation that the CP wanted, then it was immaterial for the party who still reaped 
no benefit from all of this.  
The 1969 union conference pursued Composite Resolution I, a weekly minimum wage 
of £15.00 and £16.00, depending on the workers’ job. This was a response to falling wages. 
Despite the surface workers’ pay increase the year earlier, which had brought them an extra 
£1.27.5p, their pay was low and had even fallen behind local authority manual workers and 
dustbin men in the pay league. 830 The conference also sought a shorter working day, presented 
in composite resolution II. 831The particularities of the claim, led by Yorkshire, was that surface 
workers should have their day reduced to seven and three-quarter hours, inclusive of mealtimes. 
In a demonstration of intent, the resolution also expressed the necessity for a report, detailing 
the state of the negotiations, initially to be fed back within five months, but the deadline was 
then retracted, and instead compelled the NCB to commence ‘immediate’ negotiations. 832 
Even before the pro-strike ballot was returned on 9 October 1969 some miners had 
already descended upon the NCB’s London offices. But once the strike commenced 
participation quickly increased. Within three days all 76 of Yorkshire’s pits were out, along 
with four from Scotland, two from South Wales and one in the Midlands. 833 Just twenty four 
hours later, 96 pits were out across the UK, which totalled 91,000 men. 834The Kent area also 
offered support, seven days into the strike, if the NCB’s offer was not improved. 835 At its 
height 43 per cent of the whole union was out on strike, still far short of the two-thirds majority 
needed under the constitution, but an unprecedented expression of national unity.836 
At the following Special Conference on 30 October 1969 the wage increase was 
accepted by 193,985 votes to 41,322, with effect from 3 November 1969. 837 The strike was 
over, although only just, and 168,000 votes were cast supporting a return to work, with 165,000 
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against. 838 In this vote the rank and file had parity with the NUM executive, who had voted 
14-5 in favour of returning to work. 839 But the real issue was that the NCB, who had stubbornly 
refused to concede wage increases in the context of unemployment, granted a generous 
settlement in order to avoid curtailing another demand, a shorter working day. In a twist of 
irony the CP had always forecast the primary catalyst for politically-illuminating industrial 
conflict to be the prosecution of the wages’ struggle; in the event, the first substantial unofficial 
and near-national strike since nationalisation was primarily the result of hours, not pay.  
6.7 Perceptions of 1969 
The 1969 strike demonstrated on an unprecedented scale the dissatisfaction amongst miners; it 
was, as Taylor put it, a ‘grassroots rebellion’.840 Although the original objective, a shorter day, 
had failed the 1969 episode demonstrated that the NCB would concede substantial wage 
demands when the threat of a substantial strike was presented. The NCB may have believed 
that they had got away with effectively giving with one hand and taking with another, but in 
reality they had set a precedent, one which Scargill, in particular, was alert to. But to what 
extent were Scargill and communists in the union acting in conjunction with each other in their 
confident pursuit of wage claims? The 1970 union conference was an opportunity for Scargill 
to move composite resolution III, justified on the grounds of the miners’ relatively low pay, 
and it requested a minimum wage that ranged from £20-£30 a week. 841 The NCB’s offer fell 
just short of the NUM’s aim, with increases offered ranging from £18.50-£29.50, and it was 
rejected by the union.842As an added impetus Scargill referred to the October militancy and 
reminded delegates that, should the NCB refuse the wage claim, then the subsequent response 
would ‘make last October look like a Sunday school picnic’. 843 The resolution also reflected a 
change in tactics; where resolutions previously had used the rather open-ended phrase, 
‘substantial increase’, which had permitted the miners to be ‘fobbed off’, according to 
McGahey; this one was very specific in its demands. 844 McGahey, seconding the resolution, 
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added his support primarily because, even in the context of unemployment, some areas were 
suffering a manpower shortage as men left to work in better-paid industries. 845 
Taylor has suggested that the resolution ‘committed the union NUM to the militant 
pursuit of wages’. 846 But the wage claim was not dominated by a militant caucus. Neither 
Scargill nor McGahey were being unusually radical in their pursuit of the wage rise; it was also 
supported by Dunn and Heathfield, but Roy Ottey also supported it. 847 The support for the 
resolution suggested that the wage claim was a reaction to the context. Whelan justified the 
wage claim because of the ‘crazy economics of coal’ which brought large profits to many 
sectors, as coal was sold cheaply. 848 As Bolton noted, ‘the miners are looking for leadership, 
and if they do not get it they take the initiative’. 849 Scargill called on the union to bear the 
responsibility of the failure to ‘maintain wages for our membership’ and added that until the 
claim was met, the union was not able to call on the confidence of its members. 850 McGahey 
urged the delegates to accept the resolution unanimously, for fear that without it ‘the industry 
may close up’. 851 
The lack of organisation was obvious. Emlyn Williams, the miners’ president from 
South Wales, proposed resolution 12, a wage claim which pursued £1.00 a week less than the 
Scargill-led composite resolution III had. 852 Williams reassured delegates that his area meant 
no malice in contravening composite resolution III; instead, Williams explained, the temper of 
the South Wales coalfield was such that their individual wage claim was designed to convey 
their agitation and frustration at the wages’ situation. Failure to concede their claim, however, 
would result in industrial action. This example illuminates an enduring problem; whilst it was 
probably not Williams’s idea to move a resolution that had the potential to split the left, 
Williams was obliged to respond to the will of his area. It was Daly, joined by Gormley, who 
opposed resolution 12 on the grounds of its divisiveness; a subsequent card vote, however, 
rejected the obstruction by 169 votes in favour of carrying the resolution, with 160 against. 853 
In the event the mandate for strike action failed; the outcome was 115,052 in favour and 
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143,466 against, a total majority of 55.5 percent. 854 This is a significant figure, but it still 
suggested that even though militancy existed in the NUM, it was not yet assured enough to 
graduate into mass strike action. At the key point, when the strategy appeared to be coming 
together, paradoxically its limitations were also becoming more apparent; the main one being 
that wage militancy, insofar as it existed, was not exclusive to communists in the union.  
6.8 1971: militants on the march? 
The ballot for strike action in 1970 had achieved a majority, but it was not sufficient under the 
union’s rules. Resolution seven, moved by the North West area and seconded by Kent, 
proposed a change in the union’s constitution, to the effect that the two-third majority needed 
for strike action be changed to a simple 55 percent.855 The change in rule was a clear suggestion 
of the union’s changing temperament and, unlike the removal of compulsory arbitration in 
1961, had a much bigger impact on removing the difficulties with moving unofficial militancy 
into official action. Paradoxically the CP had been a constant critic of compulsory arbitration, 
but they had had little to say on the need to lower the majority needed for strike action; instead 
it was the moderate North Western area that took the initiative, rather than any party members 
or party-led areas. But the change of rule was in the union’s interest. This was, for Scargill, 
‘the most decisive change of rule ever in the union’.856 Why was such a significant change 
moved by a moderate area? Scargill claims that this was due to the right realising it was 
vulnerable and that if it did not grant some concessions then it might find itself displaced by 
the rank and file and an ‘alternative leadership’ put in its place. 857 For Jim Phillips, writing in 
2007, the change was because the union needed to protect its ‘integrity’ following the large 
unofficial strikes. 858 Whatever the reason for the change the outcome was the same; the union 
had adjusted its own constitution to facilitate strike action and this provided an important 
weapon in the armoury through which to pursue higher pay.  
  All of this, whilst evidencing the union’s left-wing temper, was not due to the CP’s 
interventions. By 1971 even some campaigns that the CP had been fighting since 1955 were 
pursued by non-communists; resolution 30, moved by Leicester, called for men to be paid the 
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adult rate at 18 and was carried, although no communists spoke in support of it. 859 Significantly 
it was this resolution that became one of the NUM-sponsored resolutions at the TUC annual 
conference in September 1971; again, no party members had any role in this. Whilst Whelan, 
on behalf of Nottinghamshire, may have moved the resolution raising concern at the 
government’s ‘hiving off’ of nationalised industries, which became a NUM-sponsored 
resolution at the Labour Party and TUC conferences that year, it was a composited resolution. 
Of course the ability of party members to fit seamlessly into the ebb and flow of union life was 
in many ways the measure of the success of the industrial strategy; in terms of wage militancy 
and resolutions, the CP’s strategy appeared to be working. But what consequence did this have 
for the party? The CP was in no better shape. Wage militancy, even though it is unlikely that 
communists in the union thought of it this way, was not exclusive to the CP or even the broad 
left. This suggests that, although the CP may have viewed this as evidence of its ability to move 
the NUM to the left, it was in fact much more to do with a reaction against the context of this 
period, characterised as it was by rising inflation and government measures of wage restraint.   
The 1971 conference sought a ‘comprehensive’ wage rise of between £9.00 a week and 
£5.00 a week, a minimum wage of £26.00 a week for surface workers, £28.00 a week for 
underground workers and £35.00 for face workers. 860 Even Gormley agreed that miners had 
become more militant since the late 1960s as they were not longer willing to live on a low 
wage, as the cost of living rose; since the end of piece-work rates under the NPLA, many miners 
had been forced to work overtime to boost their earnings. 861The NCB, now under the 
leadership of Derek Ezra, offered an additional £2.00 a week for surface workers and £1.90 a 
week for the rest of the union. 862 Heath’s phased income policy, where the maximum rise that 
could be permitted by the NCB was seven per cent, effectively capped what the NCB could 
offer. 863 The NCB’s caveat was additional holidays, five days’ paid extra, which the NUM 
rejected as part of a wage dispute. 864 The union commenced an overtime ban in order to, as 
Emlyn Williams put it, send out a clear message to Heath that miners would not subsidise 
‘cheap coal milked off by private industry’.865 The Special Conference of the NUM held in 
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December 1971 endorsed an overtime ban with a phenomenal 96.5 percent of the membership 
in favour of it. 866  
But in all of this the CP acted as a force of agitation. Its propaganda was laudable but I 
have not found anything in the archives that suggest that the party gave any instructions or 
changed tactics regarding the way it liaised with party members in industry. Perhaps this should 
not be a surprise; the dynamic between the caucus and periphery, of King Street and party 
members in the union, had long since been one of latitude and autonomy. Did the continuation 
of this policy reflect a sense amongst the CP that they felt the party’s strategy was working and 
so no further instruction was needed? This is plausible. But for all the reasons that have been 
suggested, this was a short-sighted approach.  
6.9 The CP and the 1972 strike 
Following the successful overtime ban, the 1972 strike started with picketing from Yorkshire. 
867 The percentage of miners voting to strike in 1972 was 58.8 per cent, which under the old 
rules would not have been a high enough majority, but now that the structural problem of the 
union’s constitution had disappeared, the union was officially on strike. 868 There are two main 
debates associated with the logistics of the strike. Ottey, writing in 1985, argued that the 1972 
strike was ‘meticulously planned’ by the national leadership. 869 Ottey’s view, which recalls 
events of thirteen years before, was the product of his own particular outlook at the time of 
writing; he had recently resigned from the NUM NEC, in protest at the actions of the left. An 
interview with two members of the strike committee from Barnsley instead emphasises the role 
of the rank and file: discussing the successful tactic of picketing power stations they said that 
‘we at grass roots level knew where to go without being instructed’. 870It is equally important 
not to inflate the number of the rank and file who were behind the strike either. Although the 
vote for an overtime ban had been strikingly high this still meant that less than sixty percent of 
union members had been in favour of a strike. 871 Scargill’s own view, that the Yorkshire area 
was the catalyst and sustaining force behind the strike, is another perspective. 872 It is likely 
that a subtle mixture of all three was responsible but what is found across all three accounts is 
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a lack of mention of the CP. There is nothing to suggest that the CP caused the strike or ran it; 
but again, for a party that boasted of ubiquity in these events, its name is curiously absent, even 
when it played an agitating role.  
The result of the strike was Heath’s inquiry, chaired by Lord Wilberforce, and a pay 
rise of almost thirty per cent, which completely undermined the Government’s cap of seven 
per cent.873 In addition the miners received eleven extra concessions, including bonus 
payments, the adult rate for 18 year olds and an extra week’s paid holiday.874 The end result 
was, according to Darlington and Lyddon, that the miners won more in 24 hours than they had 
in 24 years. 875 The miners had got what they wanted and BS circular No. 67/72 was sent to all 
NUM branches on the 25 February 1972 with the results of the return to work ballot announced: 
210,039 miners were in favour of returning to work and 7,581 were against. Across what were 
traditionally classified as the most militant coalfields, Scotland, South Wales and Yorkshire, 
only approximately five per cent of each area’s membership rejected the return to work. 876 The 
Morning Star explained this by saying that these militant areas accepted the offer in order to 
‘preserve unity’ in the union. 877In Kent, however, communist Jack Collins suggested that a 
few extra days on strike could have won more and the NUM area executive rejected 
unanimously the pay offer.878Even in militant victory divisions between communists in the 
union remained.  
How did the 1972 strike affect the party’s industrial politics in the NUM? The union’s 
resolutions at the TUC and Labour Party conferences confirm the continuation of the union’s 
new-found left-wing identity. An indigenous fuel policy, composited from the Midlands, 
Durham, Nottinghamshire, Scotland, and Colliery Officials and Staffs Area (COSA), made its 
way onto the TUC agenda in September 1972. 879 The type of resolutions that the NUM moved 
at the Labour Party’s annual conference that year were also certainly ‘progressive’; for 
example, they called for economic sanctions to be applied to Rhodesia and also requested a 
conference of all European governments. 880 But these resolutions were composited and they 
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further reiterate the points that I made earlier. My argument can be countered by saying that, 
so far as the CP had set itself objectives they had been met; but what happened after this? The 
broader transformation to society that the CP wanted to see showed no signs of following the 
apparent success of the industrial strategy.  Militancy around wages, although apparent, was 
not prosecuted by communists in the union to make the party’s industrial politics work. The 
aim of communists in the union was more immediate and intended to improve miners’ pay and 
condition. It was recognised that this change might come about politically but its broad 
ambition was evidenced by the fact that it was pursued by communists, members of the Labour 
left, and even moderates in the union/  
6.1.0 1973  
Nonetheless wage claims were presented at the 1973 conference and composite resolution IV, 
delivered by McGahey, explicitly rejected the government’s claim that ‘inflation is caused by 
high wages’ and demanded wage increases of between £35 and £45 a week, which also pointed 
out that the concessions achieved through Wilberforce had all but been obliterated. 881 It was 
supported by Scargill and the Yorkshire area but also by Lancashire, Nottinghamshire, and 
South Wales. Composite resolution VII, moved by Durham, was also supported by South 
Wales and Kent; communists were working with non-party members in the pursuit of the 
miners’ interests. The miners’ case was also strengthened by the actions of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which had by October 1973 increased the price of oil 
by seventy per cent, restricting its movement and creating increased demand for coal. 882 But 
the ballot on strike action over wages failed with 143,006 against and only 82,631 in favour. 
883As the table below demonstrates even the areas that were traditionally perceived to be the 
most militant, such as South Wales and Kent, failed to achieve mandates for strike action and 
even there were small margins in the pro-strike areas.884 This further proves that wage militancy 
was a response to the problems of the union, rather than any sustained evidence of 
politicisation.    
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Table demonstrating voting percentages in the NUM 
Area ‘Yes’ vote ‘No’ vote 
Yorkshire 53.08% 46.92% 
South Wales 49.95% 50.05% 
Midlands 25.08% 74.92% 
Scotland 51.18% 48.82% 
Kent 49.25% 50.75% 
 
Although South Wales had voted against strike action, albeit narrowly, it was that area who 
were pioneers in pushing the need to secure higher wages and in October 1973 the area voted 
decisively for an overtime ban. 885The South Wales’ miners were the catalyst for the union’s 
convention of a Special Conference in November 1973, which decided on an overtime ban to 
begin immediately. 886McGahey noted that the unanimous executive vote on the overtime ban 
in November 1973 was the result of ‘rank and file pressure in all areas of the union’ which was 
‘too strong for any NEC representative to ignore’. 887 The overtime ban was not, then, a 
calculated strategy of wage militancy.  
Rapidly following the overtime ban Heath imposed a State of Emergency; during the 
first month of the overtime ban coal production was down by 750,000 tons a week at a time 
when oil prices were rising. 888 Negotiations continued without success and by 20 December 
1973 McGahey and Daly met Willie Whitelaw, the Secretary of State. Here was the great 
showdown between worker and state, based on wages, which the CP had envisaged. The 
significance of a leading communist and one-time communist, a significant force of the broad 
left, being invited into the inner sanctum of government can only have heightened the illusion 
of the party’s ubiquity. But both men were there as union emissaries and no evidence suggests 
that the party sought to influence the events of the meeting at all. Although the NUM 
representatives were initially hopeful that the meeting might ‘indicate more in Phase Three 
than had already been extracted’, this optimism was mis-placed.889 A workable suggestion, 
from Gormley and Whitelaw, rested on paying miners for their waiting and bathing time but 
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the idea was hijacked by Wilson, which meant that Heath could not possibly accept it.890 
Another possible resolution was found at a meeting of the National Economic Committee 
(NEDC) on 9 January 1974 in which Sid Green, of the National Union of Railwaymen and 
TUC, offered to accept mining as a unique industry, therefore setting a precedent for other 
strong unions, and also giving Heath reassurance that a breach of Phase Three by the miners 
would not open the floodgates for other unions: but this was rejected by the Prime Minister. 
891By January 1974 negotiations had dried up and McGahey had concluded that the NCB were 
not ‘free negotiators, but were acting at the behest of the government’.  892  
Heath’s refusal to grant ‘wage demands that go beyond what the nation can afford’, 
because they would further damage the economy, meant that neither side would compromise. 
893Faced with a situation of stalemate the following ballot result of all miners was announced 
on 4 February 1974 and indicated that 81 per cent of miners were in favour of strike action. 894 
Such a large majority demonstrated that the pro-strike majority spread across the union, rather 
than just being confined to what might be perceived to be CP-led areas. Scotland, South Wales, 
Kent and Yorkshire polled 87 per cent, 93 per cent, 89 per cent and 90 per cent respectively in 
their area elections, with even the more traditionally ‘moderate’ areas, such as 
Nottinghamshire, polling 77 per cent. 895 The behaviour of the union demonstrated that, as in 
previous examples of militancy, this was led by the rank and file. Like 1972 the strike did not 
run on for a long time and by 28 February the Labour Government was returned, peppered with 
left-wing minsters such as Michael Foot, Tony Benn, Peter Shore and Eric Varley.896 Heath’s 
risky ‘who governs?’ mandate, called at the start of the strike, had not paid off. The strike 
finished on the 10 March 1974 with a pay settlement. 897 The actual figures awarded ranged 
from a minimum wage of £32.00 a week to £45.00 a week; the lowest being £3.00 a week less 
than the figure originally proposed by McGahey, but this was accepted. 898 The impact for the 
NUM was positive and went further than just a wage award. The industry’s deficit for 1973-
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1974, which stood at £150 million, was written off by the Government, giving the miners the 
sense that perhaps the fortunes of the coal industry were on the up.899 The speed of the victory 
was impressive and this created the sense that the entire event was simply ‘too easy’; the NUM 
was bound to win, Bolton suggests, largely because ‘Heath was stupid and ill-advised’.900 
Materially, then, the miners had won. The problem, as history has demonstrated, was that the 
miners became symbolic of irresponsible and problematic trade unionism 
Here were two episodes of wage-based militant action, in as many years, which may 
superficially suggest the triumph of wage militancy; but how should politicisation really be 
measured? Although undoubtedly political, what did the strikes of this period really want? In 
1973 the miners did not immediately engage in action; if they had more political awareness as 
a result of their recent activities, as the CP imagined the situation, then they may have been 
expected to engage in further action when the opportunity arose. There is something of a 
paradox here. Whilst the strikes of this period were political across all unions, including the 
NUM, they were political in the sense that they were a reaction to the policies of the 
government; it was this immediacy, the need to change this, which motivated them. These were 
not political strikes with the characteristics that the CP had hoped that its industrial strategy 
would cause, as outlined in chapter one. The evidence for this is as follows. Leading members 
of the NUM associated with the party did not maximise the opportunity to extract the maximum 
political demands from the Heath government, which had been portrayed across left-wing 
propaganda as the embodiment of an oppressive capitalist administration. In short, they did not 
go as far as the communists would have liked and they were, as far as history records, relatively 
reasonable in their demands. 901 If wage militancy in the NUM had created a greater sense of 
politicisation, we may expect some resultant benefits for the CP; growing membership, or more 
receptiveness to its message, for example. But the CP was left languishing on the margins of 
British political life, haemorrhaging members, branches and, increasingly, void of a coherent 
identity. It is not unreasonable to assume that the party’s fortunes would improve by the 
consequence of its obvious presence in a now militant union. The fact that it did not caused 
two intertwined problems; the first was that, until such an event had occurred, the CP could 
always look forward to it as an untested phenomenon. The second problem was that, once the 
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clash had occurred, internal critics within the CP had ammunition to berate the traditionalists’ 
commitment to the industrial strategy. This divide would only become more profound as the 
years passed by. 
6.1.1 Politicising accidents 
As with all trade unionists, communists in the union had consistently campaigned for better 
conditions to improve health and safety for miners; given the dangerous nature of the industry 
in which they worked, this was an enduring cause of the mining trade unionist. But from the 
early 1970s there is a greater sense of the horrific accidents and tragedies associated with 
mining being utilised to propagate a wider cause; this was a relatively brief strategy.902 The 
examples of this were particularly pronounced around the strikes of the 1970s; for example in 
January 1972, the Morning Star recounted tales of miners experiencing broken hands, fingers, 
feet and pelvis injuries as a result of their work. 903 Comment cited the medical journal, the 
Lancet, to make their case. The risks to the men working in the industry spoke for themselves: 
along with the risk of chronic disability, affecting 61 per cent of all 55 to 64 year olds in one 
South Wales’ mining village, bronchitis and pneumoconiosis, leading to a premature demise, 
were other issues. The party journal reached the conclusion that ‘coalmining uses up men and 
discards them to an exceptional extent’.904  
Of course, all of this was true, and sadly always had been; but the change is the way in 
which the CP was willing to make these observations political. 905 It is no coincidence that this 
development ties in with the period when Scargill became the Yorkshire area’s Compensation 
Agent and it was he who was most clear about the link between accidents and political demand. 
An accident at Lofthouse Colliery, in March 1973, where the mine shaft flooded with water, 
trapping and killing seven miners, added to the sense of danger that the men faced at work. 906 
Scargill saw the opportunity to link the disaster to miners’ poor conditions, saying that ‘the 
tragedy should convince everyone of the justice of the miners’ case for decent wages and 
conditions’, before urging miners to vote for the strike ballot in response to the wage claim that 
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McGahey lodged at the 1972 annual conference. 907 Another accident in July 1973 caused one 
miner to die in a flooded shaft in Llanelli. 908 Eighteen men died in a pit crashing cage the same 
month, all adding to the CP’s argument about the exceptional nature of the job. 909 In the 
Markham disaster of February 1974, the men were killed ten minutes before they started to be 
paid and had been on the premises for 30 minutes when they died: McGahey used this example 
in the pay board inquiry for miners’ wages, to demonstrate the ‘injustice’ of the payment 
system. 910 
6.1.2 Conclusions 
During this period the party maintained its historic relationship with the miners; of the 459 
delegates present at the 33rd Congress of the party in November 1973, 119 of them were from 
the NUM.911 In the lead up to McGahey’s triumphant election to the vice-presidency of the 
union, the party could boast that ‘the solid left wing will have 11 of the 27 voting executive 
positions’.912 They were right; the union was more confidently left-wing than it had ever been. 
But to claim that this suggested the party’s strategy worked, or the CP was pivotal in these 
developments, is a misperception.   
Of course, as with any political grouping, it suited the party’s purpose to inflate its own 
potency in the one area it could convey a sense of strength, where it was elsewhere weak. As 
Ramelson boasted, the CP ‘have more influence now on the labour movement than at any time 
in the life of our party. The Communist party can float an idea early in the year. It goes on to 
trade union conferences in the form of a resolution and it can become official Labour party 
policy by the autumn. A few years ago we were on our own, but not now’. 913Ramelson was 
certainly correct that the CP was no longer ‘on its own’. The other question is the extent to 
which wage militancy was viewed the same by the party and those pursuing wage claims in the 
NUM. As the Wilberforce Report noted, ‘the miner had found himself at a fundamental 
disadvantage compared to workers elsewhere’ and the Report recognised that miners’ pay 
should have been advanced ‘more rapidly than was the case in other industries’ from 1968.914 
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The fact that this had not happened had led to ‘industrial injustice’. 915 Perhaps privately, some 
within the party recognised this. Although John Gollan boasted in his preparatory notes for a 
lecture at Wortley Hall that that the party had ‘fully worked out trade union strategy at our 27th 
Congress, 1961- started to see fruit late 60s and early 70s’, there was a private sense of 
awareness that this perception was inflated.916 Although the miners had been a particularly 
good example in this ‘the crucible of mass struggle’ the causes were largely attributable to the 
‘deepening crisis of capitalism’.917 The main catalyst for this militancy, argued Gollan, was the 
Heath Government’s decision to legislate and make trade unions increasingly politicised. 918 
Moreover, the fact that people from the Labour left in the NUM were willing to work 
with the communists in the union was symptomatic of two things. The first was that 
communists within the union were not distinguished by their politics, as they continued to give 
primacy to their union duties. But the second point is that, just as the CP perceived its apparent 
success as a measure of its acceptability in the British political milieu it was, in fact, a reminder 
of its own marginality; no longer perceived as a threat, people could afford to overlook the 
communist ‘problem’. This was the change that permitted the CP to allow itself to believe it 
was accepted into the engine room of British politics.  
The unprecedented wave of industrial militancy that engulfed Britain during this period 
represents a fundamental shift in union expectations and the state’s response to them; as such, 
it had a political dimension that was, in the post-war period, unprecedented. Perhaps then the 
sort of tripartism that Horner had envisaged for the union in the late 1940s may have been 
better practised in the tempestuous climate of the 1970s. But, as communists in the union found, 
the zeitgeist of the NUM by this point was the offensive pursuit of better wages, combined with 
a political dynamism that ensured communists in the union were content to agitate around the 
fundamental class conflict that manifested itself across the union membership who they 
represented. This was, however, only when required; in 1973 for example even those areas 
perceived to be the stronghold of communist influence did not vote in favour of strike action. 
This situation has been best explained by John Foster and Charles Woolfston, who note that 
although these strikes were explicitly political, and although the unions involved often had 
communist leaderships, and although these episodes increased the number of ‘progressive’ 
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union activists, ultimately ‘the CP failed to grow in this period’.919 The natural question, 
particularly on the lips of those who were cynical about the party’s strategy, must have been: 
if this protracted period of industrial politically-flavoured militancy did not grow the party, 
then what would?  
This chapter’s claim to originality is in the detail that it gives to wage militancy in the 
NUM; the existing literature largely focuses on the miners’ strikes in this period, whereas this 
chapter has used those events to punctuate a study of the CP in the NUM more generally at this 
time. Moreover the observation regarding the temporary politicisation of accidents by the left, 
including communists, has not previously been evidenced, nor has the existence of the Collier 
been explored. These findings add an understanding of the intricacies of union life during this 
period. This period is probably the first time in the post-war years whereby the history of the 
miners’ union is of general interest for ‘popular’ history, which has been studied not just for 
academic audiences; for example, in the work of Dominic Sandbrook. In a sense, the immediate 
connotation of this period is that the miners were emblematic of the sense of militancy that had 
permeated many trade unions during this period. Although this is certainly true, as this chapter 
has argued, the originality of the politicisation of accidents and the Collier adds another layer 
to this well-told story of the NUM in the 1970s.  
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VII Implosion, 1975-1985. 
7.0 Change 
This chapter covers a decade of significant change; the changes that take place here still have 
implications for present-day British politics.  The chapter begins in 1975, the year following 
what was believed to be the miners’ victorious triumph over the hostile Heath government. 
This was a year that looked relatively positive for both the union and CP. By 1985, however, 
both the union and party would be divided; and, most significantly, there was active conflict 
between the two groups, which was unprecedented. How did this situation change so rapidly? 
How did the CP move from a position where it could claim to have had an instrumental role in 
the 1972 and 1974 miners’ strike to one where, ten years later, it was divided amongst itself 
and with the NUM? So far the thesis has argued that the extent to which communists in the 
miners’ union were using wage militancy, as the party had envisaged it being used as a strategy, 
is dubious. Moreover, any militant action around wages was not exclusive to the CP. The 
‘success’ of wage militancy in the 1970s was not a reflection of the politicisation of miners 
over the long term, as the CP had imagined, it reflected a mixture of economic and political 
demands, which crucially were a reflection of that particular context. These findings became 
more obvious and were played out during the 1984-1985 strike when communists associated 
with Eurocommunism, who were involved in the NUM, made the observation that there had 
been a lack of evidence of politicisation throughout the strike.   
 This chapter deliberately tries to avoid being encumbered by the strike’s trajectory; this 
is well-documented in the existing literature and fresh in the mind of many and there is nothing 
to be added to it in this thesis. But an exploration of the CP’s role in the strike, particularly how 
the CP’s internal factionalism impacted on the party’s work in the NUM, needs more 
investigation, which this chapter provides. This chapter questions the extent to which, for the 
miners who the strategy was geared toward, the internal rift within the party was significant. 
To get to this point, however, the genesis of the strike in relation to the CP needs to be explored 
and the starting point for that is 1975. What is noticeable, as it was during the research, was 
that much of the sources used are from the party’s publications, particularly the increasingly 
polarised Morning Star and Marxism Today. Although there needs to be some care taken with 
these sources the fact that they are the main ones that remain, as opposed to the numerous 
internal documents that used to characterise the party, is significant. Was there a deliberate 
destruction of evidence? Or was the party so internally divided that it was unable to commit 
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itself to the sort of laborious documentation that it had previously recorded. Either, or a mixture 
of the two, could be possible. 
7.1 Contracts and Plans 
As discussed in the previous chapter the return of the Wilson government in 1974 marked the 
end of the miners’ strike and it also signified success for the NUM, evidenced not least by the 
generous concessions that the new Labour government gave to the miners. But it was also 
evident that such politically-motivated generosity could not have an indeterminate period of 
longevity, and that the government’s Social Contract was an attempt to constrain trade unions 
without utilising coercion, which Heath’s government had demonstrated to be grossly 
ineffective. A comprehensive analysis of the Social Contract is outside the scope of this thesis, 
but its premise was reciprocal rights and responsibilities from all protagonists. 920 For those 
within the CP committed to wage militancy, it represented nothing more than an income policy. 
Ramelson remarked that: ‘the real aim of the Social Contract is capitulation. Great claims are 
made that the £6.00 limit and the Social Contract have cut by half the rate of inflation. These 
are false claims, made on the false premise that wage increases are a major cause of 
inflation’.921 This view was also shared by Scargill, who dismissed the ’Social Contrick’ as 
nothing but a form of wage restraint. 922 But at the 1974 NUM annual conference the NEC of 
the union voted by 12 votes to 10 to put a resolution to the Labour Party conference offering 
their ‘full support’ for the principles of the Social Contract, a move that was heavily criticised 
in the Morning Star. 923   
Taylor makes the point that the NUM had a symbolic and practical role in making the 
Social Contract a success and, in return for the miners’ good behaviour, the Plan for Coal was 
constructed; this was a tripartite agreement specific to coalmining between government, union, 
and employer. 924 Critically the Plan intended to increase investment and production in mines, 
in return for the miners’ productivity. 925 Taylor notes that, despite numerous chances, the 
NUM made no attempt to ‘fundamentally influence the policy’, partly because it did not have 
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the resources, but also because it ‘accepted and endorsed the assumptions underlying the Plan 
for Coal’.926 It is noteworthy that the sort of tripartism that was being offered by Labour here 
was exactly what Horner, particularly, had tried to pursue in the late 1940s; yet when 
communists in the union were presented with the opportunity, it was not one that was exploited. 
It could plausibly be argued that the communists of the 1970s were acting in a way that was 
better suited to Horner’s generation, and likewise. 
There was another sense of the ethos of the 1940s being temporarily being repeated. 
The Plan offered a sense of security that had been absent in the industry for almost two decades; 
suddenly coal was promised a future as a ‘key energy source’ and the industry was offered an 
increased investment of £600 million over the following ten years.927 But the Plan would only 
work if the industry had prospects, and this looked increasingly bleak as time passed. The 
Labour Party, at least, remained committed to increasing coal production and in 1983 the 
party’s annual conference proposed that the government should stipulate a production target of 
two million tonnes of coal for the forthcoming year and that it should move toward a National 
Energy Policy.928 As a meeting of the NCB in January 1983 noted, the main problem was that 
heavy industry, generally, was in decline. 929 The division between the NCB and the NUM was 
further evident in October 1983, when the union held a Special Conference. The clear message 
from the minutes of this meeting is that the relationship between the NCB and NUM was 
irreparably fractured. The NUM even accused the NCB of creative accounting: they claimed 
that in 1982-83 the NCB ‘deliberately under-valued the stocks of coal….to the tune of over 
£200 million’. 930 By creative accounting, the NUM claimed that the loss for the year ‘should 
have been a profit of well over £100 million, yet by simply putting a pen through their annual 
accounts and changing completely the format of presentation, they recorded a loss rather than 
a profit’. 931 The NUM suggested that running pits down, at the current cost, would cost over 
£4300 million over the next ten years, whereas subsidising the industry to keep men employed 
would cost £2000 million. 932 Throughout all of this narrative, the party itself remained 
curiously quiet. 
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7.2 Piecework 
Previous chapters have demonstrated how piecework had consistently been a barrier to unity, 
and therefore militant action, in the union; the NPLA, although it had lowered pay for some, 
had also removed one of the biggest causes of unofficial strike action in the industry. 933 It had 
also offered the opportunity for a united fight around wages. Wages, of course, had been the 
catalyst for the militancy of the late 1960s and early 1970s and so it is unsurprising that the 
NCB planned to return to a potentially divisive pay structure to prevent this happening again, 
almost immediately after the strike 1974. In September 1974 the NCB suggested a new 
productivity scheme that would give productivity incentives when each pit reached 75 per cent 
of its overall target.934 Scargill and the left more generally opposed the idea on the grounds that 
‘it is about to turn the wheel of history backward to the old days of the miners’ federation, 
when the areas counted for more than the national body…we are common British miners first 
with common needs and interests!’.935 In November 1974 the membership of the NUM rejected 
the return to piecework by 121,345 votes to 77,119, or 61.53 per cent. 936 Was this evidence of 
politicisation, caused by wage militancy? Clearly, the return to a divisive pay structure would 
be have been unpopular to the left because it would make a united fight on wages difficult and 
because it would split the unity of the NUM. The ballot result almost certainly reflected a 
confidence amongst the NUM membership to reject a return to productivity-based pay. But 
whether this was the result of political consciousness and militancy, or concern about take-
home pay, is difficult to prove categorically. It is probable that many miners believed that a 
divisive pay scheme may split the union and perhaps even mark a return to the pre-NPLA 
period of numerous unofficial strikes. Moreover, following what was arguably the most 
successful miners’ strike in British mining history there may have been a sense that to alter a 
structure that had brought miners tangible gains was unnecessary.  
But by 1977 the issue of piecework was once again on the union’s agenda; Gormley 
proposed an area incentive scheme, based on an area by area basis, and also a pit by pit bonus. 
937 Various sentiments by the CP and Labour left evidenced their obvious objection to the idea 
but it was also rejected by Heathfield, who opposed the scheme on the grounds that it reflected 
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‘the efforts of the right to turn the clock back 30 or 40 years’.938 The union executive voted by 
13 votes to 11 in favour of balloting the membership in regards to the proposed scheme. 939  
The result of the executive committee’s decision was that the Kent area launched legal action 
against the union, claiming that the 11 members who had voted against the ballot represented 
a significant 250,000 members of the union. 940 A subsequent High Court ruling, on 19 October 
1977, found the proposal and the ballot to be legitimate. 941 The result of the ballot, announced 
on the 2 November 1977, was 110,634 voting against the scheme with 87,901 in favour of it.942  
The executive of the NUM pushed on with the incentive scheme regardless, and in December 
1977 voted by 15 to 9 in favour of allowing areas to introduce productivity schemes. 943   
A further attempt to stop the productivity scheme through a High Court injunction failed 
and a subsequent ballot of the NUM membership in January 1978  asked ‘do you wish to 
oppose an area incentive scheme and take industrial action, or accept an area incentive 
scheme?’: 62,79 per cent voted not to take industrial action, and therefore to accept the scheme. 
944 The question was in many ways flawed and by asking members if they did not want to take 
industrial action, members were by association accepting the scheme. For those opposed to the 
scheme, there was little to differentiate between Gormley, Daly or McGahey. This point was 
made clear when miners at Markham colliery in Yorkshire sent each man a shovel, with a note 
saying ‘do it yourself’, claiming that they could not increase their productivity due to 
circumstances beyond their control, such as poor machinery. 945 There appears to be no sources 
from the CP internally discussing this or offering a line on it; was this a notable, intended 
omission from the party archive, or was it another example of the party staying out of intricate 
union decisions? Although both may be true, based on the evidence found so far, the latter has 
a certain extent of plausibility.  
7.3 Wage Militancy 
By January 1975 the meeting of the union’s Joint National Negotiating Committee had met to 
discuss the NCB’s plans to act ‘wholly within the incomes policy of the government’ by 
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‘offering a wage claim that was lower than inflation’. 946 Coupled with the wage offer, which 
offered to increase weekly earnings from £19.00 to £44.00 a week, was a productivity scheme, 
which would bring in an average of £3.00 a week per miner. 947 The offer was rejected as 
‘derisory’ by McLean, whilst Whelan claimed that the events of 1972 and 1974 had not 
changed ‘the Tory outlook of the Board’. 948 By February 1975 Scargill had started to call for 
industrial action on March 1st, unless the NCB improved its offer. 949 But when the call for 
strike action was put to the NUM executive it was rejected by 15 votes to 11, with Gormley 
stressing the need to ‘be loyal to the Labour government and Social Contract’. 950 The NCB’s 
revised pay offer of £1.00 was recommended for acceptance by the executive and they had 
voted, by 16 votes to 10, to ballot the membership to also support it. 951 In the ballot even all 
the ‘militant’ areas accepted the revised pay offer, although with the proviso that negotiations 
would be open for future discussions. 952 Clearly there was no prospect of the union 
membership entering into industrial action lightly.  
 A similar pattern was repeated at the union’s annual conference that year when Scargill 
moved Composite Resolution VIII, which requested a £100.00 a week minimum wage, and 
was also an expression against the ‘Social Contrick’, which he claimed had been designed to 
‘deliberately restrain wage increases’.953 Although the resolution was moved by Yorkshire it 
was composited and it was also formally seconded by the North Western area, which added its 
support because it felt the claim was ‘legitimate’, and not for any not for any ‘loyalty or political 
reason’.954 There was a clear political stroke to the resolution, although this was not confined 
to just the CP, nor those associated with the broad left. If this resolution was evidence of wage 
militancy, then the fact that the resolution was composited, and clearly supported by a moderate 
area for ‘no political reason’, then even if an argument could be made for the existence of wage 
militancy in the union, it was not exclusive to the CP or even the broad left. There were more 
examples of this. At the same conference George Rees and Jack Dunn used their support for 
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the resolution to critique incomes policies; but so too did Alec Timpany, of the Scottish area 
and Labour party. 955  
It could be argued that this was the entire point of the broad left; but, if this were true, 
then how was the CP benefitting through this? The broad left might have inflated the sense that 
the NUM ws ran by communists and their allies; but in reality it had also diluted any 
jurisdiction that the party may have claimed to have in the NUM. In the above example, even 
if the CP made the argument that Timpany’s support demonstrated the extent to which the CP 
had moved the Labour party to the left, is it possible to prove that the communists were 
responsible for this shift? Was the change in the Labour party’s positioning in fact the result of 
its own internal dynamics? Even if the CP was in some way responsible for the Labour party’s 
direction then, as Callaghan has argued, this was of no benefit to the party. 956 Ultimately even 
when militant wage demands were carried at conference there was no guarantee that anything 
would come of them. For example Composite Resolution VIII was carried at the conference, 
but in March 1976 the NUM executive committee, by 14 votes to 9, accepted an increase of 
£6.00 per week, less than the £100.00 minimum that had been demanded in the resolution, but 
instead keeping the pay rise in line with the Government’s pay cap. 957 
 The pursuit of the £100.00 a week was not rescinded in light of this defeat, however, 
and in early 1976 Will Haydn Thomas, of South Wales, again moved the resolution, which he 
said was intended to send a message to the Government that ‘wage restraint would not be 
accepted in the NUM’. 958 But the claim was rejected by the miners’ executive by 13 votes to 
11. 959 Even the South Wales area rejected Thomas’s resolution, with 53 per cent in favour of 
supporting the executive’s recommendation and 46 per cent against it. 960 If wage militancy 
was working in the union as the party expected, then it is unclear why one of the most militant 
areas rejected a resolution based on wages, moved by a representative from its own area. The 
overall effect of the failed resolution, however, was that at the union’s annual conference a 
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month later Gormley ruled that wages were off the agenda at the annual conference. 961 The 
decision to move wage claims to an annual round was rejected by the union at the 1977 
conference; importantly, this was the union as a whole that rejected Gormley’s idea, not just 
one ‘militant’ section of it.  
The fight to improve wages continued to pepper the union’s annual conferences, even 
when unemployment in the industry remained a critical and unresolved issue. In July 1979 
Scargill moved Composite Resolution III, which demanded minimum wages ranging from 
£80.00 to £140.00 a week, and it was carried by the conference. 962 Again, this resolution was 
composited, but it was formally seconded by Bolton and the Scottish area who saw the 
increased wages as a means of inflating the economy by raising the ‘purchasing power of the 
people’. 963 But by November 1979 the NCB had responded with an offer that was less than 
the union wanted, and equated to a rise of between 9 and 15 percent; but it was Gormley who 
was most critical about it, dismissing it derisorily as ‘inadequate’. 964 Gormley, who had three 
years earlier attempted to stop wage claims, was now pressing for higher pay. Whilst Taylor 
has argued that Gormley worked with the left in order to try and constrain them, Gormley’s 
position also demonstrated that the fight for higher wages was not the monopolised by the left.  
The board’s revised offer of a twenty per cent increase was also rejected and was 
accompanied by the decision to ballot for national strike action. 965 Communists in the union 
added their support to the need to get increased pay, even if it meant using industrial action. 
McGahey was keen for the episode to escalate, commenting that he was ‘confident’ that the 
members would give the executive committee the mandate for strike action, whist Collins, who 
had recently been elected as general secretary of Kent, considered the refusal of the board’s 
offer a ‘justifiable demand’. 966 But when balloted 48.75 per cent of the 87 per cent of the 
miners who voted chose to accept the twenty per cent wage increase. 967  If wage militancy was 
being exercised in the union as the CP may well have liked to believe that it was, then it might 
be expected that the union membership would by this point be sufficiently politicised to follow 
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the united NUM leadership into industrial action. But they did not, and there appears to be no 
indication that the CP identified this as a problem.  
The same point is evident at the 1980 annual conference, when the £100.00 minimum 
wage demand was back on the union’s agenda, this time being moved by McGahey. 968 
Composite Resolution IV had been derived from South Wales, Scotland, and Yorkshire. 969It 
was not until October of that year that the NCB offered a 9.3 percent wage increase which 
McGahey dismissed, saying that ‘it was so unsatisfactory it could not be considered. The Board 
will have to find more cash’. 970 The executive committee voted by 14 votes to 11 to reject the 
9.8 percent offer and ballot the membership accordingly; not all 14 members of the executive 
who voted to do so were members of the CP or the broad left.971 But even if the CP could find 
some way to evidence wage militancy at the top of the union, the final ballot of the rank and 
file was 56 percent in favour of accepting the NCB’s offer and 44 percent against. 972  
 In 1983 there was an attempt to link the two main issues in the industry, low pay and 
unemployment. The formulation of wage demands had gone from being ambiguous (usually in 
the form of ‘a substantial increase’) to calling for specific amounts, something that Allen claims 
was a calculated tactic in the broad left’s attempts to change the political direction of the union, 
by using specific phrases to cement the Executive’s position. But by 1983 Bolton’s Composite 
Resolution II reverted back to demanding a ‘substantial increase’. Perhaps this indicates that 
the broad left believed that, now they had greater control of the union, they could afford to be 
ambiguous when they needed to combine the fight for higher wages with tackling 
unemployment. But the fact that the resolution was composited once again demonstrates that 
Bolton and the Scottish area were not unique in their pursuit of the wage increase.  
But it was not just wages that were on the agenda in 1983. The union executive moved 
an emergency resolution, which proposed to oppose all forms of pit closures and reductions in 
manpower. This claim was not especially new and the NUM had consistently opposed pit 
closures for reasons other than exhaustion. But the intent was evident in the executive’s claim 
that the NEC would have the right to ballot the membership ‘at a time deemed most 
appropriate’. 973 This became the crux of the union’s special conference held in October 1983. 
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Scargill’s presidential address referred to the union’s need to allow the executive the ‘industrial 
muscle’ in order to fulfil conference decisions. The end result of this was to formally oppose 
the government’s plan to close 70 pits in five years and the decision was made to impose an 
overtime ban from 31 October 1983.  
 Why had the NUM pursued the quest for better pay when unemployment was a 
significant issue in the industry? Arguably because, for those that remained employed, there 
was still a need to maintain pay. Curiously, in the battle against unemployment there was the 
most parity between communists in the union and the party; but this was not noticed, and 
exploited, by the party in an attempt to develop its politicisation which had been, after all, the 
ultimate point of the industrial strategy. This demonstrates that although there was a more 
radical current of change emanating from the modernisers, there was no evidence of a more 
gradual development of a strategy that was, by this point, almost four decades old. 974 Instead 
the party’s ‘Needs of the Hour’ for 1981 continued to advocate wage militancy and free 
collective bargaining.  
7.4 Disunity 
Particularly in chapter three, we saw examples where communists from different areas were in 
conflict with each other, largely because of their union duties. This issue could still occur in 
the late 1970s, even when the left in the union was in a stronger position and seemingly united. 
At the 1976 NUM annual conference, for example, Dunn (from Kent) moved resolution 34 
which called for the ‘immediate implementation’ of four weeks’ holiday; Derbyshire moved 
resolution 35, which called for the NEC to ‘press’ for four weeks’ holiday. 975 The main 
difference between the resolutions rested on the term ‘immediate’. Jack Collins (also from 
Kent) supported Derbyshire’s resolution 35 because he felt that Dunn’s resolution 34 did not 
give the NCB the opportunity to consider the demand. 976 This example demonstrates that there 
was no unity assumed by the fact that both men were communists; Collins chose to support the 
resolution that he felt was the most appropriate for the union. 977 Moreover, the example also 
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demonstrates another reoccurring issue with the CP’s industrial strategy; that a non-militant 
area, such as Derbyshire, could propose an almost identical resolution to an area that had a 
strong CP presence.   
7.5 Scargill’s manifesto 
Miners in the 80s is the manifesto that led to Scargill’s victory in the NUM presidential 
election, held in December 1981, where he received 70.3 percent of the vote, an unprecedented 
majority for any NUM president. 978 Why was Scargill so popular? There is a sense across the 
literature that he was in some way a maverick, and that he represented something new and 
different to the grey-suited official that most people associated with trade unionism. This was 
certainly partly self-constructed and evident across his relatively rare interviews with him is 
the sense that he had come from the ranks, leading the Yorkshire area to victory in 1972, and 
that he represented the rank and file miner. 979 Miners in the 80s was an extension of this and, 
although it was a manifesto, it had a hagiographic tone to it; whilst it explained Scargill’s plan, 
should he be elected, it also praised his qualities. The hyperbole emanated from those in the 
broad left, such as Briscoe, but also leading communists and former communists, such as 
Paynter; this gave Scargill a sense of credibility and perhaps historical lineage. 980 
But Scargill and the communists in the union were less forthcoming about Scargill’s 
involvement in the party, as evidenced from the biographical section of the document where 
his membership of the YCL was completed omitted. In the manifesto Scargill’s trajectory 
began with him as a rank and file miner, who rose up the ranks of the union to lead the miners 
to victory in 1972, fighting for justice as compensation agent and working hard to extend 
miners’ educational opportunities. In the midst of this sense of heroism and gallantry, which 
the tone of the document firmly conveys, is a notable absence of membership of the YCL. 981 
Instead he is described politically as a ‘committed socialist and well known member of the 
Labour Party’. 982 What can be drawn from this omission? Certainly Scargill personally was 
never forthcoming about his reasons for leaving the YCL and so it is logical that he would not 
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include it in his election manifesto. In the archives there are drafts of the manifesto; but nothing 
that suggests that members of the CP attempted to assert Scargill’s YCL past into it. The 
obvious conclusion is that either they too realised that it was an insignificant factor in the 
immediate task, which was getting a member of the left elected to the presidency of the NUM 
which had historically been occupied by the right, or perhaps they felt that Scargill’s decision 
to leave the party would reflect badly on the CP.  
7.6 Growing the party 
The CP had always envisaged that their strategy would have politicising consequences. Whilst 
the strikes of the early 1970s had failed to yield any tangible evidence of politicisation, some 
in the party could see the move to the left of the NUM and the Labour Party as evidence of the 
CP’s influence. But the other element of the strategy was at rank and file level. The following 
example, of the CP’s attempts to grow the party during the strike, suggests that to many miners 
the CP was largely inconsequential. The following example supports this argument. In 
February 1984 the ‘News from the Industrial Department’ enthusiastically noted that there was 
the chance of recruiting six new recruits from Durham to the party and in an effort to do this, 
the Industrial Advisory Committee had ‘signed up Mick McGahey’ for the occasion. 983By 
May 1984, Durham and Northumberland had added twelve new recruits between them. 984 
Imagining that the twelve new recruits were equally divisible between the two areas, this 
evidence effectively suggests that a month into the strike, when anti-Thatcher pro-strike 
enthusiasm was at its height, the party had managed to recruit exactly the same number of new 
members as it had a month before the strike had started.  
 
If, as the CP’s theory had hypothesised, a strike should have politicising consequences 
and if, as the CP had always imagined, it was the indispensable leader of the working class, 
then it might be expected that more miners would join the CP.  Like the strikes of the 1970s, 
and arguably to a greater extent, the 1984 miners’ strike was clearly peppered with political 
awareness. The evidence suggests that the party knew this. The ‘News from the Industrial 
Department’ in June 1984 suggested that the CP should use the coalfield meetings to ‘take 
politics to the miners’ because ‘many have joined the party since the strike began, and the 
possibility exists for strong party coalfield organisation’. 985 This was a generous interpretation 
                                                          
983 ‘News from the Industrial Department’, February 1984, CP/CENT/IND/05/09. 
984 ‘News from the Industrial Department’, May 1984, CP/CENT/IND/05/09. 
985 ‘News from the Industrial Department’, June 1984, CP/CENT/IND/05/09. 
168 
 
of the party’s own prospects, given that it by this point barely had a coherent strategy itself. 
Nonetheless, the following month, July, McLennan told the audience at a London District CP 
rally that over 60 miners had joined the CP during the miners’ strike. 986 That averaged twelve 
new members a month. By November 1984 the Morning Star reported that the miners’ strike 
had brought a ‘wind of change’ and a new-found source of attention for the CP, boasting that 
between October and November 1984 ‘over 150 people have joined the CP in the past four 
weeks! It is a long time since there was anywhere at all comparable’! 987 But even this apparent 
swelling of the ranks did nothing to arrest the droves of party members who were leaving the 
CP and party membership fell from 15,691 members in 1983 to 12,711 members by 1985.988  
 
7.7 Communist divisions and the NUM’s strategy  
Along with apparently growing the party, what else did the CP believe it was doing during the 
strike? In June 1984 Pete Carter, the CP’s industrial organiser, suggested that the party’s role 
in the strike was a tribute to the ‘lefts and communists in the industry’ who had consistently 
fought to win the membership, despite difficulties. 989  Carter paid particular attention to the 
CP members who had ‘contributed so much in so many different ways’ and who, during the 
strike, had demonstrated that ‘no other political organisation can match what our party has 
done’. 990 The crux of what the CP had been doing, according to Carter, included rallies, 
distributing leaflets and making posters.991 This was in line with what the modernising group 
within the CP were advocating.992 This was a similar approach to other groups, with which the 
modernisers in the CP sought to build that contentious ‘broad democratic alliance’; homosexual 
groups, women’s groups and left-wing pressure groups, for example. 993To its critics, it could 
be argued that this marginalised the CP to nothing more than another pressure group, many 
others of which were prolific during the strike. This may have been true, but what this strategy 
did was put the CP in-step with the zeitgeist of the pro-NUM support network. This was a much 
more credible tactic than allowing the CP to rattle around the periphery of Thatcher’s Britain, 
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resigned to a position as a depleted, once-radical force. But the problem was that it brought no 
gains for the CP as a political party, which is what it always was. It did not help it build its 
membership base, as we have seen. Yet the other option, to support a syndicalist and arguably 
illegitimate strike, did not appear to be benefitting the party either. Either way the party was in 
an impossible situation. 994  
The moderniser’s strategic interventions into the miners’ strike did little to alter the 
dominant method of the NUM, described by Francis as ‘an archaic industrial strategy’ that 
rested on the use of flying pickets and heavy picketing. 995 But one individual who could not 
avoid this problem, and who personified these divided loyalties, was McGahey who was, as 
Brotherstone and Pirani correctly point out, was most associated with the modernising group 
within the party politically. 996 The extent to which McGahey was in some ways difficult to 
‘place’, in terms of his affiliation to either side of the CP’s divisions, is clear from McIlroy and 
Campbell’s assessment that the Eurocommunist group within the party were unable to identify 
McGahey with their own views. 997But during the strike, publicly, McGahey remained a fierce 
critique of ‘ballotitis’, the apparent obsession with the need to call a ballot to legitimise the 
strike. 998Here we have no better example of the practical failing of the CP’s industrial strategy; 
McGahey, despite his own convictions, was obliged to fall in line with the direction of the 
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NUM leadership.999 There is evidence that McGahey and other CP mining leaders tried to 
persuade Scargill to change tack; but this was futile. 1000 
The strike also made apparent another major weakness in the industrial strategy of the 
CP. The CP had been instrumental in the construction of Scargillism and they had allowed it 
to flourish. This had been purely because it was to the left’s advantage; they had actively 
supported it in 1981, when it meant securing the presidency from the right. But Scargillism in 
1984, its practical application, was syndicalist and it helped to obliterate the careful work of 
two generations of communists, who had wanted to move their union to the left in order to 
secure better pay and conditions for the membership. But to observers communism and 
Scargillism, in the NUM, were perceived as synonymous.1001In May 1984 a letter arrived at 
the NUM headquarters, addressed from ‘a miners’ wife’. In the three-page tirade the writer 
noted how ‘you union men are all dishonest in your actions’; perhaps one of the most unfair 
phrases, given the characteristics that communists in the union had always embodied. 1002The 
writer claimed that the miners ‘are on strike because Scargill instructed them to come out’. 1003 
The cursory response of the NUM, to scrawl ‘CRANK’ across the letter in red, angry letters, 
demonstrates a disregard for any criticism.  
1984 was an impossible situation for the CP; ironically, although each group within the 
party was by this point bitterly opposed to the other, they were united by the dismal prognosis 
of post-strike life, although probably not consciously. For the traditionalists, their strategy had 
split the union; for the modernisers, to impose their strategy was to potentially be seen to be 
anti-union. The divides within the CP may have been somewhat personified in the NUM during 
the strike, but in some ways it was also irrelevant, for they were superseded by the internal 
divisions in the NUM. The broader divisions in the union were already being played out across 
the media; as Francis noted ‘attacks from left and right about the way the strike was conducted 
place an added burden on internal unity’. 1004 But the politics of the individual communists 
within the NUM leadership was forced to be marginalised. Ultimately individual members in 
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the CP were obliged by their union position to remain in step with Scargill’s syndicalist 
strategy, even if they may have chosen a different strategy if they had the choice. 1005 Thus, by 
the summer of 1984, there was a myriad of confusion emanating from the CP and the NUM. 
On one hand was the CP, who was in the somewhat ironic position of being divided by the very 
industrial politics that it had dedicated much of the previous forty years constructing. But the 
strategy that the traditionalists were defending was far removed from the tactic that Scargill 
had forced the NUM into, which could be described as syndicalist.   
But even for those in the CP committed to a broader strategy, what could they do to 
alter the NUM’s strike methodology? Leafleting, educating and calling for a ballot, which was 
the suggestion of the CP modernisers was, in the context of the miners’ strike, impossible to 
implement. Added into this picture are two additional factors. The first is that the NUM 
leadership’s own aversion to change was made increasingly impossible by the dogmatic 
polarisation of each ‘side’. The second issue lay within the CP itself: communists in the NUM 
had, to a great extent, had nurtured Scargillism, particularly Watters and Ramelson. To rescind 
on their support at this stage would be an admission that their entire strategy, of moving the 
union to a militant position and allowing Scargill to be emblematic of that position, had been 
flawed. All of this, however, is further muddied by the latitudinal link between party and union.  
7.8 Nottinghamshire 
The end result of the situation, outlined above, was something of political impotence from the 
CP; whilst the latitude from the party to communists in the union had always been weak, as 
this thesis has demonstrated, the party had at least been united. Now in the context of division 
beleaguered communists on strike in the Nottinghamshire coalfield looked to the party for 
direction as a letter from Jeff Staniforth, on behalf of the East Midlands district of the CP to 
Carter, demonstrates. Staniforth felt that his area was being excluded from national party 
meetings, where the discussions concerned the ‘relationship of the Notts area of the NUM and 
the union’s national organisation’.1006 Staniforth suggested that the lack of political direction 
from the CP had contributed to the NUM choosing to expel the area from the national union, 
something that he also suggested McGahey and Bolton had argued in support of. 1007 This 
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assertion is dubious. Although it could be argued that both men may have wanted 
Nottinghamshire expelled from the union, perhaps to help cease the strike because of its 
strategy, this would have been to fulfil their political motivations. As union leaders, the last 
thing that they would have wanted was to split the NUM. Moreover, even as CP modernisers 
wanting to change the direction of the NUM’s strategy, the tactic of this group within the CP 
was to preserve the union; Francis, for example, repeatedly made the case for the cohesion of 
the NUM. 1008Carter immediately replied to Staniforth’s letter, saying that ‘the political 
committee were very concerned to receive your letter, and felt the contents would be quite 
damaging if leaked…the Political Committee felt that any copies you have should be 
destroyed’. 1009 Carter committed himself and Bolton to go and met communist miners to 
discuss Staniforth’s problems. So even those communists who were critical to the style of the 
NUM’s strike, when pushed, would ultimately support it. Why? Many speculative reasons, not 
least that they could not afford to lose members and they did not want to be seen to be anti-
strike; but this did nothing to help the CP move forward from its own internal battles. 
 
7.9 Communists criticising the union 
It was only when it was obvious that the strike was clearly lost that the criticism of the NUM’s 
strategy became increasingly confident. Privately McLennan and Scargill bickered about the 
need to end the strike; but it was left to Ramelson, Scargill’s ‘old mentor’, to try and ultimately 
fail to reason with him. 1010 The analysis of the situation was not novel, but the confidence with 
which it was expressed was. Writing in Marxism Today in March 1985, Carter addressed the 
fundamental difference with Thatcherism.1011 This, of course, was not a new argument and it 
was one that had been made by modernisers within the CP before the strike; but it had been 
curiously muted during it.  1012Carter claimed that the strike could only be won by fighting on 
three fronts: the need for unity amongst the miners themselves; the need for solidarity with 
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1009 Letter from Carter to Jeff Staniforth, 24 January 1985, CP/CENT/RAM/11/04. This is somewhat ironic, as 
Carter’s own words, a few months later, would prove to be much more inflammatory.  
1010 Beckett, British CP, op.cit., 205. 
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other workers; and support from the public. 1013 Carter’s analysis of the situation, especially 
regarding the need for a united union, formed part of a broader analysis of the modernisers 
within the CP, for example Francis, who had also made this point.  
 
But this point was only made by the end of the strike; the obvious question is, why? 
There are many speculative suggestions. Perhaps the confidence reflected the stronger position 
of the modernisers within the CP, although this would suggest that there was some direction 
and leadership emanating from the party to the union, a change which seems unlikely. It may 
have been that there was an attempt to alter the direction of the union and the fate of the strike, 
but this is a whimsical and utopian possibility. It seems most likely that, once it was clear the 
strike was lost and the ‘trickle’ of miners back to work increased, there was the sense that one 
could afford to be more critical, without risking accusations of being ‘anti-strike’ or lowering 
morale. 1014 Certainly there is evidence of a change. Bolton, in April 1984, had been dismissive 
of the criticism around the lack of ballot. 1015 But exactly one year later Bolton could criticise 
the aggressive and expensive infiltration of pickets into Nottinghamshire at the start of the 
strike and the lack of a ballot. 1016 Of course, it could be argued that the source was different- 
the Morning Star and Marxism Today- but the context is also important. This explanation also 
seems plausible because the piece attracted criticism from Nell Myers, Scargill’s assistant, who 
noted ‘an anxiety, an uncertainty’ about who Carter’s criticism was directed at.1017 
Interestingly, however, the criticism did not come personally from Scargill (although it is 
highly probable that Myers was his messenger) and it came in the form of a letter; did this 
suggest that Carter’s comments were so inconsequential for the NUM that they did not warrant 
address in the media? 1018  
 
The most controversial critique, however, came from Carter and his pamphlet, which 
was written just after the end of the strike. Significantly the pamphlet was a microcosm for the 
‘old’ and ‘new’ industrial politics of the CP, and as such it was Ramelson and Carter who were 
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the main adversaries, with Allen and Watters supporting Ramleson. Carter’s pamphlet was a 
culmination of the so far somewhat muted critique from the CP modernisers and it reflected a 
confident assertion of the modernisers’ position, arguably for the first time. For Carter ‘the 
nature, style and politics of the strike revealed a failure within the labour movement to 
understand the challenge of Thatcherism. There was a lack of political clarity on how to 
develop the struggle’.1019 Carter also rejected the view that the strike was anything other than 
a victory, by arguing that the lack of a negotiated settlement reflected ‘the compulsion of a drift 
back to work’ which was ‘a major set-back for the miners and working class as a whole’. 1020 
Carter added that ‘the total victory argument is a cover up for politics and strategy that did not 
succeed, nor could they have done’. 1021 Most notably, Carter said that the lack of ballot ‘was 
a mistake both politically and tactically. Not only did it weaken and divide the membership of 
the NUM, but it allowed the focus of attention to be moved from the strike’s aim of pit closures, 
to the question of democracy, and on the Government was not slow to exploit’.1022 
 
Ramelson’s response was to dismiss the pamphlet as ‘defeatist, demoralising, 
mesmerised by Thatcher’s invincibility’, arguing that ‘the publication of this pamphlet in 
anything like its present form would be a disaster with the party’s relations not only with the 
miners’ left leadership, but with the broad left in general, and create even sharper divisions 
within the party’. 1023 Ramelson added that ‘in the light of such devastating criticism of the 
miners’ leadership and as the party had some influence there, there is a total absence of self-
crit (sic) The miners’ leadership will be able to say with some justification that the party’s 
leading rep (sic) on their leadership was a party to every decision now so sharply criticised’.1024 
Allen made the same point, suggesting that ‘the attitudes of the critics is grounded in the 
policies which now acutely divide the CP’. 1025  Allen worried that ‘the impatient and ill-
thought out criticisms from its leadership can destroy the long and sensitive relationship with 
the NUM’. 1026 Perhaps this sentence tells us much about the traditionalists’ reluctance to 
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1021 Carter, Coal pamphlet op.cit., 30. 
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change. Did this sentence reflect the sense that the industrial strategy was working perfectly, 
and so it was best not to alter it? Or, deep down, did even these traditionalists realise that their 
intervention into the NUM was too precarious to withstand any change?1027 
 
Carter’s pamphlet was leaked to the Daily Mail in May 1985. The headline, ‘top 
communist hits at Scargill’, added that ‘most of the Eurocommunists who dominate the party’s 
leadership agree with his analyses. 1028 The Daily Mail argued that ‘it provides embarrassing 
evidence of the wide rift between the Eurocommunists and the old guard party members.’1029 
The CP disassociated itself from the contents of the article, claiming that they had only asked 
Carter to ‘prepare a document analysing the miners’ strike and assessing its outcomes’.1030 But 
it took until the middle of June 1985 for Scargill to publicly respond and in doing so he 
criticised of the CP’s lack of leadership, claiming that the only one time he met any of the 
leadership was to ask why ‘the industrial organiser of the CP was conducting a campaign of 
vilification against Scargill and Heathfield’.1031 Scargill noted that ‘the irony was that the 
chairman of the party, who was part and parcel of that contribution, was also part and parcel of 
every single decision taken by the NUM’.1032 Scargill claimed that McGahey would have, if he 
had have been asked, noted that the weakness of the miners’ strike was that ‘the CP was not 
strong enough in industry, was not organised in the branches’. 1033 By the winter of 1984 Bill 
Keys of the printers’ union overheard McGahey telling Scargill that he ‘will chain Arthur’s 
mouth up for three years when this is all over’. 1034 But McGahey did not challenge Scargill’s 
claims publicly; why would he? Union position had always been more important than party 
loyalty for communists in the NUM. Instead he maintained a notable and dignified silence. 
When Neil Kinnock launched a criticism of Scargill’s tactics at the Labour Party’s 1985 annual 
conference, McGahey did not publicly comment to defend him. But he did, assuming that we 
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can trust Marxism Today, go ‘out of his way’ at the 1986 Scottish Labour Party conference to 
declare that he had no dispute with Kinnock. 1035 
But ultimately were these big questions of political strategy even consequential for the 
miners who the CP had been attempting to reach through its industrial strategy? Probably not; 
for most miners the immediate issue of the strike was the retaining of their jobs, either through 
striking or through continuing to work. Between 1975 and 1987 the membership of the NUM 
declined rapidly, from 261,871 members to 91,000 members; this was the real issue. 1036The 
same pattern, and problem for a party looking to use industrial interventions to help it 
politically, remained: so long as communists in the union fulfilled their union obligations, then 
the positioning of these men within their political party was largely academic to anybody 
outside the intense world of the CP itself. 
7.1.0 Challenges from the Left 
Another issue developing in the background to the CP’s increasingly public civil war was the 
growth of ‘other’ left wing parties. Although 1956 had demonstrated that Marxism in Britain 
could not be monopolised by the CP, the ramifications of the ‘New Left’ had largely been 
confined to intellectual critiques rather than, as during this period, alternative political parties 
who threatened to infringe on the CP’s milieu. There were various examples: the Institute of 
Workers’ Control; Militant Tendency; the Workers’ Revolutionary Party; the International 
Marxist Group; and Tony Cliff’s International Socialists (or Socialist Workers’ Party from 
1977). 1037 The SWP, particularly, appeared to be growing whilst the CP declined; presumably 
hovering up at least some dissatisfied CP dissidents. 1038The SWP’s membership increased 
from 880 members in 1970 to 4000 in 1979. 1039 In the same period, the CP membership lost 
8000 members. 1040 The SWP sought to capitalise where the CP was weak and looked to build 
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an alternative at the base of trade unions, and marginalise the significance of Labour. 1041 Thus 
Cliff made some legitimate observations about the limitations of the CP’s industrial politics; 
‘even the most ‘left’ of trade union officials is trapped by his environment’, Cliff noted, before 
using the example of the NUM where officials, including CP members, received generous wage 
increases after the 1972 strike. 1042 The problem with the CP, claimed Cliff, was that it made 
‘requests’ to trade union officials rather than ‘put forward policies for action’. 1043 Does the 
growth of these other parties impeded directly on the CP’s work in the NUM? Probably not; 
but their existence adds more evidence to the fact that, rather than putting the CP in a political 
position where it could monopolise the far-left and exert pressure on the Labour Party, as it had 
hoped its industrial strategy might do, it was not in a position where it could defend itself 
against new groups.  
7.1.1 Conclusions 
The problems within the CP were well in place before the miners’ strike began. As Harker and 
Callaghan have argued, the decline of the CP in the 1980s has to be understood in the context 
of its longer term problems. 1044 Its shrinking membership, the reputation of communist regimes 
as violent and economically inefficient, and the party’s inability to compete against newer left 
wing rivals, who were removed from this association, all added to the party’s decline. 1045 All 
these factors were compounded by the problems in the industrial milieu; whilst once the CP 
had been able to shield its more fundamental shortcomings behind the façade of industrial 
ubiquity, the events of the miners’ strike simply illuminated the terminal nature of the party’s 
problems. In a bitter twist of irony it was ultimately the party’s industrial strategy, which it had 
spent forty years believing would advance its political standing, which proved to be the main 
catalyst for its implosion. 
The strikes of the early 1970s had failed to generate any tangible gain for the CP: 
materially, its branches and overall membership numbers had continued to decline. The 
argument of those who saw no need to revise the party’s industrial strategy could always be 
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sustained until such an explosion of militancy disproved the theory. When this had happened, 
the industrial politics that the party had spent so long nurturing was the very thing that divided 
it. Those seeking to modernise the party had realised the fallacy of the party’s position in the 
1970s; Carter noted that, although inspiring, the strikes of the 1970s had failed to ‘make deep 
and lasting changes in mass political consciousness’. 1046 The lack of political consciousness 
amongst miners that had led to them falling into the strategy of mass picketing and their 
inability to grasp that ‘we were in a very new type of situation’ helped the union, and 
communists in it, to fall into the disaster that was 1984. 1047  
The strike was a no-win situation for the CP and its industrial strategy. On one hand the 
‘traditional’ group in the CP supported what was primarily a syndicalist strategy. Although 
those who had nurtured Scargill and who had helped the NUM move in the direction that it 
was now in may have publicly supported the strike, it was far removed from what the party had 
intended for its industrial strategy. But to rescind from the strike would be an admission that 
the communist project had been flawed, not least because of the Yorkshire strategy and its 
involvement in developing ‘Scargillism’. With the structure of the party crumbling, the 
industrial strategy was all that some in the party could cling to. This compounded the sense of 
division and conflict. Despite efforts to propagate the miniscule numbers of new recruits as a 
result of the strike, this was inconsequential in the overall picture of decline that characterised 
the party by this time.  
 
What could the party offer for miners? Wage militancy, if it even had ever existed in 
the way that the party had envisaged, was now impotent in this radically different context. It 
was becoming increasingly clear that a strike was not the solution to mass, state-orchestrated 
unemployment. It was also obvious that pay parity had been obliterated by 1977 and that 
militancy around unemployment was much harder to achieve. It was also becoming clear that 
the end result of the CP’s intervention into the NUM, by moving it to the left, was to split the 
union. The strike also demonstrated the sad irony of the CP’s industrial strategy; it had spent 
the best part of forty years believing that it was nurturing a strategy that would assist its political 
growth, when it was in fact a catalyst for its terminal divisions.  
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On the other hand the situation was no better for the ‘modernisers’. Whilst their broad 
approach and practical support was a much better response to the zeitgeist of Thatcherism, it 
too had problems. Primarily it in some ways reduced the CP to a pressure group; there was 
nothing wrong with this, but it was in no way representative of what the party had imagined 
that its presence in industry should achieve. Those within the CP who took this approach were 
also in an impossible position in relation to the NUM; calling for a ballot, for example, 
potentially rendered the party open to suggestions that it was unsupportive of the miners. By 
the time that the ‘modernisers’ confidently began to assert their position, largely through 
Marxism Today, it was too late, both for the CP and the NUM.  
 
How did all this impact on communists in the union? In some ways, not to a great 
extent; party members in the union leadership continued to supersede their jobs over their 
politics. The best example of this is McGahey who joined the Democratic Left in 1991 and 
then briefly the Communist Party of Scotland in 1994. 1048 The only evidence that I have found 
of him criticising the NUM’s position, and not particularly confidently, was in his support for 
Bolton’s claims.  He privately attempted to reason with Scargill but this was only revealed 
later. Although it conflicted with his political loyalties he remained in step with the union 
leadership, criticising the scourge of ‘ballotitis’. 1049 This demonstrates the over-arching 
continual issue with communists in the union in relation to the party’s strategy; but it also 
shows the issue with trying to change the direction of the strategy. The CP had helped to 
develop the 1984 strategy, but even when it had members at the top of the union, there was no 
mechanism in place to change their position.  
 
The division within the CP during the strike goes full circle back to the observations 
made so far. When boiled down the CP in the union remained, for most of the rank and file, 
                                                          
1048 McIlory, John and Campbell, Alan, ‘Mick McGahey’, in Dictionary of Labour Biography, Vol XII, 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp242- 251, 250, edited by Gildart, Keith and Howell, David. 
1049 Marxism Today keenly suggested from McGahey’s actions at the 1986 Labour Party Conference that 
McGahey was moving away from his loyalty to Scargill, by his suggestion that the NUM should use the media 
more, and not put barriers in the way of Nottinghamshire’s realignment with the NUM. Interviewed himself one 
year later, however, McGahey predicted that Scargill would remain President of the union for many years. 
McIlroy and Campbell have taken the view that although there was a difference around tactic, McGahey sought 
the showdown with Thatcher before the 1984 strike that Scargill wanted, and the there was a general shared 
view between the two men; they note the lack of real evidence for the argument that McGahey sought to 
constrain Scargill in the strike. Perhaps a broader consideration of all these perspectives is most accurate, 
reflecting McGahey’s pragmatism, and the loyalty to his union, which superseded his political affiliation, to 
which he remained committed. See McIntyre, Donald, ‘Close Up on Mick McGahey’, Marxism Today, 
September 1986, and MacIntyre, Donald, ‘Flexibility at the Coalface: interview with Mick McGahey’, Marxism 
Today, July 1987 and McIlroy and Campbell, McGahey, op cit.  
180 
 
largely inconsequential as a political unit. Wage militancy from communists in the union, if 
that is what the party leadership thought was being applied, was received by the membership 
as trade unionists fighting for higher wages. This was probably the root cause of most 
incidences of communist-led ‘wage militancy’. Anybody in the union could (and did) push for 
better wages; that is why communists and even those from the Labour-centre could support 
each other in wage demands. The CP may have mistook this, perhaps because it suited their 
needs to do so, as evidence that wage militancy worked; hence they kept advocating it, even in 
the particular context of mining and its rapid contraction. The CP’s ability to travel in-step with 
non-communists in the union was also what allowed the CP to remain a credible presence in 
the union during the Cold War. Little had changed in this pattern by the time of the strike. So 
long as communists in the union fulfilled their union obligations, then the positioning of these 
men within their political party was largely academic to anybody outside the (increasingly) 
intense world of the CP itself.  
This chapter has analysed the positions of the CP within the NUM, particularly during 
the 1984 miners’ strike. Whilst the Eurocommunist position has previously been studied by 
Brotherstone and Parini, and more recently by Ackers, this chapter adds a contribution to 
knowledge because it considers these positions within the observations made so far. It makes 
a methodological contribution also, in the use of the Staniforth letter, which has not previously 
been analysed. Rather than exploring the strike itself, where little can be added, this chapter 
has used the events of 1984 and 1985 to punctuate and substantiate the general analysis of the 
CP in the NUM at this time, building on observations already made. 
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VIII Flying the Red Flag? 
8.0 Endgame 
For a party that liked to document everything, much material relating to its industrial 
interventions remains missing, if it ever existed in the first place. Writing this history of silence, 
drawing sound inferences and deductions from what is not there, is a challenge. The limitation 
of the thesis is that it has been compelled to understand what is not written. Whilst the sources 
are plentiful, the nuances of the relationship between the CP and members industry are not. 
Many of the conversations are likely to have been conducted informally, face-to-face or over 
the telephone; in short, undocumented and therefore inaccessible. Attempts to fill in this void 
through interviews has been equally problematic: as correspondence with other historians has 
proven, the difficulty with finding respondents is common, not least because old age and death 
has now curtailed the number of potential participants. In some ways, though, writing the 
history of what we do not know is itself significant as the silence and lack of documentation 
speaks volumes. Early on in its existence, the CP had realised that instructing its militants 
would not work, not least because they were more knowledgeable about the union they were 
working in than the CP itself was. 1050 This, of course, was perfectly rational: but, in terms of 
using an industrial strategy for the purpose of developing a marginal political party (which was 
the entire point of the CP’s endeavours), this early structure left the CP vulnerable to extracting 
little benefit from their efforts, even in unions like the NUM where the party was increasingly 
perceived to be ubiquitous. 
But, even with the assumption that much dialogue was undocumented, does this really 
explain the shortcomings of the CP’s industrial strategy, which this thesis has found? For the 
first three decades of the strategy, in the post-war period, there was little evaluation of the 
strategy. The strikes of the early 1970s failed to generate any tangible gain for the CP. The 
argument of those who saw no need to revise the party’s industrial strategy could always be 
sustained until such an explosion of militancy disproved the theory. But despite the arguments 
for change, by the 1980s the picture for the CP was no better. Throughout all of these years the 
Labour Party had been moving to the left, the most obvious sign being programmatic change 
(through the AES), and the sort of resolutions that affiliated unions supported. Reducing the 
industrial strategy back to its most over-arching objective, its need to build a forum through 
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which the CP could eventually engage with Labour in a significant capacity, was still not 
coming true. If there was no evidence of CP growth or benefit amongst the miners who were, 
for all the reasons we identified in chapter one, the party’s best bet, and who epitomised militant 
trade unionism throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, then a somewhat tentative and primitive 
deduction must be that, in other unions, the CP’s strategy was an overall failure.  Future work, 
therefore, may use the findings of this thesis as a hypothesis for further analysis in other unions. 
8.1 Wage militancy in the NUM 
The issue of wage militancy is a complex one. On the surface, the party’s industrial strategy 
appeared remarkably simple: capture the top of the union and simultaneously politicise the 
bottom, through the vehicle of wages. The fight for higher wages would always ensure that the 
people moving them would be popular; but the primary issue for most miners was the money 
that they took home and their support for higher wages did not reflect any profound evidence 
of politicisation. 1051 It is in some ways difficult to define how wage militancy operated in a 
practical context. The sorts of wage resolutions that communists moved at the NUM annual 
conference (often composited) were often supported by ‘moderates’: this suggests that these 
were legitimate wage increases that were being pursued. The original argument made here is 
that in relation to wage militancy, there was a difference between the CP’s theory and the way 
that communists applied it in the union. This, undoubtedly, reiterates the structural weakness 
of the party and communist trade unionist relationship. Although some of the rhetoric that went 
with wage claims was militant, even Gormley and the more moderate members of the union 
executive sometimes spoke in similar terms, as this work has demonstrated.  
But even if we did class the actions of communists inside the union as fitting into what 
might example the CP’s theory of wage militancy, the ultimate question still remains; so what? 
Because, as far as the party viewed it, the ultimate point of wage militancy was to further an 
industrial strategy that would materially help the CP. And, as has been discussed, this did not 
happen. If the NUM was the model union of communist industrial interventions, in the sense 
that wage militancy and the capturing of union positions worked, then two main consequences 
happened, neither of them good. The first was that the party did not tangibly benefit. It only 
benefitted superficially in the sense that it could present itself as ubiquitous during a brief 
period of militant triumph, but this did not help it as a political unit. Secondly, within the NUM, 
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the growth of the left eventually served to help destroy the union. The party’s strategy, believed 
to be have the best chance of success in the NUM, effectively destroyed its own laboratory.  
The complexities of wage militancy are compounded by the problems of the NUM and 
the fact that from the late 1950s it was an industry afflicted by and in fear of unemployment. 
But the CP did not appear to discuss or instruct party members in industry to an alternative 
strategy, or even to acknowledge that a contracting industry was a less than opportune time to 
press for pay increases. The party knew this, through Hughes’s pamphlet, for example. But the 
CP did not address these issues: if it had have done, they may have been able to change the 
ultimate outcome of the industrial strategy.  Mike Prior recognised this in 1975 and the 
following lengthy quote captures the argument perfectly: 
The basis of a revolutionary demand is to choose those demands which are simultaneously 
within the scope of capitalism to grant and which will raise most clearly the issues of 
exploitation within capitalism and the necessity of socialism. The problem of the present left 
strategy, to agitate for ever higher wages and the smashing of incomes policies, is precisely 
that it fails to meet these requirements, and that the failure is determined not by any lack of 
militancy or consciousness in the working class, but because the objective base of capitalism 
has changed to the extent that the strategy is not revolutionary but utopian. 1052 
But there was no sense that communists in the NUM, who shared this position politically, tried 
to alter the course of Scargill-led syndicalist in the union until the middle of 1984. 
8.2 Communist identities 
In 1973 the Labour Party dropped its ban on communists, something that the CP had 
consistently campaigned for, especially in the party’s earliest years. But, as far as I can see, 
there was no mass celebration of this in 1973; in fact, it was something of a non-event. The 
obvious question is, why? There are various possibilities and there is scope to investigate this 
in future work. The Labour Party’s 1973 decision may reflect the fact that the CP was no longer 
perceived to be a threat. As the television critics would demonstrate a few years later when the 
party publicised itself through its participation in Granada’s Decision documentary, the CP was 
so far removed from its once-held image of Soviet tyrant that it was mocked. 1053 The party’s 
new congenial image was not necessarily a good thing, as at least when it had been perceived 
as nefarious it had an identity. Now it had lost the very thing that made it unique and there was 
a plethora of new groups on the left. Acceptability, then, brought a lack of identity: the CP, 
                                                          
1052 Prior, Mike, ‘Inflation and Marxist Theory’, Marxist Today, April 1975.  Similar arguments were made by 
James Harvey in Marxism Today in 1977: see ‘Theories of Inflation’.  
1053 See Buckley, S.B. Division British Communism, op.cit., for more details.  
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rather than celebrating the achievement of a historical goal, should have seen 1973 as evidence 
that it was about to be further absorbed into the fringes of British political life. As Prior noted 
in 1978,  although the CP may have seen closer ties with the Labour Party as one step on the 
path to the eventual Labour/CP relationship, in fact that CP’s ‘influence, membership, and 
policy’ were in decline. 1054 Moreover there was a greater structural problem that Prior 
identified. The Labour Party had sustained working class support and although the CP was 
‘accepted up to a point in the trade union movement’, it remained external to the working class. 
This, if we recall chapter one, was exactly the same problem that had been identified around 
the time of the CP’s inception. 
8.3 Scargillism 
A further question that has arisen during this research, which could be a potential ground for 
future work, is around the question of what Scargillism was. Nicholas Haggers’s 1985 book 
scare-mongered that Scargillism was synonymous with the CP. I do not find this to be the case. 
Scargillism, even if not by intent or awareness, was more aligned with syndicalism. The extent 
to which this was the conscious pursuit of a strategy is dubious. When Scargill was explicitly 
asked in an interview if he advocated syndicalism, he appeared to attempt to avoid the question, 
but he did suggest that the ‘NUM could shape the direction of British politics’. 1055 The 
methodology of Scargill, outside of seeking to use politics to improve the NUM’s position, had 
a limited political dimension. 1056 As he wrote in 1980, the only thing that could have saved the 
mining industry when it started to contract was political action, through industrial action. 1057 
Collective bargaining, rather than the boardroom, was the key to getting the union’s demands 
met, believed Scargill. 1058  
Scargill’s ambiguous resignation from the YCL further demonstrates the sense of him 
as a ’free agent’; he realised that party support was not essential to progress in the NUM. In a 
sense this was not different to communists in the union, who had not needed the party’s 
assistance to secure their positions. What bound them to the party, unlike Scargill, was their 
personal conviction in the party’s politics. What also distinguished Scargill, however, was just 
how popular he was. He was able to secure 70.3 percent of the vote in the presidential election 
                                                          
1054 Prior, M, ‘Labour/Communist relations’, Marxism Today, February 1978. 
1055 Composite Teaching Themes Tape 8 Audio 155, SWML.  
1056 Although by 1987 it had moved to a critique of the CP’s apparent abandonment of class politics, which 
Scargill felt had been replaced by a ‘new realism’ and ‘Mondism’. See Scargill, A, New Realism: the politics of 
fear, 1987. 
1057 Scargill, A, and Khan, P, Industrial Democracy: the myth of workers’ control, 1980. 
1058 Scargill and Khan, Industrial Democracy, op.cit.. 
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for the NUM and he was also able to get communists to support him, most publicly through 
Miners in the Eighties. His popularity was not least because of the size of the Yorkshire area, 
which secured him a strong number of votes in the presidential election from the off. 1059 His 
character was undoubtedly also significant. Existing accounts indicate Scargill’s personality, 
his dominant persona being a mask for his innate shyness. 1060 But it was this popularity that 
allowed the left to win the presidency of the union. McGahey, the left’s first option, had been 
curtailed through Gormley’s strategic planning, designed to freeze out the left from the union’s 
top job. But as much as the left were willing to unite around Scargill, in order to build the left, 
ultimately Scargill’s actions in 1984 led to even the CP trying and failing to moderate his 
conduct. 1061 The only person who can fully answer this question is Scargill himself and, 
tracking back to the history of silence, he was unwilling to be interviewed as part of this 
research.  
8.4 Communists in the NUM: future research 
Both the CP and NUM were significant actors in British politics, and as such have remained 
important factors in British political history. Both bring with them methodological issues for 
historians. One of the earliest decisions that I needed to make was whether to analyse the NUM 
as a national organisation or if to look at regional dimensions. Taylor argues that scholars of 
mining often look for commonality unnecessarily when in fact there should be an acceptance 
of the diversity of the NUM.1062 I chose the first option as I feel that the breadth of studying 
the NUM nationally, rather than the depth of doing a more narrow case-study approach, was 
the best choice because it allowed a broader analysis of the CP’s efforts in the NUM. Perhaps 
this could be considered a limitation of this work; other students working on the NUM took a 
different approach and chose to compare areas of the union. 1063 Future work could use the 
findings here to compare communist activities in different regions of the miners’ union: 
Nottinghamshire, with Les Ellis and Joe Whelan as particular examples, is one area that could 
be developed. The infamous charge levelled at Nottinghamshire in 1984 was that the area was 
comprised of ‘scabs’, that it was inhibited by ‘Spencerism’. 1064This popular narrative ignores 
                                                          
1059 My interview with Francis, 2014. 
1060 Allen, for example, says this. 
1061 See Andrew, Christopher, The Authorised History of MI5, (London: Penguin, 2005). 
1062 Taylor, So Many Cases, op.cit.. 25. 
1063 Unpublished PhD thesis by Adrian Park, ‘A comparative study of community and militancy in two 
coalmining settlements in Britain,’ University of Kent at Canterbury and University of Rheims, 1999, 2. 
1064 David Amos argues that the reticence of the Nottingham area was not the result of the genesis of 1926, but a 
defence of the right of the union to preserve its federal nature, to protect the 1944 Rule Book; this adherence and 
respect for local mandates, and a sense that the strikes of 1969 and 1970 had been unconstitutional. Unpublished 
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the history of that area: Nottinghamshire participated in earlier strikes, and through NPLA the 
area accepted lower pay in the interests of the union. Moreover the election of Ellis and then 
Whelan adds another dimension to this traditional ‘scab’ narrative. 
In the course of this research, further gaps have been identified. As previously 
discussed, there is the possibility of using the findings here as a hypothesis for the CP’s work 
in other industries, and also comparing different areas of the NUM. Currently I am using some 
of the material from this thesis, the surveillance files of Horner during the Cold War, to explore 
how ‘private’ records of individuals drawn from these files creates historical characters, once 
they are released for public consumption. This, I hope, will become a publication and it is 
drawn from a conference participation in September 2014. There also exists the opportunity to 
analyse the interesting figure of Lawrence Daly. Despite there being an abundance of archival 
material about him, little exists about him, although he is a significant figure in British mining 
and labour history.  
8.5 Communist politics 
In 1979 Collins (who would leave the CP in 1983) posed a pertinent question in Comment, 
asking ‘why do people elect communists at work, but nowhere else’?1065 Collins mused over 
various possibilities, such as the fact that the party did not take full advantage of the potential 
to expand political theory, for example not standing candidates in the 1979 general election. 
But this was not a new question: even in 1950, when the CP lost both of its elected MPs, the 
problem existed. The potential answer to Collins’s question is not definitive but the evidence 
suggests that it is probably because of various factors. In the particular context of Britain and 
not Russia the CP, originally perceived to be subversive, was forced to compete with a Labour 
Party who already had a link with the working class. Voting for a communist trade unionist 
was not an endorsement for the party and communists were often good trade unionists who 
happened to be communists. Whilst these men were never secretive about their politics, there 
was never reason to boast of them either. Their communism was an article of faith, it perhaps 
guided them in their union duties, but their party never drove their union work.  
The CP could never have structured the situation differently, though. If it had have been 
dictatorial to its union members in industry, and pushed them to choose their party or their 
                                                          
PhD thesis by David Amos, ‘The Nottinghamshire Miners, the UDM and the 1984-1985 miners’ strike: scabs or 
scapegoats’, University of Nottingham, 2011. The thesis also provides a detailed regional study of this area. 
1065 Collins, Jack, ‘Strengths and Limits of Miners’ Muscle’, Comment, 23 June 1979. 
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union position, the CP knew which one would have won. The reason why people elected 
communists in the workplace but did not support the party was because they were not perceived 
as synonymous; we saw evidence of that position in chapter four. The difficulties that the CP 
faced was symptomatic of many other small, fringe parties in British politics, frozen out by the 
dominant two-party cartel. Perhaps the CP’s endeavours would have been better invested in 
pursuing some sort of electoral reform, rather than trying to influence a Labour Party that not 
only monopolised the working class, but was fifty percent of the very cartel that froze the CP 
out.  
8.6 Research questions and originality 
To conduct the first extended study that singularly focuses on the CP in the miners’ union in 
the post-war period. Methodologically, the thesis is original because it uses materials drawn 
from the CP’s own archive and the minutes of NUM meetings, combining them throughout the 
period 1945 to 1985, to explore the CP’s industrial strategy in the miners’ union. From this, it 
seeks to draw a broader hypothesis that could, in the future, be applied to other case studies: if 
the NUM was theoretically meant to be the CP’s best example of its industrial interventions, 
then what can our observations here suggest about the party’s industrial politics more 
generally? 
This thesis does not purport to have any detailed knowledge of the party’s interventions in other 
industries; but, if coalmining had a historic relationship with the CP and the strategy still failed, 
then the prospect for other industries appears less encouraging. It does not seem logical that 
the dynamics between the party and other unions was any different, indeed better or stronger.  
But an understanding of what was going on in these unions would be useful for future work. 
Any future work would have the advantage that the materials for the CP would be familiar to 
me. Whilst the constraints of a thesis dictated that there needed to be a case-study, of which 
the NUM was chosen for the reasons outlined in chapter one, it is easy to forget the broader 
context that the CP was trying to implement this strategy across various unions. Does the fact 
that the CP, a small and shrinking party, was attempting to run this strategy across various 
unions explain or even excuse the shortcomings of the industrial strategy that this thesis has 
identified? The fact that the party had kept itself so distant from the intricacies of each industry, 
even employing organisers like Watters where it was deemed necessary, suggests not. Rather 
than being hopelessly stretched cross various unions, which might suggest that the problems 
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with the strategy were logistical, the latitude that had been established between the party and 
communists in the union, explained in chapter one, was the big problem. 
To explore and analyse the dynamics and structure of the relationship between the party centre, 
party organisers, and party members across all levels of the union. It is well-documented in the 
existing literature that the link between the CP and trade unionists was weak, but how was the 
industrial strategy in the NUM conducted, if this was the case? Whilst the observations about 
the latitude of the relationship have been made generally, they have not been analysed in detail 
specifically in the miners’ union. 
As this thesis has argued, this question can be loosely answered as one of latitude and 
autonomy, with local initiative generally having primacy over central party direction; this 
somewhat naïve approach allowed the ETU debacle to occur in 1961. 1066 But the ETU did not 
cause the party to challenge this dynamic in the NUM. There was an enduring insularity 
between party members in industry and those who were only in the party, with the first being 
focused on their workplace. 1067 This observation is not original but how it impacted in the 
NUM, specifically, is. The particular context of the miners’ union, explained in chapter one, 
made the CP’s strategy more exposed to problems. 
Across the three national miners’ strikes that this thesis covers, there is a lack of 
political direction from the party evident across all examples. Although the CP had established 
itself on the basis that it would not instruct union officials (after all, they were the experts in 
each industry), this immediately set the party up with problems. If, as it theorised, its industrial 
strategy would succeed by politicising the rank and file of the unions and getting its members 
elected to union leadership positions, then if the party could not instruct these officials, what 
was it doing? It appears that it may have felt that simply having committed communists in the 
union would be sufficient; and, as the number of them on the NUM executive grew, so too did 
the party’s belief in the façade that its strategy was working as it had believed.  
But the CP also sometimes made poor choices, both consciously and unconsciously; 
for example, sending a non-miner to organise the Yorkshire area before Watters but also, 
perhaps more controversially and less consciously, allowing and even helping Scargill to lead 
communists in the NUM into a syndicalist strategy. Both of these examples, with varying 
                                                          
1066 Graham Stevenson, who I interviewed in May 2014, confirms this. There are clear methodological issues 
with relying on Stevenson but he is confirming what the bulk of the other evidence suggests, in this particular 
context. 
1067 Ibid. 
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degrees of severity and consequence, were made possible by the initial structure that the party 
constructed its strategy around. This problem was compounded by the fact that, as we saw in 
chapter one, the foundations of all this were based on an example that had worked in the 
particular context of Russia.  
To analyse the concept of conflict, broader than the well-known CP divides, most addressed 
by Thompson and Andrews. By the nature of the fact that there is not yet an extended study on 
the CP within the NUM, the existing literature does not consider the contours of these intricate 
relationships. Did conflict occur between the three main groups listed above (namely, the party 
centre, party organisers, and party members across all levels of the union) and, if so, how? 
Moreover, how did the CP deal with instances of conflict? 
In some ways this question is linked to the above, for an analysis of conflict invariably 
encourages an examination of the protagonists in conflict. There is clear evidence of this and 
it is not something that has been covered to a detailed extent in the existing literature. Aside 
from the most notable ‘conflict’ thesis, Fishman’s, the skirmishes lower down the party 
hierarchy, and particularly between communists in different areas of the union, remain under-
researched. This thesis has intended to fill this gap. The catalysts for these conflicts varied. In 
the Armthorpe strike of 1955, explored in chapter four, there is a clear issue arising from 
permitted autonomy, not least because the party’s own organiser in that coalfield found out 
about the event second-hand. Interestingly in the Armthorpe example, although the event was 
punctuated by conflict between the left at the time, it was viewed as a victory and it became 
emblematic of a heroic class battle. But the Armthorpe example also demonstrates that, should 
communists in the NUM offend the miners’ executive, they may risk punishment from what 
was, universally, valued as the primary loyalty; the union. 1068 Yet the CP seemed impotent to 
address these fundamental structural strategic issues, and so they were never rectified; by the 
1980s, it is not illogical to assume that these issues were more entrenched. In the context of 
Thatcherism the picture was bleak and it was the wrong time for the party to be re-analysing a 
strategy that had been demonstratively flawed, arguably since its inception. The fact that 
members of the CP and NUM could get into conflict was in some ways consequential of the 
engrained federalism of the union; but also compounded, to a large extent, but the party’s 
industrial structure.  
                                                          
1068 Horner also found this out in 1948, of course. 
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To conduct a thorough exploration of the role of wage militancy within the NUM. Although 
this has been discussed in the existing literature, mostly by Callaghan, there is scope to focus 
particularly on wage militancy in NUM throughout this extended period, by using a 
combination of NUM annual conference minutes and the CP’s archives. In this sense, there is 
scope to investigate if it is ever truly possible to measure and understand a complex concept 
such as wage militancy; was the concept of wage militancy understood and applied differently 
by the three groups that I mention above and, if so, how was it addressed and what was its 
implications for the CP’s industrial strategy?  
The general argument in the existing literature is that communists did better at the top of the 
union; their success was more quantifiable and obvious. It is much harder to measure the 
success of the CP’s strategy at the bottom of the union. Its strategy at the bottom of the union 
was to politicise the rank and file, the main way being through wage militancy. The greatest 
problem with ‘wage militancy’ in the NUM was not that militant action around wages did not 
exist, as it clearly did; but that it was not being used in the way the CP hoped. As such, it did 
not have the fundamental consequence that the party willed it to have; for the CP, wage 
militancy was a tool through which to politicise. But for communists in the NUM, wage 
militancy was primarily a means to secure better pay and conditions, a belief that their politics 
instilled in them. It was not exclusive to the CP, nor was it exclusive even to the left, as 
numerous examples in this thesis have demonstrated. A fight for higher pay would always be 
popular. 1069  
Had wage militancy been applied as the party thought, then given the high presence of 
communists in the union there would have been some evidence of politicisation for the party. 
There was a strong political stroke to the militancy of the late 1960s and 1970s; but this was a 
spontaneous, worker-led reaction to an increasingly draconian set of government legislation, 
as opposed to a consequence of the industrial strategy of the CP. 1070 So too could strikes over 
jobs have political overtones, but this was something that the CP did not formally add into their 
industrial strategy, with wage militancy and the protection of free collective bargaining 
                                                          
1069 Rather ambiguously Graham Stevenson, when asked what did the CP believe that wage militancy would 
achieve, replied that ‘workers fought to maintain their share of the wealth and communists helped them to 
achieve this’ and added that ‘any focus on wages declined from the control of Britain’s markets and not some 
plan’. Was this a deliberate omission that wages were even intended to be utilised for a political end? Possibly, 
given Stevenson’s position. But did it also, genuinely, mean that communism acted as an article of faith to push 
for better pay; this being the job of trade unionists. That point is also evidenced elsewhere in the thesis. My 
interview with Graham Stevenson, May 2014.  
1070 As Emlyn Williams noted, before 1972 ‘miners were in the gutter, they were ready to come out’. Interview 
with Emlyn Williams, AUD 33 and AUD 55, SWML, U/D. 
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remaining the CP’s only written instruction for its 1981 ‘Needs of the Hour’. As Paynter 
pointed out, interviewed around the same period, ‘men would stand against pit closures, not so 
pronounced on wages’. 1071  
Moreover even if we move the ‘militancy’ away from wages, communists in the union 
did not always act militantly. The Oxford English Dictionary defines militancy as ‘favouring 
confrontational or violent methods in support of a political or social cause’. 1072 There are 
numerous examples of where communists in the union stepped away from confrontation, 
especially when it was in the interests of the union; this was apparent across the entire date 
period of this thesis. Communists in the NUM diligently and laboriously helped to move the 
union to the left, so that their members would benefit. Their politics instilled in them an often 
zealous passion that this was necessary. But this did not mean that they prioritised their political 
conviction over union vocation.  
So, what could, or should, the party have done differently? That question, I feel, remains 
unanswerable, although there are suggestions. Perhaps the CP should have nurtured the link 
between the party and the union better; it should have developed the strategy as the context 
changed; it should have understood the issues with wage militancy earlier than some in the CP 
did are all legitimate suggestions. But these ideas are also in some ways utopian for, as George 
Rees pointed out, there is a ‘very fine line between militancy and anarchy’; sensibly, the party 
had long since abandoned the revolutionary struggle. 1073 The failings of the CP’s industrial 
strategy can be seen as a microcosm for the failure of the party generally, and the British far-
left, whose fate was finalised by the Thatcher Government and its legacy. Certainly in today’s 
(often transient) service economy the need for any type of industrial strategy is obsolete, at 
least insofar as the how the CP thought of it.  
What can the findings of this thesis add to today’s politics and why are they relevant? 
The problems that the CP faced demonstrate the enduring problem of the left in Britain. The 
Green Party today uses the electoral system and as such it has secured one MP to parliament; 
but on the right, UKIP have two. We are on the eve of a General Election, and how this may 
change is yet to be made apparent. Perhaps the problems that the CP faced demonstrate that 
the left today should focus on securing some sort of structural change to the system, perhaps 
through some sort of pursuit of proportional representation. The study of the past helps avoid 
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the mistakes of the future, which is in some ways the traditional defence of those who have to 
justify their passion for history.  A post-mortem on the skeleton of British communism 
evidences one failed attempt to make a more equitable society. In light of all of this, it is 
understandable to see why the three old ladies that we met at the beginning of the thesis sat 
discussing the whimsical prospects for an opportunity long since passed.  
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